THE KASHMIR SAGA

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woeful tale in Sialkot — a city in Pakistan. All these happenings were taking place in full view of the Indian Army which had by then entered the State. The responsibility of these killings squarely lay on the shoulders of Pandit jawahar Lal Nehru, then Prime Minister of India, who was duly informed about all this beforehand. It must be said, to the credit of Pandit Jawahar Lat Nehru, that he candidly admitted his responsibility. Sheikh Abdullah himself had taken over the administration of the State. Therefore, he also cannot be morally absolved of the responsibility of these heinous aimes ~mmitted on innocent women and children.

From the Province of Jammu, particularly from the districts of Jainmu, Icathua and Udhampur, no less than three laths of refugees poured into Pakistan, while large gatherings in Miran Sahib and Ranbir Singhpura (a Tehsil of Jammu District) camps were machine-gunned in cold blopd. Three laths of Muslims in these areas were supposed to have been annihilated. The rest took refuge in Pakistan. The way Pakistan treated them is a very well known stow. They are still the sacred trust of Pakistan. These helpless Jammu and Kashmir refugees still patiently - wait for return to their homeland. But is the day for their return any nearer now than It was when they entered the country of their refuge?

What had happened in Jammu had its natural repercussions in what is now And Kashniir, or those parts of Icashmir which, by that time, had been liberated. The atrocities committed by the Dogra troops in these parts of the State, and also by spying of the non-Muslims, had bred a feeling of hatred against the Sikhs and the Hindus in the minds of the Muslims. As soon as the news of the carnage of Muslims in Jammu reached these parts. the random killing of Hindus and Sikhs took place here too. In some places innocent women and children were subjected to maltreatment and the male population was murdered. There can be no justification for such actions. No retaliation on our part against innocent people here could make any difference to the lot of the Muslims who had been trapped in different parts of Kathua, Jammu anti Udhampur districts. On the other hand, if we could treat the Hindu population better, our fight for freedom would have

risen much higher in the eyes of future historians. As it was, it seemed humanly impossible for any agency to control these things.

What our tribal brethren did on their way to Srinagar has been exaggerated by the other side. An exaggerated and untrue propaganda is made by Indian Press and Radio. I leave it to the future historians to bring to light the true facts. Nonetheless, I have no hesitation in saying that what happened in Muzaffarabad on or about the 22nd, 23rd and 24th of October, 1947, was bad enough, and I saw the whole thing with my own eyes. There could not have been any justification for a killing of that sort. The fault does not at all lie with the tribal fighters; and the whole blame goes to those who were leading them.

The And Kashmir Government had numerous difficulties, but it certainly did its best to organize camps for the non-Muslims. Some of the camps existed for 3 to 4 years. One camp at Muzaffarabad existed as late as 1950-1951. Those people who have since been evacuated to India, will bear testimony to the fact that, under all circumstances, we did our best for them. In the beginning what we could do was not, very effective. I quote only one instance to explain this. During the month of November, 1947,1 went to Mirpur to see things there for myself. I visited, during the night, one Hindu refugee camp at Ali Baig

-about 15 miles from Mirpur proper. Among the refugees I found some of my fellow lawyers in a pathetic condition. I saw them myself, sympathised with them and solemnly promised that they would be rescued and sent to Pakistan, from where they would eventually be sent out to India. In Azad Kashmir no big refugee camps could be maintained because of obvious difficulties. Alter a couple of days, when I visited the camp again to do my bit for them, I was greatly shocked to learn that all those people whom I had seen on the last occasion had been disposed of. I can only say that nothing in my life pained my conscience so much as did this-incident. The shame and horror of it, has never left my mind. What those friends would have thought of me. Those who were in charge of those camps were øuly dealt with but that certainly is no compensation to those whose near and dear ones were killed.

Chapter V

THE BACKGROUND OF

AZAD KASHMIR MOVEMENT

THE Budget Session of Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly for the year 1947 was held in March-April. This was the first Session of the Assembly in which I participated, after being elected a member of the State Assembly in January, 1947. This being the Budget Session, it was, as usual, a very busy one.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, it fell upon me to bring together all Mussalman M.L.As into one Muslim Conference group in the Assembly from different parts of the State, but there were others who, though not elected on the Muslim Conference ticket, did believe in the Muslim Conference ideology. They willingly Joined the Muslim Conference group.

During this Session speeches were made in the Assembly, expressing the apprehension about the activities of the l’raja Parishad Party and the RSSS in the State. It was clearly pointed out by the writer that a semi-military organisation was being built up in certain parts of the State, with the intention of killing the Mussalmans. This apprehension was converted into a reality in lJdhampur, Jammu and Kathua. It was also very clearly pointed out, during these speeches, that the Dogra Army was resorting to high-handedness in the districts of Poonch and Mirpur. These speeches, of course, were noted down, but no action was ever taken on them.

During the month of April, 1947, Maharaja Han Singh toured the State frontier areas of Manawar, Bhimber, Mirpur, Kotli, Poonch, Rawalakot and Nowshera. Like Pandit Nehru on his tour of the North-West Frontier Province the previous October, the Maharaja saw that almost all Mussalmans were in

favour of Pakistan. He was specially impressed and alarmed by a great gathering of about forty thousand men, almost all ex-servicemen of the British Army from Sudhnuttj and Bagh Tebsjl of Poonch, assembled to greet him on April 21,1947 at Rawalpindi.

During this tour the Maharaja gave clear instructions to his non-Muslim officers to aid the Hindu and Sikh population wherever it was possible to do so. Later on the Maharaja ordered more troops into these western districts of Jammu Province. A Mirpur-Poonch Brigade had been formed with headquarters at Nowshera, and in the summer of 1947, another separate Brigade composed purely of non-Muslim troops, Dogra-Hindus, Gurkhas and Sikhs. was formed as Poonch Brigade Garrison which had hitherto been kept in the main centres, were to be in all small towns, central villages, and at bridges and ferries and other key-points.

After the March-April Assembly Session had ended at Jammu, the writer visited his own constituency of Poonch and, particularly, Sudhnutfi and Bagh Tehsils. These two Tehsils of Bagh and Sudhnuttj bordered on Pakistan from end to end. I genuinely warned the people on way from Jammu to Poonch of the coming ominous events. I had thoroughly realized by this time that a conspiracy had already been hatched and the RSSS and Dogra troops, in cooperation with each other, were going to be a part of that conspiracy. I, therefore, urged the people to get organised politically. In my private meetings I disclosed to the people the dangers that lay ahead of them. I told them that they may be completely annihilated by the Dogra troops after being rounded up. I asked them to get prepared militarily to meet effectively such a danger. In order to give people courage I made very strong speeches. These speeches produced the necessary effect, and people generally got courage, became defiant, and started organising themselves exactly on military lines. These preparations remained secret throughout, though the Hindu population of this area got alarmed by my speeches and sent irresponsible telegrams to the Maharajas Government. in the meantime, while I was still at Rawalakot, one night some wandering people appeared in the villages of Rawalakot area from the Punjab. This alarmed the

l)ogm troops stationed them. The Commander of these troops, in desperation, attacked some of these villages in order to arrest those people. During this incident Dogra troops arrested and beat innocent Mussalmans, and molested women in a village very near to Rawalakot town, The next day I called a very big meeting of the whole area, and twenty thousand people collected to hear my speech which I delivered in most ‘seditious terms. I emphasizej upon the people that Pakistan

— a Muslim State- was going to be established along the border of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and in any case the Mussalmans of Jammu and Kashmir cannot remain unaffected by this great event. They, therefore, should take courage and meet all insults from the Dogra troops with courage. From that day a strange atmosphere took the place of the usually peaceful life in these parts.

After this speech I had a long meeting with the Wazir of Poonch at his request. The Wazir of Poonch told me, during this meetings, that he had no power to deal with mailers which affected the Army. He only pronthed to send the whole case of Rawalakot to the higher authorities He, nevertheless promised that he wouJd obtain the dismissal of the Subedar who led the army contingent into the village for this raid.

I then left for Srinagar with my famUy. As soon as I reached Srinagar, I contacted all the Government agencies with regard to the situation obtaining in Poonch but everybody seemed to think that whatever was happening in Poonch was my own creation. A restrictive order was served on me towards the end of June, 1947, and warrants of arrest were issued on August 20, 1947. Before those warrants could be executed I escaped to Pakistan.

Pakistan was declared to have come into being on 14th of August, 1947, and eversin~ the whole atmosphere changed in the State. On August 15, 1947, Srinagar, the centre of all activities, gave ample proof of its being pro-Pakistan. Processions and meetings were arranged in all parts of Srinagar. Pakistan flags were flying over at least fifty per cent of the buildings and houses. All house-beat owners were flying the Pakistan flags and the Jhelum river presented a fortifying

sight. Though Sheikh Abdullahs party was yet indecisive on the issue of Pakistan, this pro-Pakistan demonstration obviously made them extremely uncomfortable. Forced by events and suddenly changing circumstances, even Sheikh Abdullah’s party men were forced to speak in favour of Pakistan, because the public in general leaned in that direction. As a matter of fact some people were so sanguine as to believe that, as soon as Sheikh Abdullah came out of prison he himself would declare accession of the State to Pakistan.

The majority of the Muslim Conference leaders were in jail. Those who were outside were not united internally though they were all agreed on the issue of Pakistan. The masses were ready for a furious drive in favour of Pakistan but Muslim Conference leadership was not at all equal to the task.

Agha Shaukat Au, the then General Secretary of the Muslim Conference, was on parole for a fortnight from Srinagar Jail. He went round to meet some of the Pakistani friends whose advice we needed ever so much. The task was really very big and any good advice from the Muslim League leaders was not available. None of us was so ripe in experience as to clearly visualize the implications of Pakistan and natural repercussions of it on State politics. We did not want to bungle the situation by taking risks or unnecessarily precipitating the mauer. Some of the Muslim League leaders, who visited Srinagar in those days, contacted the Nationalist leaders instead of Muslim Conference leaders. Somehow, Muslim League leaders were impressed that Sheikh Abdullahs organisation was comparatively much weaker in Srinagar and throughout the valley of Kashmir. As has been pointed out, there were a number of leaders in Sheikh Abdullahs party itself who believed in accession of the State to Pakistan as a natural consequence of the partition of India. Jammu Province and Poonch, however, were much better oragnised, so far as the Muslim Conference was concerned. These areas were absolutely decided on the Pakistan issue. In Poonch things moved very much quicker than one expected. Nothing could have possibly arrested the march of events there.

Assemblies of more than five persons were prohibited by an order of the District Magistrate at the end of July, 1947, but, in fact, t he control of Poonch had already passed to the State troops, who now had posts and pickets at all keypoints. The arms deposited by the Mussalmans with the police by the orders of the District Magistrate were handed over to the Military. They distributed these arms to local non-Muslims and to Sikhs, originally from Hazara, who moved during the summer into the Bagh area and Poonch itself, after being trained and organised in Muzaffarabad.

This alarmed the Mussalmans. They started taking whatever measures they could to defend their hearths and homes. In the villages, in August, 1947,.some leading men particutarly ex-Serviceman, began to collect money to buy arms from tribesmen of the former Frontier Province, because it had now become absolutely clear that only by force of arms could they remove the Maharajas oppressive army occupation and save their own lives. There were others who crossed to Pakistan to escape arrest or to leave their families at a place where they could live safely and honourably while they themselves could take up the fight against the Dogra Maharaja.

During these days a very big meeting of Mussalmans was held in front of the mosque at 1-lajira, Poonch. It was addressed by Muslim preachers and also by a local Sikh, Khazan Sing of Arunka, who declared that, the State being overwhelmingly Muslim should join Pakistan and that the Muslim authorities should treat the Sikh and Hindu minorities fairly as they wished to remain in their homes in harmony with their Muslim neighbours. In this meeting they passed resolutions asking for a responsible Government right of free assembly, release of political prisoners, accession to Pakistan and abolition of all recently imposed taxes by the Central Government at Srinagar.

A tolumn of troops was sent from Poonth via Hajira to march through Rawalakot to Bagh where stronger agitation was in progress. To protect their friends of the Bagh area, who sent messengers asking that the ftoops should be held up, the

villager of lChai Gala attempted to block the road and prevent their passage to Rawalakot. They had no arms, only woodmans axes, which every man carries in these hills, but the Dogra troops fired on them and killed three and wounded many more before they cleared the trees and boulders blocking the road and marched through.

There were a number of clashes between the Muslim exServicemen of Poonch and the Maharajas Hindu troops. Captain Baiwant Sing, in charge of the Dogra troops at Bagh, agreed that the Muslim demand for accession to Pakistan was legitimate. lie sent a Muslim official of the State to pacify the crowd, which eventually held a meeting and camped outside Bagh. Next day, however, there was more trouble and fighting broke out when the Dogra pickets around Bagh opened up with rifles and bren-guns on the Muslim crowd encamped below, causing heavy casualties.

Dogra troops sent out their patrols to the neighbouring Muslim villages. One patrol was sent to surround a nearby village, the centre of agitation against the Dogras and the Muslim villagers were threatened with extinction if they did not deliver up the local Muslim Conference leader, Khadim 1-lassain Shah. To save them he surrendered himself and was taken to Bagh. Before they killed him, the Dogra officer asked him what he wanted. He replied~ ‘Freedom and Pakistan”. On this he was bayoneted through his chest!

Reinforcements continued to arrive from Poonch through Rawalakot. Pandit Ramchandra Raina, a decent Kashmiri Hindu, who was a revenue officer in Poonch, was sent to tour the troubled areas to seize weapons and to pacify the people. But the civil officials were now powerless. Poonch had, since July, been given up to the unrestrained control of the non-Muslim occupying forces, who received secret orders from the Maharaja and his Dogra chiefs. There were, however, some Hindu civilian officers, who positively encouraged the Dogra troops to stamp out the popular movement and clear the country of all the inhabitants who demanded self-government and Pakistan.

Immediately after the Bagh firing, columns of troops, accompanied by bands of armed Sikhs and civilian Hindus aided by non-Muslim villagers, were sent out through the country-side to search and plunder villages in a most merciless and random fashion. In most cases the unarmed Muslim male villagers abandoned their villages when the troops and armed bands approached, remaining bidden in the nearby forest till they had passed. The civilian armed bands and local non-Muslim villagers assisted the police and army in their loot and arson. Women were raped mercilessly. The writer was told of an incident where a girl of thirteen was raped by ten soldiers and she ultimately died of this.

It was then so clear to all of us that the Maharaja was bent on joining India in total disregard of the wishes of eighty per cent of his people and that resistance to his plan of accession to India would be ruthlessly crushed. This meant the expulsion from their homes or the slaughter of a million Muslims living in a broad belt of territory along Pakistan borders, from Muzaffarabad to Kathua.

One of the best commentaries on the Pakistan Movement in Poonch is that of Sheikh Abdullah himself. As reported by the Associated Press of India, under the date-line. New Delhi, October 21, 1947. Sheikh Abdullah said: ‘That the present troubles in Poonch, a feudatory of

Kashmir, were because of the policy adopted by the State. The people of Poonch who suffered under the local ruler, and again under the Kashmir Durbar, who was the overlord of the Poonch ruler, had started a peoples movement for the redress of their grievances. It was not communal.

The Kashmir State sent their troops and there was pank in Poonch. But most of the adult population in Poonch were ex-Servicemen of the Indian Army, who had close connection with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children, crossed the frontier and returned with arms supplied to them by

willing people. The Kashmir State Forces were thus forced

to withdraw from certain areas.

The story of this rising has been described by a Hindu leader of Kashmir, Pandit Prem Nath Baiaz, in the following words, in Poonch, where thousands of demobilised Muslim

veterans ol’ the Second World War live, an open armed rebellion broke out against the Maharaja and his new administration. The rebellion spread rapidly to the adjoining areas of Mirpur where, also, war veterans lived in large numbers. Instead of realising what he had done, Maharaja Hari Singh egged on by Congress leaders and the new Counsellors, despatched the whole of the Dogra army to quell the disturbance, or, as one Rajput colonel puts it, to re-conquer the area’. The Army perpetrated unheard-of atrocities on the people of Poonch; whole villages were burnt down and innocent people massacre& Report reaching Srinagar were not allowed to be published in the press, and no official reports were issued to allay the fears of the public. This happened in September and the tribesmen did not enter the State before the 23rd of October, 1947

In Srinagar itself the Dogra Government became more and more insecure because of the events in Poonch. Larger contingents of troops were sent from Srinagar. As the information of the movement of troops reached us we became more nervous, and, it was only too evident that the whole of the State appeared to be ready for a large-scale disaster. Somehow the State authorities came to be quite convinced, probably on the basis of good evidence, that I was wholly responsible for the events in Poonch. On one occasion Thakar Janak Sing, the then Prime Minister, during an interview, pointed this out very clearly to a deputation which met him to discuss the events in Poonch. I was a member of this deputation. Even at this stage I gave him the solemn guarantee of complete peace and order in Poonch, provided all troops were withdrawn and Poonch district was left functioning under normal civil administration. This seemed to him a very intriguing advice.

I was served with an order by the Government through their Chief Secretary, not to leave Srinagar under any circumstance. If I remained in Srinagar the Government will have no objection. My entry into Poonch was in any case, considered undesirable. Warrants for my arrest were placed with the border authorities in Kohala, Banihal and 1-laji Fir Pass. In the meantime, information about the events in Poonch reached me daily. Every new day brought a more urgent and fervent appeal from the people of that district to do something about the matters. Poonch being my constituency, my moral and other responsibilities were so great that I eventually did gather the courage to do what I actually did and came to the timely rescue of an otherwise lost but brave people.

On or about the 20th August, 1947, 1 and Agha Shaukat Ali, the General Secretary of the Muslim Conference went to meet some of our Pakistani friends and advisers. We were looking for solid advice and reliable information on all matters that confronted us. These Pakistani gentleman were holidaying

-
Culmarg. They were in possession of solid facts and gave us good advice. The next meeting was held at the house of the late Dr. Mohammad Din Tasir in Srinagar

We had a long meeting with these gentlemen and discussed with them the existing state of affairs in Kashmir. We appraised them of the conditions existing in Poonch. These gentlemen were of the opinion that, unless there was some counter preparation, there was a genuine apprehension of Mussalmans being exposed to the danger of complete annihilation. They had come to this conclusion, in all probability, on the basis if some information that they had in their possession and their views were confirmed by the facts that were placed before them. It was with these gentlemen that we had another meeting in Srinagar at the house of late Dr. M.D. Tasir. It was suggested in this meeting, that if I had to get arrested at all, it must be done in Rawalakot, my home place, where easily twenty to thirty thousand people would have followed me into the jail, making the situation extremely difficult for the Government. The Wazir of Poonch had informed Srinagar authorities that my entry into Poonch would

not be desirable and my arrest anywhere in that area would entail a major crisis for the Government.

During this meeting it was also decided that, in the meantime, I should leave immediately for Pakistan, in order to re-enter Poonch to head the movement there. All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, sent me a letter of authority in Pakistan, which I produce below SRINAGAR,

I7FH SEPTEMBER, 1947.

%{y dear Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, We have started the civil disobedience movement here, and I

have addressed a number of mass meetings. I may be arrested at any moment. Therefore, in consultation with the available members of the working committee, I am constrained to appoint you as my successor.. As such, you will be perfectly competent to receive and deliver goods on behalf of the Muslim Conference. You can negotiate with any party or organisation. and arrive at any understanding you deem fit and proper. The Muslim Conference will be bound by your acts and words. In my and my colleagues’ opinion, you are utterly worthy of the trust reposed in you. I hope and trust you will, as usual, discharge your heavy responsibilities with zeal and enthusiasm, and our community will surely profit by your able guidance. You will please appoint your successor whenever the prospect of your arrest arise.

May God bless you,

Yours sincerely,

(Sd) HAMIDULLAH KHAN,

Acting President,

All J & K Muslim Conference.

NB.-- It may please be noted that, as long as I am not arrested, you are, even now, quite competent to act on my behalf outside the State.

(Sd)- HAMJDULLAH KHAN.

I was to escape to Pakistan accompanied by Agha Shaukat Ali. A day for escape was also Fixed. This fact was to be kept

dead secret but somehow the Government Came to know all about it. The next day, early in the morning, before we could make the first move, Agha Shaukat Ali was re-arrested and ~ken back to jail. When Irtachaibs hou t 7 o’clockm the morning, it was being closely watched by the police and Agha Shaukat Ali had already been delivered to the jail authorities.

The moment I learnt about it, I decided to disappear, I did not attend the courts and spread the story through my clerks that I had gone to Islamabad for a day to attend a case. The police rushed to Islamabad as foolishly as they did so many other things. The whole day I kept away from my house because, then was a twenty-four hour watch on my movements. Today it seems like a miracle that all arrangements for my escape from Srinagar were complete by the end of that day. Two persons were responsible for this arrangement. One was Sultan Hasan Ali Khan of Boi District Hazara and the other Raja Abdul Hamid Khan of Muzaffarabad, one of my colleagues.

I would like to mention here a small incident. Before my escape, we had a meeting at Dr. M.D. Tasir’s place. Dr. Tasir, who had a real sense of humour, suggested quite seriously that I should escape wearing a ‘Burqa’. This suggestion I at once turned down. It would be a disgrace if l was caught by the police in a burqa. Owing to the fact that such suggestion was put forward, the rumour, somehow, got around that I actually escaped in a burqa. Dr. Tasir himself, in an article which he published in 1948, contradicted this.

The day I escaped from Srinagar, my little son, Javed, was running a high temperature. One of our friends, Dr. Noor Hussain, volunteered to look after him. I told my very credulous and simple wife that I was going to Lahore and would be back soon. The same friends who were responsible for my escape, also arranged for accommodation in a house-boat for my last night in Srinagar.

In the morning of August 25, 1947 while Srinagar Police looked for me in a dreary drizzle, I reached Domel

(Muzaffarabad) without any incident. The journey from. Srinagar to Abbottabad was without an incident of any kind. I learnt later on that a warrant of arrest was lying with the Customs Officer at Domel. There was no search of my taxi. In my taxi there happened to be two vagabond-friends of the taxi driver, who were running away from Srinagar courts. Though I had paid for the whole taxi, they made themselves comfortable in it by the courtesy of the taxi driver. On reaching the other side of the border, I was told that they were running away from the Police. I did not, however, tell them that I was myself travelling for a similar reason.

While in Abbottabad I learned to my grief and extreme sorrow that in Tehsil headquarters of Bagh the Dogra Army had opened fire on a crowd of ten thousand people. This certainly was a declaration of war on the people and left no doubt in my mind that people of Poo~pch were faced with a major catastrophe. Unless some outside help reached them in good time their life and security were exposed to grave risk.

Sitting in my hotel in Abbottabad, I wrote not less than one hundred chits in my own hand to different people in Poonch area. In these I asked the people not to lose courage and to prepare to defend their homes at every cost. In these chits I conveyed to them that I was busy trying to get them the necessary arms, though at that moment I did not have the slightest idea as to what I could do for them in concrete form. There was, however, a strong belief in my mind of solid help either coming from the Government or the people of Pakistan. These chits, it seems, did reach their destinations safely, though the Dogra security arrangements were fairly stiff. When, in the mad fury of a mob, in the chaos of thought and action, people paused and took stock of what they had, they found that they had very little.

In the meantime the Dogra Government issued orders to the following effect:

(a) Confiscation of all arms;

(b)
Clearing of Pakistan Border areas;

(d)
Poonch and Mirpur districts to be placed under Martial Law.

Against this background, I reached Lahore on 28 August, 1947. On the Lahore Railway Station, complete chaos prevailed. I paid Rs. 15 to get a tonga to reach my hotel in Anarkali. Normally, it should have cost me a rupee. I carried letters for Mian Amir-ud-Din, who was the Mayor of Lahore at that time. Through the good offices of this gentleman, I tried for a meeting with the Quaid-e-Azam, who was then the Governor-General of Pakistan, in order to place before him the Kashmir case. The Quaid-e-Azam himself did not wish to meet me because he did not desire, in any manner whatever, to be associated with anything that was happening in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at that moment. Accompanied by another friend, Mr. B A. Hashmi, a friend of the Srinagar meeting, I approached Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the Central Minister of Refugee and Rehabilitation, with the object of arranging a meeting with Quaid-e-Azam. Raja Chazanfar Mi Khan failed to contact the Quaid-e-Azam. As a matter of fact the whole atmosphere was so uncertain and everybody felt so awkward to approach the Quaid-e-Azam that no one possessed enough courage to draw the attention of the Pakistan’s Governor-General to Kashmir affairs and save so many Mussalmans from disaster. Pakistan herself was most tragically gripped by the problem of the influx of refugees. Complete chaos seemed to take possession of everything. Most well-wishers of Pakistan doubted if Pakistan could exist another couple of months.

For a full period of one week I went round seeing the people in Lahore. Every dawn brought mc new disappointments. There was not a ray or glimmer of hope. There was hardly any Newspaper editor whom I did not meet. The Press were quite prepared to do their best, and, in fact, they did their best as the movement actually started But nothing disappointed me more than the streets of Lahore. The sun rose dyer Lahore and went down with the same mechanical precision. Every hour, every day for me in Lahore was the greatest agony a human being could possibly undergo.

I was completely disappointed, tired and exhausted. All avenues of hope had been explored, and I was thoroughly dismayed with everything—people, streets, tongas, other noises and limitless thoughts. The noises of Lahore seemed such an unreal drudgery. People seemed so selfish. Could not they possibly realise that all business and trade was useless? Could not they visulaize that a whole nation was faced with the threat of virtual annihilation? All these thoughts rose and fell like waves pf the sea in my mind who had no second person to share the secjtts of his mind.

I decided to pack and return to the scene of the tragedy. Keenly conscious of the great duty which nature had so suddenly and prematurely called me to perform, equally conscious of my failings and limitations, something still worked within my mind like a volcano. With all the disappointments and failures lodged in my heart, I wanted to see, before leaving Lahore, the Editor of the Pakistan Times—a daily of Lahore. I started for the office of that paper while my bedding was being packed in my hotel. As I was passing the Nila Gumbad’ area a car stopped near my tonga. and a gentleman asked me to come down from the tonga and get into the car. I accompanied him to Model Town, where he was going to see the bungalows of his Hindu friends just to make sure that they were safe. The journey from that point in the city right down to Model Town and back, could have taken hardly an hour or so. Within this short time I was able to convince my friend of the impending tragedy of the people of Kashmir. I did not really believe that he could do much. But I would have told this story to anyone who had lent me a sympathetic ear. This friend, strangely enough, promised to do his best but he insisted that he should make sure about things for himself. He, therefore, proposed to proceed to Srinagar. To any proposal which could help the cause in any manner I could have no objection. I told him that I was proceeding to Murree where he could always contact me if he so desired.

It seemed that he did consult quite a number of people before arriving at a definite decision. From Murree he collected his wife and went to Srinagar with the pretext of his wife’s

diagnosis about some disease. After remaining in Srinagar for about a week or so he came back to Murree to have a conference with me. To my entire satisfaction and relief, he agreed with me on all points. He realised the urgency of the matter and also the risks Mussalmans were exposed to if no outside assistance was extended to them in good time. I really do not wish to go into details of what happened after that but I must admit that this gentleman did his best with deep sincerity and honesty of purpose. He did his utmost to advance the cause of the movement which, later on, came to be known as the And Icashmir Movement. This gentleman was no other person than Mian iftikharuddin of Lahore, a great leader in his own right. He died in 1960 or so. The echo of this movement rose out of the high hills of Kashmir and rang round the world and is by no means finished yet. The gentleman mentioned gave up his association with the movement when he accepted a Ministry in the Punjab.

Chapter VI

BEGINNING OF AZAD KASHMIR

MOVEMENT

I stayed in Murree and made it my base, if one may borrow an army expression, where some sympathisers loaned a number of rooms in a hotel. In that hotel much was said during the dark hours of night and nothing was done or said during the long hours of the day. The Punjab Police, Intelligencc Department, though quite vigilant, probably did not know much about the whole thing. For the work which I had undertaken Murree was a very convenient and congenial place. One could have all the information from Srinagar every day and also easily contact Muzaffarabad, Poonch and Mirpur. From Murree one could easily establish contacts with people in Poonch along the Jhelum River during the night. During the day Dogra Army soldier regularly patrolled all the possible routes of communication.

Not quite single handed, I took the decision to resort to arms in defence of our lives, honour and property, and to prepare the people for it. Before taking this most crucial decision, I did not consult my colleagues, because I did not have the opportunity to do so. The decision was not taken just overnight. I collected some sympathetic army officers of the State before whom I placed the whole situation. These officers, at great risk to themselves and other advisers, calculated all the pros and cons of the whole matter. A number of conferences were held. Maps were studied and all other possible loop-holes were foreseen. By the advice of these really great friends we were able to chalk out a scheme by which Mussalmans could be saved and an effective resistance could be put up to Dogm troops and their satellite, the RSSS. Here I must mention that the question of tribal people coming to our assistance was neither

visualised nor contemplated at this stage of planning. On the other hand, when I got the information that tribesmen were prepared to come to our assistance, it was a pleasant surprise to me.

After making the difficult decision to resort to arms we got busy with the collection of weapons of all sorts. A secret collection of Muzzle Loaders was started, and with these Muzzle Loaders we collected gun-powder and lead from all over the I’unjàb. A small factory was started in village Basian in the Tehsil of Murree, where lead was converted into bullets. During October nights, these things were transported across the Jhelum river. All arms that could be had in the district of Rawalpindi were collected. It had become easier now, because the story of the atrocities of Dogra troops had spread all over the Punjab and some of the refugees from Bagh had already crossed the

Jhelum river into Pakistan, where they were camping in the Tehsil of Murree. Even the burning of villages in Poonch could easily be seen from the high hill of Murree. About this time a strong protest was lodged by the Government of Pakistan with the Maharajas Government about the atrocities committed by the Dogra troops on Poonch Mussalmans.

In Murree I was able to mobilise, most effectively, public opinion in our favour. We were able to raise some funds which we sent to the Frontier Province for the purchase of ‘drawl or one shot rifles. This method, though it had a small beginning, made huge progress in due course of time. Very soon it became possible to find ways by which we could collect a large number of rifles. Before these rifles could be distributed it was made sure that an organisation existed which would utilize this material to the best of our advantage.

In Murree a unique service to our cause was rendered by the local Tehsildar at the risk of his job. It was in his house that we were able to collect the ‘stuff . Then during the night, in an extremely well-guarded manner, the ‘stuff was despatched on mules to the banks of the Jhelum river. On the banks of this river, on both sides, awaited parties who had prepared Raja Suiwn Maqsood.

‘shinas -- inflated goat skins -- for the transportation of arms and ammunition across the river. In this, otherwise most risky and dangerous enterprise, the Tehsildar, not only risked his job but also his life. All this ‘business was to be a hush-hush affair. The police were never taken into confidence. Once we were caught red-handed on this side of the Jhelum river. We completely denied any complicity in the matter, though some others were hauled up. The loss of valuable arms was sustair~ed with a heavy heart.

The area of operation was mainiy divided into two large sectors, Muzaffarabad to Bhimber, and Bhimber to Jammu. Gilgit was left out, because the Gilgit organisation was separate. The Dogra Army Muslim Officers, raising a local rebellion, had established an administration of their own. This was effectively arranged with officers who were posted in Gilgit by the Dogra Government. Each sector was given a separate quota of rifles for operation and placed under an Army Leader. Similarly, different leaders were put in charge of different sectors to provide the necessary political link. Before the whole scheme could operate in an organised and effective manner, we needed an army to fight an army. That mere armed crowds could not possibly achieve much was realised in the very beginning. It seemed, therefore, that the sine qua non of the whole plan was that a peoples army be organised. It could only be effectively done in Pakistan and probably in Mirpur, though Muzaffarabad was also organised. Mirpur failed to provide the immediate need because the Dogra troops had not done that much damage in Mirpur as they had done in Poonch, and, moreover, Poonch had no less than 80,000 discharged soldiers from the old Indian Army. The bulk of the Azad Army was consequently raised from Poonch. For this purpose, during the month of September, 1947, 1 crossed the Jehlum River a number of times during the nights on a ‘shina — with the help of some of our great men, who later so heroically laid down their li,4es during the fight that ensued. Most of them are no more amongst us today but each of them played a unique part in the early days of our liberation movement. No matter how much is said in their praise, words surely cannot sum up their great deeds of personal bravery and heroism. We hope that

Almighty God will reward them and their children for what they did.

During the September nights, in the light of torches, under the hanging threats of the Dogra Army Units, we raised companies and then units of the Azad Kashmir Army village by village from ICohala down to Mirpur. Each sector was placed under the charge of different sector commanders. This army had to operate only with the rifles and ammunition, the scarcity of which can hardly be imagined. The rest of the things—rations, clothes and other stuff—were to be provided by the local people themselves All people worked with such dedication and unity that I could not have even thought possible. What part women played, how small children carried water, ammunition and rations to the fighting soldiers, arc acts without any parallel in the history of recent times.

As soon as lighting started, all Muslim Officers of the Dogra Army joined us with their soldiers, arms and ammunition. This happened to a great advantage on the Muzaffarabad front. Some of the officers came and took positions along with the rest of us and played a great part in the organisation of the Azad Army. Some of these officers gave their lives in the actual fight with great valour and patriotism~ particularly in Mirpur and generally on other fronts. In all probability history will never know them individually, yet their patriotism, sell-sacrifice and devotion to the cause will always be remembered with respect in the atmals of Jammu and Kashmir.

This peoples army was later provided with officers from outside also. In this connection I must mention the services of the officers of the Indian National Army’ from Pakistan. I have profound admiration for them and for the spirit with which they volunteered to serve a peoples cause. Some of them had their failings, as is bound to happen everywhere. Some of them later took part in State politics and took side with one leader or the other. If they had not done that and simply stuck to the organisation of the Azad Army their credit would have been much higher. Unfortunately, they brought in politics aT)d it putrefied the army organisation. Most of them, no down,

played their part with devotion and sincerity. It is not advisable to mention names as it raises controversy and does not serve any useful purpose.

The fight started on different fronts. People were so oppressed by the Dogra troops that they could not wait for an organised attack. I cannot blame them. Any people would have acted in the same manner. This, however, cost us much. By starting earlier than we should have we lost the great advantage of surprise attack on the Dogra dug-outs. Secondly, the Dogras got to know the intentions of the people to revolt. They then informed their Government who sent more troops to reinforce their earlier and smaller units. Thirdly, our soldiers attacked without enough reserves of ammunition and without any hand-grenades. The Dogras had a well-run line of communication connected with their base and this communication was their monopoly. Our soldiers could only work during the nights and only by using irregular paths and boats on the Jhelum River, which also were burnt by the Dogras later.

As a result of all this, we could not capture positions which we hoped to do in a couple of days. The Dogras dug in strongly and used three-inch Mortars and also Bren-guns against our ill-equipped troops. As against these, we had only 303 rifles which were ‘Dana-made’ and one-shot. These facto,, made our position not only extremely costly but, at times impossible. This happened in Bagh, Rawalakot and Kotli fronts.

Luckily, Tehsil Sudhnutti of Poonch District was at once vacated by the Dogras and this gave us a solid foothold on the !‘oonch side, where at Trarkhel we started raising a regular army and established a training centre which could regularly feed all battalions of the Azad Army, at least on the Poonch front. A similar training centre was started at Harigel for the same purpose.

If we could capture all the Dogra positions by surprise all over Poonch we would have completely defeated the Dogra Army within a month all over the State and taken Srinagar

And Janimuboth.

The greatest snag in the whole campaign had been the lack of communications and dearth of automatic arms, which are absolutely necessary for an attack. We had to attack everywhere, while Dogras, and later the Indian Army, had to defend everywhere. As soon as the Indian Army entered the fight the Indian Air Force came into operation as well. It then became impossible for our soldiers on the Poonch, Kotli and Nowshera fronts to operate during day-light. To make a concentrated attack on the enemy position during the day was, in fact, out of question. All our attacks were made during the nights, when the Indian Army would start a huge barrage of light Machine-Gun fire without in the least caring for their supply of ammunition. They were fighting like a regular army with all arms and ample supply of ammunition and with their regular line of communication working behind them. Azad Kashmir troops miserably lacked a regular line of communication and a regular supply of arms and ammunition.

In spite of all this, since October 27,1947, the ‘Azad Army, (name given to the Peoples Army of liberation) was able to conquer from the Indian Army Facucally the whole of Poonch, with the exception of the city of Poonch. The whole of Rajauri and Mirpur districts, right down to Akhnoor, were captured by us, while the enemy held Nowshera, peace-time army stronghold throughout, On the Muzaffarabad front we went right upto Srinagar and then had to retreat to Chikoti, which position we hold ever since. We went right up to Sopore, conquering the whole of I-Iindwara Tebsil. On the Gilgif front the whole of Gilgit was conquered, and also the whole of Ladakh right down to the position thirty miles from Srinagar. The army which operated in Ladakh under most difficult conditions of snow, without any line of communication, must be given the greatest credit. For regular soldiers this would seem an impossibility but during the Azad Kashmir Movement miracles were performed by our soldiers. Whether history will ever give this movement the credit it deserves is a separate matter. Of course, to expect any reward from any human agency for what the people did would be a great fallacy.

_______ _________________

Chapter VII

SUDHAN REVOLT:

Sudhan Tribes Role In The Struggle

For Freedom in Kashmir- Since 1832 --. 1990

SUDHANS reside, primarily, in what is called Sudhan Tract. It begins with the Kotli Tehsil and ends with Sudhan Gali in Bagh Tehsil. They roughly number about half a million people.

Sudhan is a tribe of professional soldiers. They are a brave and self respecting people. They can be easily made to resort to Arms for a cause. They, some time, differ with one another, in ordinary life, but just as much easily and quickly get together in

times of crises.
-

In social life they follow time old customs and traditions, which may not be easily acceptable to a modem man but these traditions have a good basis and a good background. Though conservative in their thinking, basically they are a religious people, God fearing and believing tenaciously in God and His existence.

Sudhans possess a good physical appearance and some of them could be classed as one of the most handsome of human race. They claim their origin from Afghanistan. They came from Afghanistan via Dera lsmail Khan, in NWFP Pakistan, and are the same as Sudhazais of Afghanistan. It is well established and accepted by all authors, that in social habits and customs they are certainly akin to Sudhazais of Afghanistan. Among Afghans, Sudhazai are a very respected clan with long good history behind them.

It is said that some 500 years or so ago Sudhans landed in Western parts of Poonch Province and fought for their existence, but the local people dominated them. In this period, they multiplied quickly and emerged into a strong and powerful tribe.

Siths and Dogras had to fight the Sudhans in wars spread over a fairly long time. Sudhans resisted the Sikhs and Dogra. till powerful armies of Sikhs and Dogras subjugated them and committed unheard of atrocities on them. But they have survived as a tribe to the present day. This happened between 1830-1840, much before the Treaty of Amritsar, which was concluded in 1846.

When Sudhans were defeated, in 1832 or so, the Dogras imprisoned as many as five thousand women and children and as many men were ruthlessly beheaded. Their heads were presented to the Dogras barbaric forces against five rupees per head. This cutting of heads and their sale continued for a period of two months or so.

In order to suppress these people for ever, the Dogra forces flayed alive their leaders. As many as twenty people were flayed alive. They were refused even a drop of water. Their bodies were hanged from trees. Some of these trees are still there to bear witness to these ghastly events.

As far as one can see and judge world history, such atrocious events could not be easily found in the history of any Land.

For some years Dogra rule was tolerated by the remaining people. They patiently bore all the miseries. They, however, regained their self respect and dignity and soon became a danger for the autocratic and bigoted rule of the Hindu Maharajas.

These events have been described in ‘The Reigning Family of Lahore’ by Major C. Carmichael Smyth. Though he has missed many important details but his description of the events cannot be disputed. He seems to have studied the situation and

wrote candidly and unbiasedly about these tragic events. I

would like to quote at some length from this great book for a

graphic description of these events.

Under the heading ‘The Soodhan Revolt”, he writes:

About the years 1832, several independent hill-tribes inhabiting the north western regions of the Punjab were reduced into subjection to the Lahore state. These were the Doondh, Soodhun, Suthee, and Murdiall tribes. The Doondh tribe lived chiefly on the banks of the Jheium, especially on the western bank, from the point where the river leaves the Kukka Bumba hills For about twenty-five or thirty miles down the stream. This tribe was in number about fifty or sixty thousand. The Soodhun tribe inhabited a large tract on the eastern bank of the same river opposite the country of the Qoondhs, and numbered about forty thousand souls. The Suthee tribe dwelt chiefly in the lower hills to the south of the tribes above mentioned, and was estimated at about twenty thousand. Lastly the Murdial tribe lay to the east of the Sudhun, and was reckoned at about eighteen thousand people”.

“About the period above mentioned the Dogra brother of Jummoo endeavoured to bring these wild clans into subjection, nominally to the Lahore state, but really to themselves. Finding, however, the conquest less easy than they had anticipated, they prevailed upon their master, Runject Sing, to march with his whole army towards Rawal Pindee, and thus to aid them by making a demonstration against the tribes whom they in vain sought to subdue. Runjeet accordingly marched with some sixty thousand men in the direction indicated, and encamped with his force at Kooree, in the plains, but just at the entrance of the hilly region inhabited by the doomed clans- Seeing so overwhelming a force, under the famous Runleet Sing, apparently coming against them, and startled by—the çhunder of a hundred and fifty~ pieces of ordnance echbipg among their mountains day and night, the people readily submitted to the yoke which the Dogra chiefs sought to impose upon them’.

While mentioning the role of Shams IChan, he describes him as:‘One of the head-men of the Sudhun tribe when it

submitted to the Dogras, was Shumas Khan. This man, as a hostage for the fidelity of his clan and family was kept about the person of Rajah Dehan Sing, whom he actually served as a private Gorechar trooper. In this capacity he so far won the favour of his master, and was taken so far into his confidence, that he incurred the jealously and dislike of the elder brother, Goollaub Sing. This feeling of hostility induced Goolaub on serval occasions to remonstrate with his brother, on what he chose to consider the folly and impropriety of reposing his confidence in a man so circumstanced as was Shumas Khan. The younger brother, however, could never see the matter in the same light, and he accordingly continued to display his favour and partiality to the fallen chieftain as before. Shumas was to all appearance duly grateful to his patron and reciprocated his regard; and thus he remained in close personal attendance on Rajah Dehan Sing at Lahore, until near the end of the year 1836’.

The Sikhs and Dogras got engaged in their war against the Pathans in and around Peshawar. But the Pathans, however, could not resist their onslaught and submitted:“It was while engaged in the suppression of these disturbances in the Yuzoofzye districts, that Goolaub heard of a revolt in his own hill states, among the Sudhun, Suthee, Doondh, and Murdiall tribes. It took him, however,two months and some hard fighting to reduce the Yuzoofzyes to subjection, nor was it till he had laid waste a great part of the country, and had driven most of the inhabitants to the hills that order was many degree restored. After all, the country was in a very unsettled state when his anxiety for the suppression of the revolt in his own dominions induced him to hasten thither, leaving the Yuzoofzyes to the managemcnt of one Ursulla Khan whom he made Kardar of the district. This man was

devoted to the interest of the Jummoo Rajab, anc ~ greatly favoured and trusted by him. He is the .me Ursulla Khan, who lately caused much disturbance by exciting and heading an insurrectionary movement in the country entrusted to his charge’.

The Sudhans hoped, on the basis of some rumours, that the

Sikhs and Dogras would not be able to cross the Jhelum river

and overcome them. It happened to be a false hope because the

Slkh and Dogra troops gathered round Kahuti, now on Letrar

Road, and started preparations of all kinds.

Smyth Says:

“It was by the wide-spread intelligence of the Seik

reverses at Peshawar, and a rumour that these disasters were of so serious a nature that they would require for some time all the pàwer of the Dogra brothers to repress them, that the hill tribes had been induced to hope that they might by a vigorous effort shake off the yoke which they so reluctantly bore. This hope was strengthened by the prevalence of another rumour which spoke of Rajah Goolaub Sing as being badly, some even said mortally, wounded, in one of the skirmishes with the Yuzoofzyes. Hence it was that the tribes rose in rebellion, and being at first but feebly opposed by the Seik garrisons, carried all before them”.

Again referring to Shams Khan, Smyth opines that:“It happened that Shumas Khan, the former chief of the

Sudhun clan, and who, as has been related, had since the subjugation oihls tribe, continued in attendance on Dehan Sing, had just before this time obtained leave to return for a short time to his home in the hills. Goolaub Sing, as it has been mentioned, held this man in bitter enmity, and on hearing of the reports which were circulated in the hill country, and which were exciting the people to rebellion, he immediately wrote to Dehan Sing at Peshawar, informing him that Shumas lCban was the treacherous enemy who was spreading these rumours so prejudicial to

their Interest. He furthermore strongly advised his brother to leave the supposed traitor entirety in his hands, and not to interfere in any way with the measures to which he should resort for punishing him and restoring order in the country.

“A short time after this, instructions were sent to some of the Kardars and other dependants of Goolaub Sing, to have Shwnas Khan, with all his family, taken prisoners at his residence in the hills, where he then. was. The chief, however, received intelligence of the design for his capture and knowing the fate that would await him should he fall into the hands of Goolaub, made his escape with all his family into the fastnesses of the hills, thus placing himself beyond the reach of the Rajah’s power.

This was the signal for the hitherto smouldering flame of rebellion to break out. The whole county rose in arms against the authority of the Dogra Rajahs, and as they at first met with little oppositions the insurgents had in less than a month, and before Goolaub could extricate himself from the Yuwofzyes, taken and destroyed all the forts and strongholds of their rulers, from Poonch almost to the walls of Jummoo itself, and from the borders of Cashmere to the base of the hills. All the troops which Goolaub could as yet send against them were repulsed and obliged to return with heavy toss, leaving the triumphant insurgents In possession of the whole country. And this although the Jummoo force numbered about five thousand men, and was commanded by Meean Oottum Sing, the eldest son of the Rajah, one of the bravest of his race, and by Dewan Hurree Chund, Goolaubs principal minister and coinmande?.

Stationing himself at Kurree, north Last Rawalpindi, Goolab Slngh now took a different course:~Seeing, however, that if force alone were used, the result

would be at least doubtful, he halted at Khouotee for some time, and commenced a course of intrigue and bribery for the purpose of aeatlng disunion among the Insurgents, and

bringing some o them over to his side. Shamas Than had now openly placed himself at the head of the enemies of the insurgents, and it was by intriguing with and bribing the enemies of this man among the hill chiefs that Goolaub wrought his purpose. Having succeeded by such means in detaching many of the insurgents from the common cause, and secured their aid or at least their neutrality, the Rajah at the head of about eight thousand regular infantry and twelve thousand irregulars, a sort of militia raised in the hills about Jummoo, ascended from the plains at Kohoutee and marched towards Mung and Pelundheree. In order to strike terror into the insurgents and to distress and punish them, he devastated the country as he advanced, permitting his troops freely to plunder and to practise every excess. More than this he offered a reward of five rupees for the head of every insurgent or any of those connected with him, man, woman or child; and in consequence a cool systematic massacre ensued, likely to lead to the utter extermination of the miserable people. Panic struck by this display of ferocity and hopeless of being able to resist the overpowering force led by the Rajah, the insurgents dispersed and fled to hide themselves and their families among the rocks and mountains, and in the pine forests and jungles, leaving their houses, oattle, and property to the mercy of the advancing army”.

These armies then ruthlessly pounced upon armless villagers and their innocent women and children. According to

Smyth:

Often the troops came upon their hiding places, and discovered a wretched family pent up together in some den or cavern, where they were, without respect to sex or age. savagely massacred for the sake of the paltry reward put upon their heads. However, after some few days of this exterminating slaughter, the Rajah issued an order that the women and female children should be spared, and when taken captive, brought and delivered over to certain officers whom he appointed to take charge of them. Thus in a short time each separate division of the army had in

its train a drove of unfortunate women and children, driven about like cattle, in the most miserable condition, half starved and scarcely half clad~whateVer little clothing they had carried with them in their hasty night from their homes having been taken from them by the greedy and merciless Dogra soldiers. Sometimes for days no rations were served out to these wretched captives, and they were left dependant for subsistence on what chance threw in their way, or what the rude soldiery might be disposed to give them. On the re~assemblage of the army at j~~jundheree, these prisoners were gathered into one large herd, consisting of about five thousand females of every age. They were now regularly penned in a sheep-fold secured by a strong hedge of prickly bushes, and here kept without any proper provision being made for their subsistence. The troops themselves, at this time, lived chiefly on the grain called Mulch or Mekei which they eat raw; and a bundle or two of this was considered necessary to preserve them from actually dying of hunger. To quench their thirst they were once a day loosed from their fold and led to some neighbouring stream, and then like sheep driven back again. To such barbarous treatment, and other ill-usage, which it is not necessary to describe, no less than fourteen or fifteen hundred of these poor wretches fell victims during the halt at Pelundheree’

How many male ‘insurgents’ were butchered, he says;‘The males of the insurgent tribes had been almost entirely

exterminated, some five or six thousand of them, whose heads were tossed about the encampment in the sight of their captive relatives, having been hunted down and slain during the halt of fifteen or sixteen days at Pelundheree. Altogether not less than fourteen or fifteen thousand people of those small tribes perished in this campaign

Ultimately what happened to Shams Khan is a tragic story. Those who had given protection to Shams Khan and his family, betrayed him treachlessly and handed him over to the Dogras troops. This is how Smyth describes it

“During the stay of the army at Pelundheree, some of the enemies of Shams Ichan, for whose head Goolaub Sing had offered a very large reward, promised to lead the Rajas

forces to the spot in which the insurgent chief was secreted with a few his followers. Accordingly Meean Oottum Sing, with a strong detachment, was guided to the very house in which, by the advice of his betrayers, Shamas IChan had taken up his abode. He was there surprised while he and his attendants were asleep, and of course was immediately put to death. His head with that of his son, who was killed at the same time, was afterwards exhibited in an iron cage, at the top of the Adha Dek Pass above Poonch where it remained for some years.

With the life of Shamas Khan ceased the last hopes and efforts of the insurgents. No further resistance was offered to the triumphant progress of the victors; and satisfied with the amount of punishment which he had inflicted, Goolaub withdrew his troops, retiring by various routes through the hills to Jummo.

Some five or six thousand women, children and youngmen were taken prisoners. What happened to these miserable people, women, children and some young men is another woeful story. The same author has graphically put it thus:-

“On his departure for his capital the Rajah ordered that the drove of captive females should be sent thither after him. During the march to that place, about seven hundred of them died from want or fatigue, while many more were privately carried of f by the soldiery as their share of the booty. Thus of the five thousand females that had been collected in the sheepfold at t’elundheree, only about eight or nine hundred reached Jummo. From these some forty or fifty of the youngest and best looking were selected for the Rajah’s Zenana, in which some of them are still living. The rest, with the exception of about a hundred who died from ill-treatment at Jummo, after being kept in the neighbourhood of that city for some time, were sold to

the highest bidden, and thus many of them were consigned

to hopeless slavery~.

Finally Smyth gives last touches to his story like this;

“Thus was the Sudhun insurrection suppressed and revenged, and such was its immediate but not its only result. Those who had escaped the sword of the conqueror. and were left at liberty in their hill-fastnesses, on returning to their homes found that they had yet an enemy to encounter more formidable than Jummo troops and their merciless leader. The fields having remained uncultivated and unsown during the occupation of the country by the enemy, Famine, with all its honors, raged throughout the land- The wretched people were, therefore, again compelled to fly, and some thousands of them sought the means of subsistence in the nearest lowland districts, where, however, many of them perished of hungeT, perhaps after selling their children for a rupee or two each to purchase food or preserve their lives and the lives of their offspring.

Such was the fate of a people who dared to take up arms in an attempt to free themselves from the power of Rajab Goolaub Sing”. -

Sudhan tribe, after surviving the Dogras atrocities of 1832-1840, re-emerged as a verile and strong people- In the great war of 1914-1919, they fought in Flanders and Turkey with British Armies. This war gave a new outlook to the Sudhans after they came back home as heroes of a world war. As a consequence of their participation in World wide event Sudhans not only gained their dignity but also got a new outlook on all matters of life. They improved their social conditions and habits-

Some of them got elementary education in British Army Schools. They could now read and write letters home. Their country has a beautiful climate--snowy winter with strong winds blowing -- thus preparing them for any adversity. Coming of spring, with brilliant sunshine on ever green trees and hills make their country a heaven on earth- Small singsong

streams flow in this land after snow slowly melts under a

powerful sun.

They till their land haif-heartedly because it is not very productive. They, in my opinion, make excellent soldiers but poor tillers of soil. The soil itself is not very cooperative

The Sudhans rather would go out, in a spirit of adventure abroad than stay at home and patiently wait for the crop to grow and ripe. Sudhans are an impatient people with a strong go in them.

The Sudhans are very sensitive clan. They will not tolerate deliberate insult. If insulted, they can fight back to establish their dignity. They can quarrel with each other over small matters, for example land, for years. They never commit rape, but a Sudhan would like a good looking girl to run away with him. Such a thing can start perpetual feud between families for years.

This brings us to the last great war and Sudhans history. This war gave Sudhans a great chance to fight on all fronts of the war. They fought in North Africa and Europe all over. Against the Japanese, they fought - In Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia and other fronts.

After Sudhans came back from war fronts, Indo-Pakistan continent was witnessing a unique political struggle and was on the verge of independence. This struggle for independence affected every big or small town. A new age was emerging with a brilliance never withessed for ages before.

Sudhans were thus affected by the magnificent struggle for freedom- Dogra rule seemed miserably crumbling along with the British Raj, where the sun never set for two hundred years or so. Filled with a spirit of new urge to be free, the Sudhans, like all Icashmiri patriots, were - ready to do their part in freedom struggle. In fact they were the first to challenge the Maharaja and his armies all over the state, All other tribes big and small joined them later.

The Dogras being conscious of this challenge, vigorously tried to suppress all such movements of the freedom fighters. Dogras spread their small armies over all parts of the state. This made these armies extremely vulnerable. When ultimately It came to fighting, the Dogras surrendered in most of the places without a fight and they surrendered their arms and ammunition also. All this happened in 1947-1949- Then the Indian army walked in. Azad Kashmir Forces fought the Indian army and their aeroplane for a year, till 1949.

The struggle of the And Icashmir forces against the Indian army, which started in 1947, has been the subject of dispute between India and Pakistan. A large number of foreigners have given a detailed account of this fight for freedom by all Kashmirl people. I would like to quote some authors whose integrity cannot be questioned. Ian Stephens has written two books on Pakistan. One is ‘Horned Moon and the other is Pakistan’. In the second book, he has given an account of this struggle for freedom. It has a chapter on Kashmir. He says:

“By the second week of September, the carnage in the now divided Punjab had spread over heavily, as mentioned, into adjacent tenitories to north, south, east and west; and for a while seemed likely to push uncontrollably on. And a curious point Is that, of the four outfiowings of disorder, it was the northward one--the one which then attracted least attention and indeed whose very existence, amidst the confusions, was largely unknown—that had the most intractable long-term effects”.

This author has given a reliable account of the beginning of the Kashmlr Liberation Movement. This should set at rest the controversy as to who started the movement. This also falsifies the claim of those people who unduly assume the credit of starting the movement in August, 1947. Let us see what Ian Stephens says on page 187, of his book ~I’akistan”, first published in 1963. He says:

“This was the rising against the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir and his officials, away up in that ramshackle great States obscure Sudhnuti tract near West Punjab, by the sturd.y Muslim peasantry, who included many exsoldiers. They and their forebears had suffered long misrule under the princely regime; and the reports now reaching them of orgainsed butcheries of their fellow-Muslims by Sikhs and Hindus on the plains, and their consequent fears for their own future under Hindu Raj, goaded them into action. Their country, however, is a wild tangle of bulkily~ forest-draped mountains, hard of access; roads through it, owing to intentional neglect by the Maharajahs Administration of a notoriously troublesome section of his subjects (very different from the plaint people around Srinagar), were few and bad; and communications across the Punjab to the main news-gathering centres in Delhi and Karachi had collapsed. So such knowledge of the rising as reached the outside world was fragmentary, and largely discounted. The best authority on it is Symonds; but his important material was not gathered till several weeks after it started. The next chapter goes into the affair further’.

This is how it began in Sudhanoti tract. Sudhans gave the lead and took up arms against a one hundred year old autocratic Hindu Maharajas whimsical rule.

The author of the book “Pakistan while giving the background, on page 197, describes the events:“Sc, much, briefly, as introduction. Now for the events of the latter part of 1947. Kashmir had from the outset been looked on by Muslim Leaguers as geographically an integral part of Pakistan-concept, and indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the ‘K in Pakistan specifically stands for Kashmir. Soon after the June 3rd announcement however signs developed that influential Hindus were disinclined to let affairs rest on this basis. The ruler was Hindu; might not this be used to swing Kashmir into the Indian orbit? That such thoughts were astir seemed

unmistakable from the Press, and from conversations. Mr. Nehru’s emotional involvement in the State’s affairs — he was a Kashmiri pandit by ancestry -- had already shown itself, both in his writings, and in his odd conduct during the previous summer’s negotiations with the British Cabinet Mission, when he dashed off to Kashmir on a relatively trifling political pretext. And during the few weeks remaining between the June 3rd announcement and Independence Day, the State had several other noteworthy visits: from Acharya Kirpalani, now President of the Congress Party; from rulers of certain princely States in East Punjab, notably Patiala and Kapurthala States, where appalling slaughter of Muslims was soon to begin; and most suggestive of all, from Mr. Gandhi, who had never shown marked interest in Kashmir affairs during his political career as yet”.

How Indian leaders, including Mahatama Gandhi, wooed the Maharaja is given in this paragraph:“And before long much curious rumour got afloat—people experienced in the subcontinent’s way are wary both of believing rumour and of ignoring it — to the effect that Mr. Gandhi had succeeded where Acharya Icirpalani had failed; that his influence, coinciding with that wielded over the superstitious Maharani by a Brahmin priest in the princely entourage, had persuaded the Maharaja that accession to India was his destined and proper course; that he would announce this when opportunity arose; and that assurances of it had been privily passed to Delhi. On the other hand, there were those who said that the Maharajah remained in a mood of obstinate, feeble indecision--which seemed rather in character. That, evidently, was the impression formed by Lord Mountbatten, and later by Ismay, who successively visited the State in June and August to pr~s on him the urgent need for declaring what he meant to do. At the crucial moment he evaded the former’s attentions by sudden inability to be seen, owing to ‘colic’. And lsmay has amusingly recounted the impossibility of engaging him in any political discussion at all?

Then,

~But besides all this, some concrete facts did emerge. During July, he enlarged his army—it was overwhelmingly Flindu-Sikh, few Muslims were ever recruited to it, despite their being 77 per cent of the population — and moved units to Pooch and Jammu areas, not far from the Punjab boundary. Those were doubtless reasonable precautions in themselves, at so critical a time; but they were made noteworthy by the simultaneous issue of orders that Muslim civilians in those areas having weapons must surrender them. And as Independence Day passed, and the State’s future remained undisclosed, there were that seemed other pointers: the abrupt dismissal from the Prime Ministership of Mr. Kak, a Westernised Kashmiri Pandit who was understood to have recommended accession to Pakistan on practical grounds; the appointment by Mr. Nehru as Minister without portfolio in the Indian Cabinet Delhi of Mr. Copalaswami Ayyengar, an able, reputedly anti-Muslim Brahmin who had been Prime Minister of Kashmir from 1937 to 1943; and then the very significant release from jail in Srinagar of Sheikh Abdullah, leader of one of the State’s two political parties, the pro-Indian National Conference, although the leader of the rival pro-Pakistani Muslim Conference, Chaudhuri Ghulam Abbas, remained incarcerated. There had also, amid the fog of rumour during these weeks, been interesting reports of road-building projects or activities in the States extreme south-eastern edge, near the Indian border. The atmosphere in the Vale at this time, heavy with whisper and suspense, intrigue and abscure surmise, is well depicted in Wilfrid Russell’s bOOk”.

Role of Sudhan tribe has been narrated in this book in a unbiased manner. And also controversy as to who started the war of liberation has been finally set at rest. It must be said, at this stage, that some people try to twist the facts of history in their favour. Their claim that they started the movement must now unequivocally stand contradicted for all time.

The author, an unbiased historian, had the courage to say:

‘Meanwhile, in the Sudhnuti tract of Poonch province, an event had, as we know, occurred of which, at the time, the outside world learnt almost nothing, and which Indian propaganda has since persistently brushed aside; an event which, linked with its horrible and speedy sequel in Jaumrn province, bulks far larger, in human terms, than the much--publicised inrush of Pathan tribesmen via Baramula towards the end of October—which was the actual precipitating cause of the Indo-Pakistani crisis. Alarmed by the strengthening of the Maharajah’s army, by his order that local civilians must give up weapons, and by the continuing lurid reports of rioting in the nearby Punjab, the Sudhan foresters and herdsmen and petty cultivators, from their dwellings amidst little terraced fields on the Himalayan slopes, rose in revolt against the princely regime, whose exactions they had long bitterly resented, and against which they had managed to stage a minor rising in the early 1930’s. The revolt started with scattered incidents in the last week of July, and by end of August was well under way. ~ut confusion in the Punjab, then, was such that authentic contemporary news of it never reached the press. The best authority on it, as mentioned, is Symonds, who also gives particulars of the atrocious tax-system under which the Sudhans groaned. Essentially, their was a straight forward peasant revolt, the religious beliefs of the participants being irrelevant; an uprising of the oppressed against ancient feudal tyrannies; the sort of thing that ought to have got sympathetic acknowledgment from someone of Mr. Nehru’s ideals. His then helper and confident. Sheikh Abdullah, frankly stated the facts as early as October 21st.

Besides being a sturdy lot, the Sudhans had some military experience to draw on. The recruiting authorities in British India had long ago recognised their qualities, and during World War ii 40,000 or more of them had served in the undivided Indian Army. In consequence, despite woeful shortage of arms--which they strove to collect by sending inquirers to the village arms-factories away in the Pathan tribal country — their revolt achieved quick successes

against the Maharaja’s forces, who worsened things for themselves by indiscriminate burning of Sudhan villages. The smoke could be seen from as far as the Murree hills in West Punjab, and is remembered to this day. By the end of September, large tracts of Poonch province had been freed of princely rule-permanently, as affairs turned out”.

After describing events in Jammu Province, the author comes back to Sudhans role as thus:‘As has been mentioned, the leaders of the Sudhnuti

revolt--which later evolved into the Azad lCashmir movement--had sent men across the Indus Plain into l’athan tribal territory to seek arms. At this time, and on into November, the future political relations (if any) of the quasi-autonomous Pathan tribes with Pakistan were entirely uncertain. Discussions had begun, and it was hoped that these formidable, restless people would decide to accede to the new-formed Sate, if only — by the cynical -

-
because their scope for mischief would be greater otherwise; but the necessary jirgas had not been held. It would be fair to say that the Pakistan authorities felt frightened of the tribes, and conscious that, at least for the nonce, they lacked the physical means for coping with them. The Pakistan Army as yet scarcely existed, it was in process of formation out of the previous Army of undivided India; bits of the latter were still being shuttled about the map, Hindu- and Sikh ones remaining untransferred on Pakistani soil, and Muslim ones on Indian. And for decades, the tribes had proved an intractable, dangerous thorn in the flesh of the much stronger British regime. As recently as 1937-8, those of Waziristan alone, for months, had pinned down no fewer than 50,000 troops of the Imperial forces in sanguinary guerrilla warfare.

This author has taken a lot of trouble to describe fully other events which have affected deeply till today the relations between India and Pakistan.

Before I close this chapter on the question as to who started the Liberation Movement, in 1947, let me quote Joseph

Karbel as a final authority. On page 66 of his book “Danger in Kashmir”, he says:~Whatever the validity of the mutual accusations, there is little doubt that Kashmir was brewing with revolt against the Maharaja long before the tribesmen invaded the country. The political opposition launched in 1930 was carried into an open resistance in 1946. This was resumed in the spring of 1947, and it reached a critical dlima,c in the summer when the news of the fratricidal struggle in Punjab echoed throughout Kashmir.

The Maharaja apparently was thoroughly aware of the situation. He strengthened the Sikh and Hindu garrisons in the Muslim areas. Then, towards the end of July, he ordered the Muslim to deposit arms with the police. The Muslims answered by organizing themselves in guerrilla groups in the wild hills of West Poonch, where their movements remained unnoticed for some time. They were led by seasoned soldiers who previously had been demobilized from the British Indian Army. They organised the smuggling of arms. Messengers were sent to the tribal areas •of the North-West Frontier Province, where manufacturing of small arms and ammunitions had been practiced for years. The Muslim partisans in the hills were aimed with these weapons. Many ex-servicemen from World War IL, hearing about the Maharaja’s expeditions against Muslim villages, evacuated their families to West Punjab, where their relatives lived, and returned to Jammu to fight the Dogra rule.

Then the author clinches the m~atter by stating:-

“This movement was led by a young ICashmiri, Sardar Mohammed Ibrahjm Khan, who since June had traveled throughout the country, arousing the spirit of his countrymen. In August he narrowly escaped arrest in Srinagar and fled to Pakistan. At Murree he laid the foundation for a political movement of liberation, out of which later grew the Azad (Free) Kashmir governmenr.

Chapter VIII

TRIBAL PEOPLE

WITH the beginning of the Movement of Azad iCashrnir, the tribal people of the former Frontier Province and the surrounding territory came into prominence. Throughout British rule in United Indli, the Pathans in general, and the tribal people in particular, were invariably treated as ‘hostiles. The British Government in India had to keep a huge army to enforce peace and maintain law and order in this tribal territory along the former Frontier Province. As soon as Pakistan was established, the Government of Pakistan did a very wise thing. They withdrew Pakistan Army from the areas surrounding the tribal territory. The attitude of the Government of Pakistan completely changed towards these tribes who are now living as good neighbours. In consequence the attitude of the tribal people towards the Pakistan Government and people of Pakistan has undergone a radical change. They have become great friends of Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan probably value them as an asset, and quite rightly so.

The tribal people, particularly the Mabsoods and Mehmands, are a great fighting people. The Suleman KheI tribe from Afghanistan, also, are equally good fighters. it is pretty nearly an admitted fact that the Frontier Tribesmen are one of the very best, if not the best, marksmen in the world. There are facts to prove that the men of these tribes have performed miraculous deeds of bravery and heroism. I know some instances where the tribesmen performed extraordinary acts of personal bravery and heroism in the Kashmir struggle. If properly handled, the tribesmen will always be a great asset to Pakistan.

On the partition of India, in East Punjab unbearable atrocities were committed on the Mussalmans. These atrocities came to be known all over the world. Stories of how Sikhs treated Mussalmans got very wide publicity all over Pakistan. In fact, the manner in which these miserable creatures were killed, their women raped, and their children killed in the presence of parents, is too well known. As soon as the Frontier Pathans and the tribesmen came to know of these stories, they flocked, with whatever arms they had, towards the West Punjab, to be allowed to go into the East Punjab. The West Punjab Government very rightly prevented their intrusion into East Punjab, though this action of the West Punjab Government never met with the approval either of the tribesmen or the public in general.

Along with the stories of atrocitics in the East I’unjab, in the months of August, September and October,1947, the stories of the tragic happenings in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, began to appear in the West Punjab Press. It published stories of how the Mussalmans in the State of Jammu and Kashmir were faced with a similar fate as they had met in other East Punjab State. A beginning of the general butchery had already been made in the dt~’ of Jammu and in the districts of Udhampur and Kathua. The tribesmen and the l’athans of the Frontier Provinces, and, particularly, the people in the adjoining district of Abbottabad, got to know of the impending fate of the Mussalmans of ICashmir. A huge Lashkar of tribesmen started off on their own from different pans of the tribal territory, and infiltrated into Icashmir, through the district of Muzaffarabad. Muzaffarabad city and district were dominated by Sikhs. All Sikhs in this district and Baramula city were heavily armed. A large number of Sikhs had also entered Muzaffarabad from the Frontier Province with arms. The existence of a militant force in this district and Baramula city jeopardised the safety and security of the Mussalmans. Because of the mounting tension in Hindus, Sikhs and Mussaimans in the West Puñjab. and what had happened in the East I’unjab, these Sikhs became a real danger to the people in these areas. In fact the Mussalmans in the city of Muzaffarabad were in danger of being completely wiped out.

It was in these circumstances that the people df the Frontier Province, and the tribes, came to the timely rescue of these helpless people. The Muslim part of the Dogra Army joined this Laskhar of tribesmen. We were able to liquidate the entire Dogra Army from Kohala to Srinagar within the short period of a week or so. This Lashkar of the tribesmen, plus the Muslim part of the regular Dogra Army, had captured the whole territory right up to Shalting on the outskirts of Srinagar and had surrounded the aerodrome in Badgam. On the 26th October, 1947 the Indian Army entered the fight and we had to retreat to Un, and then Chinari, leaving all this territory. These days were certainiy crucial in the history of this campaign of liberation of Icashmir. If we had captured Srinagar, which had already been deserted in so cowardly a manner by the Maharaja and his troop, the history of Kashniir would have been different.

Tribesmen played an important role in the movement of Azad Kashmir. They came all the way from different parts, from the settled and unsettled areas of tribal territory, to fight in Kashmir. Sulemankhel tribesmen came all the way from Afghanistan to take part in this Jehad of Icashniir. It has generally been made out by the other party that the tribesmen were pushed into Kashmir by Pakistan. So far as the Azad Kashmir Government was concerned, we never went into tribal territory at any stage of the campaign to persuade.the tribesmen to come to Kashmir. It is absolutely true that tribesmen reached And Kashmir without any effort on the part of the Azad Kashmir Government.

With regard to the tribesmen coming into the Azad kashmir liberation movement, the Government of India held altogether a different view, In their original complaint to the Security Council, the Indian representative to the United Nations in his letter of the 1st January, 1948, submitted in para No.2 of his complaint that:

“On the 24th October, the Government of India heard of a

major raid from the Frontier Province of the Dominion of

Pakistan into the valley of Kashinir. Some two thousand

or more fully armed and equipped men came by motor transport, crossed over to the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmit, sacked the town of Muzaffarabad, killing many people, and proceeded along the Jhelum Valley road towards Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu and Kashn,ir State. Intermediate towns and villages were sacked and burnt, and many people killed. These raiders were stopped by Kashmir State troops near Un, a town some fifty miles from Sninagar, for some time, but the invaders got round them and burnt the power house at Mahora, which supplied electricity to the whole of Kashmir.”

Then, again, in para No.8 of the complaint, the Indian representative alleged that-

The intervention of the Government of India resulted in the saving of Srinagar. The raiders were driven back from Baramula to Un, and are held there by Indian troops. Nearly 19,000 raiders face the Dominion forces in this area. Since operations in the Valley of Kashmir started, pressure by the raiders against the Western and SouthWestern border of Jammu and Kashmir State has been intensified. Exact figures are not available. It is understood, however, that nearly 15,000 raiders are operating against this part of the State. State troops are besieged in certain areas. Incursions by the raiders into State territory, involving murder, arson, loot and the abduction of women, continue. The booty is collected and carried over to thc tribal areas to serve as an inducement to the further recruitment of tribesmen to the ranks of the raiders. In addition to those actively participating in the raid, tribesmen and others, estimated to 100,000, have been collected in different places in the districts of West Punjab bordering Jammu and Kashmir State, and many of them are receiving military training under Pakistan nationals, including officers of the Pakistan Army. They are looked after in Pakistan territory, fed, clothed, armed and otherwise equipped, and transported to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir State with the help, direct and indircct, of Pakistan officials, both military and civil.”

The allegations contained in this complaint were thoroughly refuted by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the debate which subsequently took place in the Security Council. It is certainly true that tribesmen, as they proceeded on to Srinagar, committed certain excesses but surely the allegations contained in the complaint by India are not correct. The reasons which impelled the tribesmen to come into the Kashmir Liberation movement have been examined. In spite of India’s propaganda that the tribesmen were sent into Kaslunin at the instance of the Government of Pakistan, the central fact remains that the people of West Pakistan were deeply stirred by the developments in Kashmir and there was a universal desire to go to the succour of the oppressed Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir, many of whom had close ties of blood and kinship with the residents of the former N.W.F.P. and formen West Punjab. Consequently, a considerable number of tribesmen and msldents of West Pakistan, including refugees from India, crossed the borders of the State on the 22nd October, 1947 in order to help their brethren in distress.

The Government of Pakistan did its best to stop this incursion, but, with its Army in the process of{reorganisation and all available troops engaged in rescue opetations in East Punjab, or tied dov?n to the North-Western Frontier, it could not stem the tide of tribal advance. Excitement in the tribal area was indeed so great that it is doubtful whether anything short of a large-scale military operation could check the tribal movement. Pakistan was not in a position to undertake such an operation, nor would it have been approved by public opinion.

When tribesmen did come to our aid their management became a difficult problem. Like all arthies, they also marched and fought on their bellies. To manage different camps on a long road, where these tribesmen could be led, was an exfraordinary job. Since we were not conversant with their habits, ways of life or their temperament we had some difficulties in understanding them in the beginning. Matters became easier when we came to know them.

Tribesmen need constant and careful watch in war. One could not expect them to fight and conquer, and theit hold

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ground. That is where we made a terrific mistake. Tribesmen are a fluid element. They must have a professionally trained force with them so that the ground covered may be held by such a force. When the tribal Lashkar retreated from Srinagar, we had no other troops to hold the territory evacuated by them. If we had sonic regular troops from l’oonch or other areas, we could have held ground in the valley by the use of hill positions, in fact this is what happened over the top of tJri, where; though India occupied road positions, we held the hills to make It Impossible for Indian troops to. have a link with i’oonch, where they remained surrounded for months. This action is a lesson for the future that the tribes are good for a large-scale attack where the enemy may be running, or where they may not have dug in.

Tribesmen are good at two things. They are, in truth, masters of these. One is laying of an ambush and the other is dagger fighting when surrounded by the enemy. When tribesmen know that a hundred lorries are cariying ammunition you can safely leave it to them to lay an ambush in a fashion unknown to regular troops. They simply crawl over the whole ground, camouflage themselves perfectly to spring a unique surprise on the enemy. This happened in the ICashniir fight on a lange number of occasions. The other thing in which the tribesmen beat everybody is ix dager fighting. Once tribesmen are surrounded by the enemy, one can be sure that a tribesmen will fight with his knife. In the battle for the Pandu hills on Muzaffarabad front, I am told, tribesmen used the dagger with great success.

One cannot use tribesmen in an. attack, though Sulemankhel on Nowshera front did marvelously well in an attack also. Tribesmen fight in small groups, using all sorts of weapons, and crawling up to enemy positions. But before they prepare for a thing like this, they have got to be put in that mood. They start by beating their drums not caring that the enemy would know their position. Tribesmen had to suffer losses on many occasions due to such things. Very heavy because a tribal attack never consists of a large group of men.

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It is a moot point whether or not we should have withdrawn the tribesmen from Icashmir front. One loss that we have suffered in withdrawing them made the value of their physical presence evident. Tribesmen were in reality a great threat to the enemy. It is not now possible to have them back on the front because It may involve Pakistan in international complications. On the other hand, it would have been a difficult job to maintain huge Lashkars of tribesmen on the front. Their management is a job which is not altogether free from difficulties. And, in any case, how long would It have been possible for any government to maintain a disorganized Lashkar on the front sticking to some positions doing nothing? You cannot use tribesmen as a regular army. That in fact Is what makes tribesmen differentfrom the regular forces.

The And Kashmir people will owe a debt of gratitude to the tribesmen for generations to come for coming to their rescue at a very critical time. There may have been excesses but excesses are committed in all wars, even by regular aitties. The Indian army of occupation on icashmir committed excess beyond ones imagination and description. Tribesmen have great qualifies of comradeship and sincerity. They are simple and brotherly. Tbey cannot tolerate insults and are always quick to retaliate if insulted.

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Chapter IX

AZAD KASHMIR ARMY

A fine small army was produced during the Azad Kashmir movement. I have narrated the circumstances which necessitated the formation of this army. The Dogra Army, in complete co-operation with the RSSS, started playing a dangerous role in Jammu and ICashmir State. Very fortunately, the designs of these forces came to be known to the people in time. These designs were clandestinely backed by the Government of the time. The combination of these circumstances left no other alternative with the people of the State but to prepare to defend themselves. The age-long tyranny of the Dogra Maharajas had made people bend completely under their oppression but the designs of a mass annihilation could not be tolerated.

How the of Mad Kashmir Movement took its birth has been described elsewhere. As a natural result of the people’s will to overthrow a reign of tyranny, which now sanctioned butchery, an Army came to be formed in a crude shape, which, in due course, modified itself into a regular army, to be respected even by the enemy. In the beginning the leadership of this pedple’s Army was in the hands of local commanders who were trained soldiers of either the 1914-19 war or the last war of 193945. Under them were fully-trained young released soldiers of the old Indian Army. These soldiers had fought in Libya, Malaya and Burma in the Second World War and in European campaigns in the two World Wars. They had met other people who had fought for their freedom against Hitler and other forces of Fascism. These soldiers were not mere dummies but soldiers who were conscious of their fight -- a fight for freedom. These soldiers were not soldiers of fortune, nor a group of paid men, because they received no pay. The

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Azad Army was a people’s Army in the real sense of the term, which was spontaneously formed as a result of a peoples will and resolution to free their land of a Government which had completely alienated the sympathies of the people and had used force and third degiee methods to suppress them.

There was no plan or method of regular recruitment. What exactly happened was this: The possibility of mass annihilation by the Dogra troops, who were stationed in different centres and villages throughout the State. came to be confronted by the people, who then started organising themselves into formations which could fight it out with the Dogra troops. Small village bands were organised to begin with. From villages, these organisations grew into sector organisations, and a sector organisation was under the authority of a Sector Commander. From Sectors they developed this organisation into an Area Command. An Area Command was presided over by the senior-most officer amongst them. From an Area Command, the whole thing enlarged itself into different commands, and started operating on different fronts. The front Commanders held under them a number of battalions, which were never organised into Brigades.

With the beginning of the campaign, there could not possibly be a unified Command. Therefore, where there were Dogra troops stationed, the Azad Army grew into Battalion shape or a Company formation, as the case was, and took up their local fight with Dogra Garrison under the command of a locally chosen leader. But as soon as the areas were cleared, and fronts were established on a regular line, these small formations evolved into bigger formations, till they developed into front commands. Actual unification of command took place about three months after under General Tariq, who was a capable officer.

The main handicaps that this Army organisation suffered, were a deadly lack of weapons and an absence of any line of communication. Therefore, so far as their supplies of rations were concerned they were all collected locally and supplied to the troops on the front by the local people themselves, How the local people co-operated with their army, and got themselves

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into this army machine, surprises one when one looks at it now. The proof of how marvellously people can act in a crisis was given by these people.

How this revolt in the State of Jammu and Kashmir originated, and how the people took up arms against the established government of Maharaja Nan Singh, was very well described by Sheikh Abdullah himself. As reported by the Associated Press of India under the dateline, New Delhi, October 21,1947, Sheikh Abdullab expressed himself as follows-

“That the present troubles in Poonch, a feudatory of ICashmir, were because of the policy adopted by the State. The people of Pooncji who suffered under their local ruler, and again under the Kashmir Durbar, who was the overlord of the Poonch ruler, had started a peoples movement for the redress of their grievances. It was not communal. The Icashmir State sent their hoops, and there was panic in Foonch. But most of the adult population in Poonch were ex-Servicemen in the Indian Army, who had close connection with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children, crossed the Frontier, and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The present position wa~ that the Kashmir State Forces were forced to withdraw in certain areas,~

The same story has been repeated in different language by Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, one of the Hindu leaders of Kashmir, in these words“In Poonch, where thousands of demobilized Muslim

veterans of the Second World War live, an open armed rebellion broke out against the Maharaja and his new administration. The rebellion spread rapidly to the adjoining area of Mirpur, where also war veterans live in large numbers. Instead of realising what he had done, Maharaja Hari Singh, egged on by Congress leaders and the new Counsellors, despatched the whole of the Dogra Army to quell the disturbances, or, as one Rajput Colonel

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puts it: to reconquer the area’. The Army perpetrated unheard of atrocities on the people of Poonch; whole villages were burned down and innocent people massacred. Reports reaching Srinagar were not allowed to be published in the press, and no official reports were issued to allay the fears of the public. This happened in September, and the tribesmen did not enter the State be~re 23rd of October, 1947.

As the war hardened in Kashmir, and the front stabilized, the Azad Kashmir Army started its own training centres to feed its fighting forces. It had become necessary, because, after all, the Azad Kashmir Area had only a population of ten lacs, and it could not supply trained soldiers to an Army which had swelled to dyer 50,000. Young boys came forward to enlist themselves in the And Army. Some of them were only 15/16 years of age. I saw some of these boys on the front during the Azad ICashmir War. Once I saw a young soldier coming back on foot to his headquarters. this young lad was hardly 15 years of age, and was completely covered with dirt and lice,. He was bare-footed, and without any uniform worth the name. He had been fighting on a ridge which was at least seven thousand feet high and covered with snow. This young lad had been on the front with his rifle for days together. I was told later, that he was ordered back to headquarters for a change and had left the front with tears in his eyes. Similarly, small boys ran away from their homes and joined different units, trained themselves on the front, and then fought without regular rations or uniform of any sort, and of course, without any kind of pay.

It is difficult to narrate, in any detail, all or even a few instances of personal bravery. But I would like to mention some of them which are in my personal knowledge because of my close conta~t with the Azad Army. One Subedar, who was an M.C. of the old Indian Army, was leading an attack on a Dogra position in the Mang area, of Tehsil Sudhanoti of Poonch. This was the last of a number of pockets of resistance which was to be liquidated. The Dogras were entrenched in a school building which was housing a lot of ammunition and Arms belonging to the enemy. This school building was defended by probably two or three soldiers of the enemy. I must incidentally mention here

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that Dogra is a good fighter and can easily be considered one of the best fighters among the Hindus. The situation had become desperate for us because reinforcements to relieve this small garrison had come within sight and started bombarding the place with a Y mortar, Our soldiers wanted arms and ammunition very badly. If this school building was captured to our men they could get a lot of arms and ammunition. The difficulty was that this building was being defended by means of a bren.gun, which makes all the difference. At that stage our boys could not even dream of possessing a bren gun. This great Subedar crawled all the way and reached the window of the building where these bren guns seemed to be posted. He wanted to jump on the soldiers who were using the bren guns. As soon as he tried to do so, a bunt of shots pierced him through his chest. He was followed by his two nephews, who also met the same fate; but a number of others followed and the school building surrendered and we captured a large store of arms and ammunition.

When the Indian Army started their push towards ICoth in the end of 1948, the position became every precarious. The Indian Army started their offensive with tanks. This being hilly area, there was no big tank formation, but attack was nevertheless led by a number of tanks. We, of course, had no tanks nor anti-tank guns. A large number of boys volunteered to attack the advancing tanks with grenades. They laid an ambush and jumped into the tanks with grenades in their hands. These boys were slashed to ribbons but the tanks were put out of action. We are told Japanese soldiers performs great deeds of persona] bravery but I am sure our soldiers did no less.

On the Bhimber front in the district of Mirpur, a tribesman of the Sulemankhel Tribe performed an equally great desi when he crawled for about 400 yards and jumped on three soldiers who had been operating a machine-gun post. On all fronts, Mabsood and Mohamand tribesmen laid ambush for lorries in a way which by itself was a great feat of personal courage. In the hospitals, I saw these young men often severly wounds but they were always in high spirits. Tribesmen are great soldiers, but only as tribesmen. If we by to train them and teach them the regular tactics of army; they are no longer the

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terror that as tribesmen they are. During the month of August, 1947, the first conflict that took place with the Dogra Army was in a place named Khaigala, round about Rawalakot Area of Tehsil Sudhanoti of Poonch. The Dogra Army was sending forces to different area. Half a battalion’s strength was being sent to Bagh to suppress the ‘trouble there. The Bagh people had requested the Rawalakot people to stop, or at least hamper, the progress of this Dogra Battalion. Five hundred people without arms gathered to stop this unit. These people had stones and axes in their hands. This crowd was duly warned by the Commander of the unit, who never expected anything from the people except a demonstration, till a volley of stones started, with the result that some Dogra Army soldiers were injured. On this the Dogra unit opened fire on the crowd, killing a large number of people. How these people with their sheer courage and audacity opposed a regular army unit is an instance without parallel.

The Azad Army later on was commanded by good officers. Though some of these officers had their limitations even some substantial work was done to organise the Army on a real war basis. In all these efforts for making the Azad Kashmir Army a regular organisatlon. General Tariq played a great part. Indeed, It was General Tariqs presence which kept some of these officers together.

The Azad Army played a unique historical role. In spirit, in their devotion to a cause and in their unprecedented sacrifices, the Azad Army will be placed as second to none. After the cease-fire was ordered in the State of Jammu and ICashmir its units were given training and put into gear. Officers were given to these units, in their training centres, to bring them upto the level of a regular Aimy. Azad Army forces were reduced from 4045 Battalions to about 30 Battalions.

The Army of Azad Kashmir is naturally an ally of the Pakistan Army. The Pakistan Army has to play an historical role in Asia, not only in the defence of the land of Pakistan but also in the defence of those principles on the basis of which Pakistan has come Into existence. In the context of present

108

internatjop.al affairs, the Pakistan Army will indeed one day be called upon to perform great deeds. If any such occasion arises, And Army men will stand shoulder to shoulder with the Pakistan Army soldiers. We must never forget that the Pakistan Army is the greatest asset of Pakistan. The magnificent role played by the Pakistan Army during the Kashn,jr campaign in their own way does not strictly fall within the purview of this small book. Pakistan Army is not an Army definitely of occupation in Azad Kashmir, as is the Indian Army in occupied Kashmir. Pakistan army is there to defend their frontiers and to defend the values on the basis of which Pakistan was formed These soldiers are there also to defend the lives, property and homes of the Kashmiri Mussalmans

Under the IJ.N.C.LP Resolution, a cease-fire had been agreed upon ~n Jammu and ICashmir State. This U.N.C.I.P. Resolution was mainly in three parts-

(a)
The cease-fire agreement;

(b)
The truce agreement; and

After the cease_fire had been agreed upon agreement on the truce had to follow and was to be implemented by the Government of India and Pakistan, but this did not prove to be a smooth sailing. As soon as the question of demilitari~tion was taken up, India tried to wriggle out of the undertakings to implement the resolutjo,,.~ of the U.N.C.I.p. by putting in fresh proposals in order to defeat the demilitarization plan. India in I~er attempt to by-pass the accepted demilitarization terms raised two objections;

(a)
Disposal of Azad ICashn,ir Forces;

(b)
Question of the administration and defence of the Northern Areas.

When the Government of India raised the question of disposal of Azad Kashmir Forces, the U.N.C.I.p. took a clear-cut and unambiguous stand. The Commission In their letter of

109

September 19, 1948, addressed to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said-

“Moreover, the Commission agreed that it will be anxious to reduce the truce period to a minimum, and that the resolution does not contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of Azad Kashmir Forces”.

The Commission made the position clear in more or less the same language to the Government of India. The Commissions Chairman in his letter to the Prime Minister of India dated August 17,1948 said that:“Limited Government of Indian forces would remain, and

that on the other side only the Azad people would remain in their position.”

Before the controversy about the disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir Forces became extTemely acute, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, stated to the Commission as follows-

‘The disarming of And Forces is really a matter of chronology. First there must be a cease-fire and, after that a truce, as envisaged In Parts I and II of the Commission’s resolution of 13th August, 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arranging for the holding of the plebiscite, is the creation of conditions in which the Kashmir Nationals can return to the. area now in the occupation of Azad Kashmir Forces. So far as non-Muslims are concerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarmament of these for&s had been carried out”.

The point of contention was whether the Azad Kashmir Forces should be disbanded and dissolved before the plebiscite stage, or whether the IJ.N.C.I.F. resolution contemplated the disposal and disposition of the And Kashmir Forces by the Plebiscite Administrator himself. The Government of India maintained, that before the Indian troops can be withdrawn, And ICashmir Forces should be disbanded. The Commission

110

and the Government of Pakistan, on the other hand, held the view that, according to the U.N.C.I.P. resolution~ the disposition and disposal of Azad Kashmir Forces only lies with the Plebiscite Administrator before the actual plebiscite takes place. Oniy on that particular point of time, the question of disbanding or disposaj or disposition of the Azad Xaslmiir Force, can be considered and not before that.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in his speech during the Security Council’s Session of February, 1950, stated:The next question to consider is, whether India is light in

contending that the Commission’s Resolutions required that the And ICash,njr Forces should be disbanderi and disarmed during the truce stage, or whether Pakistan is Correct in contending that this has to take place during the plebiscite stage. On that, of course, the best evidence is the language of the Resolutions itself. In that respect, I would first submit that the Resolution of 13 August, 1947, which deals with the cease-fire and truce, makes no reference to the And Forces whatsoever, and that, in itself, is conclusive evidence that the disbanding and disarming of the And Kashmir forces, such as was later contemplated, was not to take place under the Resolution, that is to say, not during the truce stage. This was repeatedJy explained both to Pakistan and to India.

Mr. Korbel, Chairman of the Commjs~~ expressed his views on this matter in the following words:“That the Commission had taken great pains to assure the

military balance on both sides, and the element of balance had been continuaily at the back of the Commissions mind, while drafting the resolution.”

Mr. Korbel then asked the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to take note of the fact that-

‘Even after the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, the

Azad Forces would still muster 35 battalions of armed

people, who were not asked to disarm or to withthaw”

1ll

Some sort of explanation was also given by the Commission to the Government of India. From the summary record of the meeting that took place between the Prime Minister of India and the Commission on 17 August, 1948, it is evident that the Commission explained to the Prime Minister of India in the following words:-

“Moreover, he pointed out that limited Government of India forces would Temarn, and that, on the other side, only the And people would remain in their positioif.

When we go to the resolution of 4 January, 1949, of the CommissIon, Paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution reads as below:tiAfter implementation of Parts I and 11 of the Commission’s resolution of 13 August, 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administlatot will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces; such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite”.

The second part of same Paragraph reads:

~M regards the territory referred to in A-2 of Part H of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed Forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator, full consultation with the local authorities.

The territories referred in this resolution are the And Kashmir territories.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan making his speech during the Security Council Session of February, 1950, on the Icashmir question, explained”.

112

“It is as clear as anything could be that in the whole scheme of demilitarization, the disbanding and disarmament -- or call it the final disposal of the Mad Kashmjy Forces, was to be undertaken at the plebiscite stage, and along with the final disposal of the remaining Indian forces, and of all the armed forces of the State of Kashmir. As late as the 18th February, 1949 — after the acceptance of both the resolutions of U.N.C.LP -- the correct position with regard to the Azad Kashmir forces was known and accepted by the Government of India:

The Government of India, after they had accepted the U.N.C.I.p. resolution of August 13, 1948, began to change their position. In his letter of 10 March, 1949 to the Commission, Sir Girja Slianicar Bajpai, the Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs for the Government of India, states the following:-

Pakistan forces must be withdrawn entirely from Jammu and Kashmir State territory, and the disposal of the so-called Mad ICashmir forces during the period of the truce, must be so arranged as to prepare the way for the ultimate disbanding and disarming of these forces”.

The Commission while answering the letter of Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai on 14 March, 1949, in their paragraph 2, stated as follows:— “In the course of the conversations last August, the

Commission explained to the Government of Pakistan, that in its view, a Military balance would exist in the Sate of Jammu and ICashmir during the truce period, in the sense and to the extent, that the Resolution of the 13 August did not call for the disarming or disbanding of the Mad Kashmir forces, which the Conm~jssion understood to number approximately 35 battalions.”

Then again in their letter of 28 April, 1949, the Commission reiterated their position in the following words:

113

“The Commission of India will understand that the Commission cannot deal, at this stage, with the question of disbanding and disarming the And lcashmir Forces, since it does not fall within the purview of the resolution of the 13 August. Nevertheless, the Commission appreciates the significance of the question, and is anxious to consider it without delay.

“‘While the Commission cannot share the view of the Government of India, that a reduction of its forces beyond the strength mentioned in your letter of 17 April, 1949, must depend upon the actual disbanding and disarming of the Mad Icashmir Forces, it is convinced that an early study of the matter would hasten the preparations for the plebiscite”.

This long controversy shows how the Government of India were extremely touchy on the subject of the Azad Icashmir Forces. They insisted throughout that the Azad Kashmir Forces should be immediately disbanded so that the truce agreement could be brought about. This was altogether a new stand on the part of the Government of India and demonstrated in clear terms that India was really apprehensive of the fighting qualities of the Azad Kashmir Forces, and at the back of their mind lay the lurking fear that, during the truce period, the cease-fire could be broken and the entire State overrun by the Azad Kashmir Forces. One cannot easily understand this apprehension, when the Government of Pakistan is prepared to give an undertaking to the Security Council, and to the Government of India, that there will be no breach of the cease-fire. If the intentions of the Government of India were genuine then they should have been able to accept the word of the Government of Pakistan.

Today the issue could be resolved provided one knew exactly where the Government of India stood. It is not quite clear as to whether the Government of India are making the issue of disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir Forces, as an excuse to avoid the truce agreement, and ultimately the plebiscite, or whether they genuinely believe that the Azad

It will be seen that behind all this long controversy is the intention of the Government of India to defeat the holding of the plebiscite.

114

Kashmir Forces are a real handicap to the holding of a plebiscite. If this were clear, one could surely think of definite and different appmach to the whole problem.

So far as the Azad Kashmir point of view is concerned, we accepted even the stationing of a large number of Indian troops on the side of occupied Kashmir, and, in his last speech in the final session of the Security Council, the Foreign Minister, of Pakistan went so far as to say that Pakistan would be prepared to accept 28 Battalions to be stationed in Indian occupied Kashmir, provided India left the Mad Kashmir forces in tact on the Azad Kashmir side, This, of course, surprised the Government of India.

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Chapter X

AZAD JAMMU & ICASHMIR

GOVERNMENT

WflEN restlessness in the State took concrete form of an organised revolt against the Maharaja’s Government, nobody had any clear idea about the shape the revolt was going to take•r4t was impossible for the leaders of the Muslim Conference to call their working committee or to come to a joint decision with regard to this matter. As a matter of fact, since the General Council meeting of July, 1947, it was not possible to get into easy contact with leaders of the Muslim Conference living in different parts of the State. General traffic was disrupted and the situation changed every day from bad to worse. Under these circumstances one could not visualize a joint and a concerted action. During the month of August, 1947, only those leaders of the conference could meet and decide things who were available in the city of Srinagar. Eversince I had left Srinagar, I was unable to contact any of my colleague. The acting President of Muslim Conference had delegated all powers to me to pursue our struggle. What I could do there has been narrated in the preceding pages.

Since October, 1947, events changed quickly in the Southern parts of the State, particularly Kathua to Muzaffarabad. Fighting had already started from the 6th October at different places. The Dogra troops were putting up a stiff resistance at some places but had 5urrendered large areas. When these areas came into the possession of the Mad Army, we were faced with the problems of their administration and restoring law andorder there. These were difficult problems but more so for us because we had also to continue our fight against the Dogra troops. Necessary organisation had to be built on the ground, the Azad Army had to be organised and recruits had to

116

be supplied to it after giving them necessary training. Rations and ammunition had to be carried to the troops to feed them. The line of communication had to be set up behind the troops. The building of roads and the opening of hilly areas had to be undertaken. All these matters urgently called for the formation of a Government which could ujidertake these functions.

On the 24th October, 1947, for the first time since the year 1846, there came into being a Government parallel to that which was now in Srinagar headed by Sir Hart Singh. Since 1931, the political movement had always aimed at responsible Government under the aegis of Maharaja Han Singh himself. Whether it was Muslim Conference leadership or National Conference leadership, they never conceived that a parallel independent Government could be set up after an armed rebellion against the Maharajas Government. Of Course, such critical times had never come to pass since 1846. Such momentous decisions fell on the shoulders of the leadership of the Muslim Conference which was now working underground. No leader in jail could be consulted. Even if it were possible it is very difficult to say if any of the leaders in jail would have approved of such a revolutionary step.

On the 24th October, 1947,. this parallel Government was declared to have been established with its capital at Pulandri, a small own on the southern side of Foonch along the Jhelum river. I was unanimously voted as the first President of the liberated areas of Kashmir, named Azad Jammus and Icashmir. This was unanimously endoried decision of the Working Committee of All Jarnmu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. The Government which 1 had then formed comprised the following:

1.
Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim
President

2.
Syed AU Ahined Shah
Defence Minister

a
Ch. Abdullah Kban Bahafli
Revenue Minister

t
Kh. Chulam Din Wani
Home Minister

5.
Syed Nazir Hussain Shah
Finance Minister

&
Mw Waiz Muhammad Yusuf Shah
Education Minister

7.
Khawaja Sanaullah Shamin
Civil Supplies Ministe

117

The basis of this Government was that President was the Head of the State, and also the Head of the Government. He appointed his Ministers as Head of the State and the Minister worked with him as a Cabinet to be responsible to him. The President kept some portfolios for himself and distributed the remaining portfolios to other Ministers. The Minister, therefore, could be asked to resigu, or they could be dismissed by the President, if any such necessity arose. The political party, All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, through its Working Committee, gave their unstinted support to all this. As a matter of fact there was no one prepared at that moment .to assume the onerous and dangerous role of President about whose government even two persons outside the State were not agreed.

Nobody contemplated, with any seriousness, the question that the set up was going to last long enough. No one at that time liked to be brought into it. The reason was that most of the leaders had their families either in Srinagar or Jarnmu city. My family was also in Srinagar at that time. I was prepared to run the risk and I was the approved choice of all my colleagues. the small considerations of ones family would sink into the backvound if one were to see, with open eyes, the great events that were taking place around us. There was no time even to think about ones children or wife. This matter had to be left to the will and protection of Almighty God. My wife and child had to sneak out of Srinagar in a desperate condition. My wife was then in the family way. From Un, on Srinagar-Domel Road, to Rawajakot, my home place, she had to walk on foot, a distance of thirty miles. They were followed by Secret Police all the way but they succeeded in dodging them.

Following is the text of the statement issued by Provisional And Government of Kashmir:The Provisional Azad Government, which the people of

Jammu and Kashmir have set up a few weeks ago with the object of ending intolerable Dogra tyrannies and securing to the people of the State, induding Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, the right of free self-Government has now established its rule over a major portion of the Stgte t~rritory and hopes to liberate the remaining pockets of

118

Dogn nile very soon. In view of these circumstances it has been reconstituted with Mr. rbrahim, Bar-at-Law, of Poonch as its provisionaJ head, and its headquarters have been moved to Plandari in Poonch.

The new Government represents the united will of the

Jammu arid Kashmin State to be free from the rule of the

Dogra dynasty which has long suppressed and oppressed

the people.

The movement of liberty which has culminated in the formation of the present provisional Government has a long history dating from 1929. Thousands of Jammu and Kashmir people, including members of all communities, have suffered death and imprisonment in the cause of this movement. One of its forms was the Quit Kashmir Movement launched in the Kashmir valley last year.

It will be recalled that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as a friend of the suffering people of Indian States went to help this movement at the time but was not allowed to enter the States territory under the order of the ex-Ruler Han Singh. The tyrannies perpetrated by the Raja and his officials and his troops on the people increased with the increase In the desire of the people for freedom and self-Government.

Recently a prominent Hindu patriot, who wanted to proceed to Karachi and New Delhi to represent the intolerable conditions in the State to our neighbouring Dominions of Pakistan and India was arrested by the exRuler’s officials.

The united will of the people has, however, overcome the organised violence of the Ruler’s armies. I-fe and his so-called Prime Minister have fled from Icashmir and will perhaps soon flee from Jammu as well.

The Provisional Government, which is assuming the administration of the State is most emphatically not a communal Government. It will include Muslims as well as

119

non-Muslims in the provisional Cabinet which will serve the people, the temporary purpose of restoring law and order in the State and enable the people to elect by their free vote a popular legislature and a popular Government.

The Provisional Government entertain sentiments of the utmost friendliness and goodwill towards its neighbouring Dominions of India and Pakistan and hopes that both the Dominions will sympathise with the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their efforts to exercise their birthright of political freedom. The Provisional Government is further anxious to safeguard the identity of Jammu and Kashmir as political entity.

The question of accession of Jammu and Kashmin to either Dominion can only be decided by the free vote of the people in the form of a referendum. The Provisional Government will make prompt arrangements for this and hopes to invite independent observers to see that the question is decided by the free will of the people?

When this Government was proclaimed it had the solid backing of the Muslims all over the State, whether in occupied or liberated areas. Some of the non-Muslims also backed it. This Government was supported by a small but strong volunteer Army of 30,000 soldiers and had enough territory to establish its stronghold on what came to be known as Azad Kashmir territory.

When it came into being it had very little with which it could run. It had no funds whatsoever no buildings, no staff, nothing worth mentioning. What it had behind it was the strong and solid will of a united people who wanted to sacrifice their all to get emancipation from Dogra troops- This unity of purpose and will to fight carried us a long way. This fight had its international repercussions. The story of the Mad Kashmir Movement since then has spread all round the world.

Mythical names entered into the history of Jammu and Kashmir State. Pulandri, Trarkhel, Chikoti, Chinnari and Chunnj and so many others. These naMes flashed across the

120

world press. They made history, though lying in far-flung unapproachable corners of the State. Great stories of heroism and sacrifice came to be connected with these names. In these places and all along the 300 to 400 miles long front, a grim drama of life and death was being staged. There are other places which will never be forgotten by the unknown soldiers of unknown places who had come all the way from Afghanistan and Palestine to take part in the Kashmir 1€/tad--holy war. There are still other places which entomb the sacred bodies of boys who had run away from their parents and homes to sacrifices their young-lives to a cause so dear to the Mussalmans in Pakistan and all over the world!

As soon as the Government of Azad Kashmir was announced, the news went around the world. The revolt against the Maharaja of Kashmir was given wide publicity by all sections of the press, both in England and America. The establishment of a Government parallel to that of Maharaja Han Singhs in ordinary circumstances would not probably attract so much attention. But because of the extraordinary period of history through which we were passing, the announcement of this Government made indeed a very big news. The tension that existed between India and Pakistan was a strong factor contributing towards the publicity this Governmeni got in Pakistan as well as abroad. Though, up to the present day, the Pakistan Government have been unable to see their way to give de jure recognition to it, the de facto position of this Government has been recognised. The people of Pakistan, however, gave their fullest support to the whole of the liberation movement of Azad Kashrnir.

Some of the difficulties which confronted this infant, inexperienced Government have been mentioned above. There were very great difficulties and handicaps which faced the organising of the liberation movement itself and the establishment of a full-fledged Azad iCashmir Government. In the first place, we had no capitaJ. Pulandri, a very small town at one end of Poonch district, was first adopted as a capital. As Pulandri was the first town to be surrendered by Dogras, and because It was also very easily accessible from the borders of Pakistan by a kacha road and a bridge over the Ihelurn river, it

121

was considered to be the most appropriate place. During the months of November and December, 1947, we established different Departments of this Government in the crudest of forms. We established tents around this little town of l’ulandri in the thickness of forests and each tent was a department, and so many departments were under different Ministers. These thick forests were a complete camouflage against an air attack.

One can not easily imagine how a Government could have possibly stood on its legs in such circumstances when it was totally disconnected with the rest of the civilized world. The capital, however, was transferred later on from Pulandri to Trarkhel because of enemy air attacks.

Secondly, the difficulties that we faced in the establishment of this organisation was due to the non-availability of experienced staff. The whole cabinet, including myself, did not have the experience which was needed, not only to run a Government but to establish a new one from the beginning. We -had no experienced officers nor secretaries to assist us in the planning of all this. Even ordinary clerks were not available and those who were available, were very much unwilling to work in war areas, which were frequently bombed by enemy planes. No one could give them sufficient protection against the random bombing of the enemy. A small number of officers and clerks volunteered and worked, even under these conditions. Some of these boys were from the city of Jammu, from where they had been hounded out as refugees. They readily accepted the call which I sent them in Sialkot. A lot of credit for working and living in p’aces where regular shelter was not available, where food could not be obtained easily. where no transport for coming back to Pakistan was even to be thought of, goes to these people.

I might narrate here that, on one occasion, in this little town of Pulandri the whole of this Government was pretty nearly finished by an enemy plane. We were holding a meeting with public at Pulandri after 5 O’clock. It was absolutely out of question for an enemy plane to come that way after 5 0’ clock in the month of December. All the Ministers and important officials were taking part in this meeting. No less than 500

122

people were also present there to receive instructions or submit their applications. The little town of Pulandri is at the base of a rising hill. Suddenly from over the hill an enemy plane appeared right above our heads. This plane was most likely coming from the Un front and was returning to its base in Jammu. We were caught completely unaware, but luckily this plane had no bomb, It started strafing the crowd. Twenty people completely and immediately covered all my body with theirs, with the result that most of them were injured. This is one of the many Instances which go to show how much we depended on the unflinching loyalty of our people. I can quote instances of such loyalty without number.

In spite of these difficulties, we were able to establish, within six months, a well - run administration A police department to maintain law and order and a system of Judiciary were brought into being. And also a Magistracy was established which, besides doing case work, helped us in the mobilization of war material. We were able to collect land revenue and àustoms duties with facility and ease.

The way common man reacted to the revolutionary changes was a surprising experience. Suddenly, in 1947, the whole machinery of law and order broke down in the State. People were left without any Police and without any courts. There was no other public organisation which could immediately replace Dogra Administration The common people rose magnificently to meet this crisis. Each village formed a village committee which took upon itself the performance of the following functions:

(a)
Prevention of crimes;

(N Decision and adjudication of all disputes;

(d)
Transport of arms and ammunition to the fighting front;

(e)
Enrollment of new recruits and their despatch to the training Centres;

123

(f)
- Looking after the non-Muslims scattered all over

the State;

(g)
Looking after the property left by the non-

Muslims.

There was no central Punchayat which could coordinate the work of different villages but every village committee nicely co-operated with the neighbouring village committee.

The committee’s orders in the village were final and were rarely questioned by anyone.

When the Azad Kashmir Government started functioning in January, 1948, these local committees extended their cooperation, and by their co-operation alone, the Azad Kashmir Government established their Counts, Police Stations, and ultimately realised revenues for the State. I can state without contradiction that during 1947-48 and 1949 dacoity and murder cases were one in a thousand. Even small crimes were practically non-existent. The credit for what Azad Kashmir Government has been able to do to establish its position within and abroad all goes to the people without whose willing cooperation all this would have been impossible.

All this was made feasible also by the magnificent cooperation and support that we got from the people of Pakistan. They liberally and generously contributed money and good-will and their sincere efforts towards the establishment of the Azad Kashmir Government. All over, the citizens of Pakistan formed associations to work for the cause of Azad Kashmir. These associations did solid propaganda in Pakistan and abroad for the Azad Kashmin Movement and collected money and recruited volunteers for the Azad Army. From Peshawar to Karachi the Azad Kashmir leaders got a great ovation and much applause. The Azad Kashmir Movement probably organised the people of Pakistan, just as much as the people of Kashmir.

In their resolution adopted on 13th August 1948, the United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan dealt with

124

the subject of the Azad Kasfjnijr Government in Part II under

Truce Agreement Under Part II A-a the reso1ufl~ says:“Pending a final solution, the territo~.y evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administers by the local authofl1j~ under the surveillans of the ConiJlljssj011l

The Indian Covemm~t were always touchy on the subje.j of the Azad ICashmir Government In his letter of 20th August 1948, addres~~j to M. Josef Korbel, Pandit Jawal~nlal Nehr,j, the Prime Minister of India, in paragraph (3), sub-p~,~~ (I) stated as follows:~That paragraph A-32 of Part II of the resolution (13th

August, 1948) should not be interpreted or applied in

practice, so as:

(a)
to bring into question the sovereigi~ of the Jammu and ICash,,iir Government over the portion of their tentho1y evacuated by the Pakistan troops;

(b)
to afford any recognition of the so-calls ‘Azad

~
Or,

The Govenu,~,~ of Pakistan always took a different view and emphasi~.j on the LJJc.cjp the impon~ce and political

signhfican~~ of the Azad Kashmir Movement and the Government of Azad Kashmir. While asking for further elucidation on the resolution of the 13th August, 1948, the Government in their Memorandum observed in Para No. 1, as under- -

‘It has been explained to the Commidion, that it is Only the Azad Kashrnjr Government that can authonise the issue of cease-fire orders to their own forces. The Pakistan Government ~vish to be informed what steps the Commission has taken, or propo~ to take, to secure the

125

agreement of the Azad Kashmir Government to its

proposals.’

In the same Memorandum in pan 8 it was stated:“In paragraph 3-A the Commission proposed that, pending

a final solution, the territory at present under the control of the Azad Kashmir Government will be administered by that Government, under the surveillance of the Commission. -The Commission no doubt realises that the population of this territory is almost wholly Muslim, and is in full support of the Azad Kashmir Government.”

It will appear that the Mad Icashmir Government became a real issue between the Government of India and the

U.N.C.I.P.
The Pakistan Government, vis-a-vis the Commission, insisted that de facto recognition must be given to the And Kashmir Government, if ads jute recognition could not be accorded to it. As it will appear from the letter of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, the Indian Government had serious objection to any recognition being given to the Azad Kashmir Government. The Commission, however, wriggled out of this problem by calling Azad Icashmir Government ‘Lodal Authorities, to be placed under nominal surveillance of the U.N.O.

While the 13th August, 1948, resolution of the tJ.NC.I.P. was a subject of correspondence between the Foreign Minister of the Government of Pakistan and the U.N.CJ.P., in his letter of 16th September, 1948, addressed to the Chairman of the U.N.CJ.P., the Foreign Minister of the Government of Pakistan observed as follows:-

“They (Government of Pakistan) desire to make it quite clear at the outset, that these views are the views of the Government of Pakistan, and arc not, as such, in any sense binding upon the And Kashmir Government, nor do they in any manner reflect the views of the Azad Kashmir Government. They note that it is the intention of the Commission to hold discussion with the Azad Kashmir representatives as individuals, and they do not doubt

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these repre~~tives will convey to the Comnijssion the views of their Government of the proposals of the Commission The Government of Palcista would at all times be prepar~ to lend th&g~j offices to pers~de the Azad Icashmi,. Government to accept the view of the proposals of the Commission which the Pakistan Goverm,~,t them.s~lyes take, but such accepta~ must rest finally with the Azad Kashn.jr Govw~.i,tent them.s~ives As had already been explained to the Con~~~011 political control over the And Xashni.jr Forces vest.~ in the Azad Xashmir Government and it is the latter Covemn~,t alone that has authon~, to issue a cease4jre order to those forces, and to conclude terms and

of a truce which would be binding upon those forces”. In the same latter it was flirt hey emrhasisecj that;“It must be stressed that the struggle for the liberation of

ICa~frpJy was initiated by And Kashnijr now represen~ by the Azaci Kashmir Government, and that the Government is necessary party to any settlement of the ICashmj~ question Indeed this view is impflcjt in the propo~l5 of the Con~jssion of °-operation between the Comn..issj0~ and the local authod~jes in several respects”

The observations of the Foreign Minister of the Government of Pakistan make one thing absolutely clear. In no uncertain language the Goveriiment of Pakistan had very nearly accepted the de Jute Position of the Azad Kaslunir Cüvernment And that only the Azad ICashmir Goverpjnent Could ultimawly agree to a cease_fire and a truce agre~*nt in Jamjnu and Kashmir State. ft is also clear from this letter that it wa$ in the Azad ICaslimir Government that the control of whole of And iCashmir Army was vested.

So far ?5 the views of the U.N.cjp with regard to the posftjon of the And ICashmir were concerned, the Commission, though implicitly accepting the de facto position of the Azad KaSIimJr Government could not see their way to give it de jute recognition. This view was expressed by Mr. Icorbel at a meeting held on 2nd September 1942, with the repre~nbtives of Government of Palcisthn in these worcjs

127

“By ‘Local Authorities” we mean the Azad Kashmir people, though we cannot grant recognition to the And Kashmir Government”.

With regard to the political authority of the Azad Kashmir Government, Mricorbel expressed his views that:-

“Subject to the Commission’s surveillance, the local authorities will have full political and adi~inistrative control, and wilt be responsible for the maintenance of law and order, and security. Neither the Indian Government nor the Maharaja’s Government at Srinagar will be permitted to send any military or civil officials to the evacuated area”.

As to the nature of surveillance, Mr. Korbel, in his meeting held on the 2nd September, 1948, said that:“As regards the term ‘surveillance’, we have used it

deliberately, in the absence of a better word. It does not mean actual control or supervision. All that we are anxious for is to appoint neutral observers to see that the local authorities carry out the truce agreement. If the local authorities do anything against the spirit of the truce proposal, the observers will report the matter to the Commission, which will then endeavour to have it set right. No interference with the local administration is intended”.

In the same meeting, when probably hard pressed by the representative of the Government of Pakistan, Mr. ICorbel accommodated the Azad lcashmir’s view-point by saying:“We have gone as far as we could to meet the point of view of the Azad ICashmir people. We have tried to deal with the de facto situation. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that the State of Jammu and Kashmir stilt exists as a legal entity. We have to respect its sovereignty.’

128

Chajryp.an of the Commi~0~ Mr. JJClaJu Huddle in his letter of the 19th Sep~mber 1948, to the Fozej~ Minister of the Government of Pakistan adnhjued that:“In COnnecfi~ with the political aspecjS of the question

rajs~.J in points 2 and 3, the existence of the Azad Kasbn.jr

Movement has not been ignoreej by the Commission consideration ther~f appearing in Part U A-a df its resolution of the 13th August, 1948.”

The United Nations Commission then sent a SubCommjttee under it to study the working of the Azad Kashj,.~ Government and report back to the Commission This Committee studied all the problems of And Kashmir in detail, after visiting all areas of the territory This Substudje4 different as~cts of ~al and economic

proble,~ of Azad Kash,~ir as well. The Sub Co ~ttee stayed in the capital of Azad Kaglunir Muzaffarahad for about a week or so and had discussion with the ~ as the

of Azad Kaslm~ir and with all the heads of Depar~,,~ m~5 submit~ a report to the U.N.C.I~ ~t the

wu never published ~ on, when I v~jted Was~n~n in 1950, 1 learnt from the Chai~an of that Committee, that the report submitted to the Commission expressed complete satiscathon over the Azad Kashmir Govenm,ent affairs

As regards the legal aspects of the Azad Icashmir Govenm~ent it is clear now that a de facto recognition to it5 existeyj~~ has been given even by the UNCIP though in an indirect manner. The Pakistan Government though not officially, but in all other ways, have given Azad Icashmir Government legal dS well as de facto recogi.j600 over the territory of Azad Kashj~j~ At one time, in the beginning of the And Kash,pj~ Movement, i had reques~ the Government of Pakistan most seriously, to give full-fledged recogr.jtion to the Azad Jammu and lCasjijpjr Government and accept it as the only legal and COflStitutional authority on behalf of the people of Janunu and ICashmjr In that case I proposed to them that the Government of Paki5~ should accept the instmmeflt of accession from this Government and treat Jammu and ICashr,*

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as a legally and COfl5titutioflaily acceded State to Pakistan. In that case, I further propose.J that the Government of Pakistan should, with every constftuuor.al right and propriety, march their troops into Kaslmm. and take possession of Srinagar and Jammu both. 11 this proposal was accepted, then the trouble about Jaminu and ICaslunir would have been cut short, arid, as some persons observed, there would have been no war in ICashmir. This is definitely proved by the later events of Junagadh and Efyderabad. I wond~ if this matter can now be considered de novo with some advantage.

This is a question which is not free from difficulty. The real constitutional position of And Jammu and ICashmir Government can easily be misunderstood What I always understood, and I emphasized before the Government of Pakistan, was the position that Pakistan Government should recognize thetovem,,~nt of Azad Jam,nu and Xashm.fr as the only represen~afi~~ Government of Jammu and ICashmir State. This, by no means, should be unders~oot4 to imply that the State of Jammu and Kashznir be recognizej as an independent entity. At no stage, since 1947, has this been seriously suggested by any President of And Jammu and Kaslunir Govemj~en~ or by any of representative Authority of Pakistan side of the cease-fire line of Kashmfr that the Jammu and Kashmjr State should be declared independent One very important and crucial point against such a suggestion is this that geographically and economically, the State cannot be independent of Pakistan. And, consequently, the State though large enough to be independent State in area, cannot be maintained as an independent State financially. This is sufficient here to mention that the proposition that State be kept independent, both of India and Pakistan, has now been debated in many quarters. This has been considered as an alternative solution for this otherwise a very difficult problem. mi5 question will be dealt with separately in another part of this book.

The Pakistan Government have since 1948 set up a Ministry of Kashmir Affairs which works as a liaison between the And ICashmir Government and the Government of Pakistan. Therefore, through this Minist,y, the Azad Kashmjr Forces

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affairs vis-a-vis the U.N.O, and the Pakistan Govenup~t are also conducted.

The All-Janijnu and lCash,j,jy Muslim Conference from the beginning of the And kashmir Government, acted as the political party instrumental in the formAtion of this Government. Since no legislative assembly or parliament could be convened, und& the prevalent ~ therefore the political party, the Muslim Conference had to take the plaèe of an assembly or a parliament. This position is anomalous. Many serious difflculti~ have arisen in connection with this position. The following questions still remain as live issues-

a)
Who should appoint or nominate the head of the State?

b)
To what extent should the Political Party have adminjsfrafive and political control over the head of the State and the Goyernme,it?

c)
To which body should the Government be made responsible?

These questions constitute vejy moot points, and of coume, they have been the main casue of difference between the leaders of Mad ICashmir and have led to the disntegnu~ of the Mad Kashmjr Movement to a very large extent.

The constitutio~ position of Mad Government has since undergone a fundamental change. The position of Mad Jamniu and ICashmjy Muslim Conference has now been relegated to the position of only a Political Party, in Azad Kàshmjr and Pakistan, by the enactment of the And Jammu and Kashmir Government. The President of that Government is elected by an Electoral College. This electoral college is again elected on an adult franchise basis by the people living in Mad and Kashmir territory. The system of Basic Democracies was in~oduced into And and Kashmir some five years or so ago. Under this system certain powers have been delegated to the Union Councils formed in different areas. This, in brief, is after the pattern which was Introduced In Pakistan ht the Ayub era. Besidc~ the Jammu and Kashmjr Muslim Conference, there are

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other bigger and smaller parties functioning in Pakistan as well as in And Kashmir. Of course, in Pakistan, these parties are organised by the refugees who are now living in Pakistan. These parties now can take part in the election of the President of Mad Kashmir. But very recently some more changes have been brought into the modus of election of the President of And Icashmir. These changes amount to a retrograde step. The election of the Azad Kashmir President by an electoral college has been abolished. The right that was granted to the refugees in Pakistan to participate in the election of the President of Azad Jammu arid ICashmir has also been taken away. This has cut down the rights of those Jammu and Kashmir nationals who are settled in Pakistan anti also the nations of And Jammu and ICashmir territory. I hope a time will come when the whole position Will be revised again so that a respectable system of democracy is granted to the people of Azad }Cashniir and they get a chance to elect their own Government on an adult franchise basis. It hardly needs any emphasis that, since 1930, the people of the Jammu and Icashmir have been strenuously fighting for political rights. In these political rights, of course, was included the principal demand for the establishment of a full-fledgea democratic Govenu,,ent which should represent rightful aspirations of the people of the State. It will, therefure, be very sad if the Government of Pakistan took away that right from the people of Azad jammu and Icashmir tern tory.

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Chapter XJ

DIFFICULTIES -- CAUSES OF FAILURE

I have made reference, though not in detail, to the difficulties which, we had to face in the beginning of the Liberation Movement. The first difficulty that we had to face was the non-availability of enough arms. We were able to obtain some rifles, though absolutely insufficient for our requirement, but the most crucial difficulty was with regard to ammmijtion. It was impossible to get any ammunition through any official source in Pakistan. It was entirely through personal efforts that we were able to collect some of it. The difficulty was solved to some extent by the capture of enemy dumps on the reheat of the enemy. At places the enemy was completely annihilated and in this way the Azad Kashmir forces were able to get hold of big enough dumps of ammunition and arms. The absence of automatic weapons was probably the main cause for the lack of initiative on the part of the Mad Army around Poonch. Besides automatic weapons, we coxtpleteiy lacked the use of 3 Mortars or 3.7 guns, which were also necessary for attack, because the Indian Army were completely equipped with all this.

One great problem that we had to overcome in the beginning was miserable lack of communication. I must place on record the great spirit which people displayed in the building of roads with crudest of implements available. The manner in which the people of Muzaffarabad repaired the roads which were blasted by the enemy action or by rains is worthy of praise indeed. The people, one and all, showed the readiest cooperation. Similarly , in Poonch and Mirpur, people as a mass stood up to build roadi and established a kind of communication line with the advanced position of our troops. We were only able to build kacha mule tracks. The work that the mule - boys

133

did during the beginning of this campaign, at least till we were able to build jeep roads, has no easy parallel. The sacrifice of these boys, the great hardship that they voluntarily suffered and the risks that they ran, show the remarkable courage of the human material which goes to make the And Army and the Pakistan Anny. It would be unfair not to mention here the work of those who later took upon themselves the construction of roads through the most difficult terrain in these parts of Icashmir. That all worked in a spirit of lehad and that all were prepared to risk their lives without any reluctance is a hard fact from which, I am sure, posterity would always draw inspiration.

But the greatest of all our problems was lack of unity of command. And this lack of unity of command was not due to any absence of planning. It was due to the fact that no wireless, telephone or telegraphic communication could be set up so quickly between different sectors. Between Muzaffarabad and Bagh the only means of communication was a courier. Between Ohimber, In Mirpur district, and other fronts no other communication was possible, except by post or telegraphic message, either from Garhi Habib Ullah, in Abbottabad District, or Icohala, in Murree Tehsil. It was indeed a serious handicap. It takes time and a good deal of stability to establish all these things. The situation was still very fluid, the setting up of regular means of communication, therefore, was out of questiàn.

The lack of communication was probably one of the main. reasons why some regular troops could not be shifted from Poonch to Barainula when the tribes, started to retreat. Their retreat was a shock to us all and a relief to the Indian troops.

On the 23 rd of October a Lashkar of tribesmen entered the city of Muzaffarabad. The Muslim Dogra troops stationed at Balakot had joined them, and therefore, until they reached Muzaffarabad city, no opposition was offered to them. In Muzaffarabad there was a strongly armed Jatha of Sikhs in the Gurdawara. There the Sikhs put up quite a stiff resistance till they were overcome. On the bridges, one over the Kishan Ganga

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River and other on the Jhelum, the Dogra troops were subdued by a clever surprise attack. I am told that tribesmen crossed the Kishan Ganga Bridge without any shot being fired. It seems that whatever troops there were, either surrendered or ran away to Srinagar. Some Dogra troops were still holding the Kohala Bridge. They were given a fight by the Azad Army soldiers from the Poonch side.

Since the tribal Lashkar lacked organisation it is quite possible that on their way to Srinagar they may have committed some excesses. They fought their way all along the Srinagar road till they reached Shafting, a place in the suburbs of Srinagar city. During this period, till they retreated, they encountered the Indian Army’s first contingent at Baramula. We have it on first hand information that when the Indian Army unit encountered the tribesmen in Baramula, it was practically annihilated. Their commander was also killed. This raised the morale of the tribesmen and also of the other local forces fighting with them This first encounter with the tribes so thoroughly demoralized the Indian Army that even six weeks after this clash the Indian Army was reluctant to make an advance along the Kohala road. After the retreat of the tribes from Baramula, the smallest unit of the Indian Army could have advanced along the road and easily reached Kohala, and caused a severe set back to the Azad Kashmir Liberation Movement. But they did not make any move. In fact the Indian Army soldiers were so afraid that each hill appeared to them to be infested with tribesmen though they had completely retreated to Abbottabad.

Failure to capture Srinagar was a turning point in the history of this campaign. If we had captured Srinagar, which was deserted by the Maharaja and his troops we could have captured Jammu very easily. But this could only be done before the landing of the Indian auxiliary troops in Srinagar Therefore, capture of the Srinagar aerodrome was the most crucial factor. We wasted two days in Baramula. These two days passed in discussions over small and stupid things. This waste of our most valuable time was caused by the factor of uncertainty in the Lashkar. Had they been under a uniform command, which could be obeyed without much ado, and the

135

tribes had proceeded to capture the airport, instead of wasting forty-eight hours In Baramula, Srinagar would have fallen into our hands like an over-ripe fruit.

The actual retreat was due to the fact that the tribes, as they advanced towards Srinagar, were attacked from behind by a contingent of the Indian Army, which probably came via Sopur. The Indian Army were by that time using their Air Force, shelling the concentrations of the tribesmen, who found themselves completely helpless against an air attack. Realizing that their line of communication back to their base may be cut off from behind, they lost heart and began to move back on lorries which they had employed as a means of advance. Also, among the tribes appeared an element which started propaganda that tanks were coming and tribes would be cut off from behind. I am told that some Money was also distributed. in all probability, because of absence of uniform command, they disintegrated into smaller groups and vanished, leaving the territory entirely defenceless. Though they suddenly left the field, they left the Indian Army completely dazed and stupefied. Since then the enemy has never advanced any further than Chenari.

All tribesmen reached Abbottabad safe and sound, leaving a completely helpless people to their own defence. At this juncture, General Tariq held back the Indian Army with fifteen men. General Tariq showed, during this crisis, not only remarkable courage but extraordinary presence of mind. He, with the help of these fifteen men, kept back the Indian Army, till, within the seven days that followed, we were able to collect a contingent of 700 soldiers for this front. One can hardly describe the supreme efforts that were made in those seven days. So many of us, did not sleep for days and nights together. If we had not collected these 700 men and built up strength on this front within the shortest possible time we may have easily lost the whole campaign. This was perhaps the most critical period in the whole of the campaign. After collecting these 700 men we visited the headquarters of General Tariq in Chenarl Dak Bungalow. We found him and his soldiers in high spirits.

136

The Liberation Movement produced the figure of General Tariq as its great hero. To the Muslim boys and young men in Pakistan, General Tariq appeared on the scene like the heroic figure of his namesake In Spain of Yore. His great deeds, particularly during this part of the campaign, were certainly

After the tribal debacle on the Srinagar front, a really dependable army was In the making in Poonch and Mirpur and other fronts. So many pockets were cleared after pitched battles in Poonch and the Kotli tebsil of Mirpur. In the whole district of Poonch, except Poonch city itself, Dogra troops had been liquidated. Similarly in Mirpur, except Nowshera, where the Indian Army held out with determination, all resistance was broken. After Mirpur, Azad Kashmir troops liberated Rajouri Tehsil of Riasi district and reached the rear of Shopian, a small town only 35 miles east of Srinagar.

In the meantime, Gilgit forces had crossed Zogifla Pass and reached places only thirty miles from Srinagar. They practically surrounded the Indian Army now trapped in the valley of Kashmir. On the Hindwara side also we almost reached Sopur town, which is not far away from Srinagar. And forces gained marvellous victories, and, in fact, advanced so quickly that to hold the territory later became an impossible task.

On the other hand, the Indian Army Generals planned a different course. To start with, they wanted to hold their positions at any cost. Under the same policy, for instance, the Poonch garrison held out in most difficult conditions. All credit must go to those who managed to supply rations to a civilian population of 30,000, and also to the troops fighting in Poonch which was not an easy job. Nowshera in Mirpur District was made the base for the Indian Army build-up for operations in Rajouri and Poonch. For nine months in 1948, the Indian Army build-up was consistently reported on all fronts. During November and December, 1948, fighting on all fronts was started. The And Army had practically no rations and ammunition build-up on any front. Our difficulties in Ladach

137

were also peculiar Other fronts also were in a similar position because of lack of communications.

As soon as large-scale operations were started simultaneously from Ladakh down to Mirpur on a 400 miles long front, the And Ann>’, because of numerical inferiority of arms, gave way to the Indian Army.

In less than a month’s time, huge territory in Azad Kashmir was reoccupied by the Indian Army and a vast number of refugees fled to Pakistan.

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Chapter XII

SECURITY COUNCIL- 1948

IN January, 1948, the Government of India took the Kashmir case to the Security Council. At that time the Indian Army’s position in Kashmir was very precarious. The And Army was putting very heavy pressure on a number of fronts. A very big area of Jammu and Kashmir had already come under the control of the And Jammu and Kashmir Government. The Azad Army had scored singular success on a number of fronts and they were still advancing. This position, probably, had forced India to take the Kashmir case to the Security Council, though the Government of Pakistan had suggested this course to them as early as November 17,1947. At that time the Government of India had rejected this proposal. When India did refer the case to the Security Council, it came as a surprise to many of us. The Government of India, in their complaint to the Security Council, took the stand, infer ali~, on the following grounds-

(a)
On 26th October, Ruler of the State, His Highness Maharaja Si! Hail Singh, appealed urgently to the Government of India for military help. He also requested that Jammu and Kashmir State should be allowed to accede to the Indian Dominion. An appeal for help was also simultaneously received by the Government of India from the largest popular organization in Kashmir, the National Conference headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. The Conference further strongly supported the request for the States accession to the Indian Dominion. The Government of India were thus approached, not only officially by the State authorities but also on behalf of the people of Kashmir, both for military aid and for the accession of the State to India.

139

(b)
“The grave threat to the life and property of the innocent people of Kashmir and to the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir that had developed as a result of invasion of the Valley demanded immediate decision by the Government of India. It was imperative that the defence of Jammu and Kashmir State should be taken over by a Government capable of discharging it. But, in order to avoid any possible suggestion that India had utilized the State’s immediate peril for her own political advantage, the GovernTnf3nt of India made it clear, that once the soil of the State had been cleared of the invaders, and normal conditions restored, its people would be free to decide their future by the recognized democratic method of plebiscite or referendum, which, in order to ensure complete impartiality, might be held under international auspices.

(c)
‘The Government of India felt it their duty to respond to the appeal for armed assistance, because they could not allow a neighbouring and friendly State tobe compelled by force to determine either its internal affairs or its external relations, and after the instrument of accession had been signed and accepted by the Dominion of India, it became imperative to take up the defence of the State

(4)
~That the forces which had entered the State to liberate it were sent by the Government of Pakistan and were receiving assistance from it.

(e)
That the facts narrated above indisputably point to the conclusions

(i)
that the invaders are allowed transit across Pakistan;

(ii)
that they are allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of operations;

(iii) that they include Pakistan nationals;

(iv)
that they draw much of their military equipment. transportation and supplies (including petrol) from Pakistan; and

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(v)
that Pakistan Officers are training, guidthg and otherwise actively helping them.

U)
“That the Government of Pakistan is not willing to stop the assistance in material and men, which the invader! are receiving from Pakistan territory, and from Pakistar nationals, including Pakistan Government personnel, both military and civil. This attitude is not only un-neutral, but constitutes active aggression against India, of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir forms an integral part.

In the end the Government of India requested the Security Council to ask the Government of Pakistan

(I)
to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participating or assisting In the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir

State:

(2)
to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State;

(3)
to deny to the invaders-

(a)
access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir,

(b)
military and other supplies,

The Government of Pakistan, firstly, denied all the allegations in assistance and support to the forces of liberation operating in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly, the Government of Pakistan most vehemently denied the validity of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. It was stated in this defence, “that India obtained the accession of the State of Jan-imu and Kashmir by fraud and violence, and that large-scale massacres and lootings and atrocities on the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir State have been perpetrated by the armed forces of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian Union, and by the non-Muslim subjects of the

141

Maharaja and of the Indian Union’. And, thirdly, that the life and security of Muslims of the State of Jammu and Kashmir were really in danger and that a large number of Mussalmans had already been butchered in the province of Jammu, and an equal number of Mussalinans had been driven out of the State and were taking refuge in Pakistan Fourthly, Pakistan also quite rightly, pleaded that the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir are predominantly Mussalfl’afls, therefore, they wanted to join Pakistan rather than India. Because of the atrocities committed by the Dogras in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and also, because the people of the State wish to obtain emancipatio1~ from Dogra tyranny, and wish to accede to the Dominion of Pakistan, “the Muslim population of the State have set up an And (free) Kashmir Government, the forces of which are carrying on their light for liberation. It is possible that these forces have been joined by a number of independent tribesmen from the tribal areas beyond the North-West Frontier Province, and persons from Pakistan including Muslim refugees from East Punjab, who are the nationals of the Indian dominion~.

The Pakistan Government countercharged India with these acts

(i)
India never wholeheartedly accepted the partition scheme, and has, since June, 1947, been making persistent attempts to undo it

(ii)
that an extensive campaign of genocide’ has been carried out against the Muslims throughout India, particularly in Indian states;

(iii)
that the security, freedom, religion, culture and language of Muslims in India was in serious danger;

(iv)
that a number of States which had acceded to Pakistan had been unlawfully occupied by the Indian forces;

(v)
that India blocked the implementation of agreement arising out of the partition of India

142

(vi)
India now threatens Pakistan with direct military invasion;

(vii)
that the object of the various acts of aggression of India against Pakistan, is the destruction of the State of Pakistan.

The Government of Pakistan requested the Security Council to appoint a Commission or Commissions, to enquire into allegations and counter-allegations in the case and give a finding on them.

Alter hearing both sides, the members of Security Council had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it was not possible for the Security Council to immediately accede to the request of India. They also thought that the accession of the State to India was not a final one. As a matter of fact some of the members thought that, it the life and security of Mussalmans was so endangered, IL would have been criminal on the part of Pakistan not to extend any support to a people struggling for their very existence, just across the Pakistan border, who were all Muslims.

India’s case was argued by the late Gopala Swami

Ayyanger, who was once the Prime Minister of the State of

Jammu and Kashmir. Besides others, Mr. Ayyanger was

assisted by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, Head of the then

Administration in Srinagar. Pakistan’s case was pleaded by

Ch. Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of

Pakistan. Long speeches were made. Tempers were lost.

Inappropriate and foolish things were said on the floor of the Council. India lost her case in the first round.

I remember the scenes during the last speech of Sir Gopala Swami Ayyanger in the Security Council, before he ran back to Delhi for further instructions in February, 1948. His speech was to the effect, that his nation and his country had been insulted.

Sh. Abdullah also made a speech in the Security Council. The Government of India thought that a representative’ of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, Sh. Abdullah, would be in a

position to convince the Security Council members of their point of view, but the effect of the speech was quite the reverse. Some of the things that Sh. Abdullah said in his speech were not only illogical but also quite contrary to the case that India was trying to make out. For example, the Security Council was considering the establishment of a neutral Government in Srinagar of all parties, so that a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir could be held under a neutral administration. Sh. Abdullah made a speech in a sentimental fashion. While making his remarks on the question of the neutrality of the proposed administration, Sh. Abdullah dared to say before an assembly of world statesmen that if God-Almighty descended upon this earth and assumed charge in Srinagar even He could not remain neutral. This sweeping statement just helped to prove the case of Pakistan, which was built on the fact that Sh. Abdullah’s administration in Srinagar could never be neutral. No plebiscite under that administration, therefore, could be either impartial or fair. The British delegate pointedly asked Sb. Abdullah, if, in his opinion, God-Almighty could not remain neutral, how on earth could he himself be neutral? Of course, Sh. Abdullah was at a loss for words and simply grinned. In fact, during this speech he threw away the paper which contained his original speech and spoke exteinpore, which was a very unguarded action. Giving way to his sentiments, he said things which he should not have said, at least on the floor of the Security Council. It might have been quite safe to say these things in Amira Kadal Chauk. There was another matter, also, which made Sh. Abdullah rather uncomfortable. He was confronted with the speech he had made in November, 1947, in New Delhi. In this speech he had whole-heartedly supported the revolution in Poonch. He had also endorsed, in un~ambiguOUS words, the justification and genuineness of the revolt against the tyranny and suppression by Maharaja Han Sringh’s regime in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in Poonch.

It is quite true that Sir Gopala Swami Ayyanger and Sh. Abdullah quarreled with each other and serious difficulties arose between them. Sh. Abdullah blamed Sir Copala Swami Ayyanger for not being eqv to the task and being no match for

144

Ch. Sir Zafarullah Khan. Sir Gopala Swami Ayyanger conddiñ±ied Sh. Abdullah for his indiscreet speech and for his going out of his brief altogether. This was one of the reasons why India’s delegation suddenly decided to pack up and run back to Delhi. All this is based on good information that Sb. Abdullah’s men used to meet Dr. M.D. Taseer every evening. Dr. M.D. Taseer, incidentally, was my Secretary during this tour.

Somehow or other my first impression of the Security Council was not favourable. I thought that the Security Council was not dealing with the case in a court-like manner. But as my experience grew about these matters, I knew that the position of the Security Council was not that of a court, but that of a board of conciliation, It tried by all means to bring the parties together and in this endeavour it tried to evolve a formula which could be agreed to be both the parties. This entailed a long process of compromise and discussion.

On the 20th January, 1948, a resolution was moved by the President of the Security Council recommending the setting up of a Commission of three, to investigate all outstanding matters of dispute between the two countries. This resolution was adopted and accepted by both India and Pakistan. All aspects of the Kashmir case were examined during the prolonged, debates from the 15th January to the 6th February, 1948.

After being satisfied that the only solution of the Jammu and Kashmir State problem lay in holding a Plebiscite to determine whether Jammu and Kashmir State should accede to India or Pakistan, the Security Council concentrated its efforts on laying down conditions, which could ensure impartiality and freedom to the Plebiscite. A resolution was then drafted on behalf of the Security Council based on the following principles

(a)
all foreign troops must be removed from Kashmir;

(b)
all inhabitants of Kashmir must be rehabilitated to their original homes; and

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When the Indian delegation found that this resolution was likely to be adopted by the Security Council, it applied for adjournment of the debate, ostensibly to enable the delegation to go back to India for consultation but in reality to gain time to use diplomatic pressure to secure acceptance of theft views. On March 18, 1948, the Security Council took up the Kashmir case again.

The Security Council worked out its own solution and on April 21, 1948 adopted a resolution the provisions of which are outlined below‘(i) The preamble noted ‘with satisfaction that both India

and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. It increased the membership of the Commission, which it was proposed to send out to implement the resolution, from three to five. It instructed the Commission to proceed immediately to the Indian subcontinent and there to place its services at the disposal of the two Governments with a view to bringing about a cessation of fighting and the ‘holding of a plebiscite by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with one another and with the Commission.

(ii)
In order to restore law and order in the State, the Security Council requested the two Governments to take the following measures-

(a)
Pakistan should use its influence with raiders, and such of its nationals as may be fighting in the State, to withdraw from the State;

(b)
The Government of India ‘should put into operation, in consultation with the Commission, a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them

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progressively to the minimum strength required ‘for the maintenance of internal security in the State, after it has been established that the tribesmen are withdrawing.

(c)
The minimum forces of the Government of India should be posted, in consultation with the Commission, at places from where they may not offer any intimidation, or appearance of intimidation, to the inhabitants of the State. Any reserve of troops considered necessary should be located in their present Base Area.

(d)
The Commission should, s far as possible, use local forces for the maintenance of law and order, and if these are ‘found to be inadequate’ the Commission should, with the agreement of both India and Pakistan, arrange for use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective.

“(iii) The Second part of the Resolution purported to lay down the basic conditions for the holding of a plebiscite in the State. It provided for-

(a)
A coalition Government in the State to which responsible representatives designated by the ‘major political groups’ should be invited to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at Ministerial level.

(b)
The appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with full powers to carry .out the plebiscite, including the powers of direction and supervision over the State Army and the Police, and the power to appoint special magistrates.

(d)
The removal from the State of all Indian nationals who had entered the State otherwise than for a lawful purpose.

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(e)
At the end of the plebiscite the Commission would certify to the Security Council whether the Plebiscite had or not had been really free and impartial”.

The Government of India rejected this resolution. Neither did Pakistan see its way to accepting this resolution. Notwithstanding their objection to the Security Council’s resolution, both India and Pakistan co-operated with the United Nations Commission which was founded under this resolution. Pakistan nominated Argentina as its representative on the proposed Commission, India nominated Czechoslovakia. Argentina and Czechoslovakia failed to agree on the third member. The President of the Security Council then nominated Belgium, Columbia and the United States, to complete the composition of the U.N.C.LP.

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Chapter XIII

U. N. C. I. P.

DURING 1948, the Security Council sent out a U.N.C.L1’. which landed in Karachi on 7 July. The Commission left for Delhi on the 10 July, 1948, to confer with the Govermnent of India, and immediately started exploring the possibilities of an Immediate cease-fire In Kashmir. The suggestion of a cease-fire was discussed at a formal meeting of the Commission heid on July 23 in New Delhi which was attended by the Pakistan representatives. From 10 July to 13 August the Commission held a number of meetings and discussion, both with the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan. Cit. Ghulam Abbas Khan and the writer also had a chance of having discussions with the Commission in Karachi, on the various aspects of the Kashmir problem. The commission, in the meantime, sent a Military Sub-Commission to study the military situation in the liberated areas of Jammu and Kashmir. This Sub-Commission first flew to Srinagar and after seeing the Indian side of Icashmir rejoined the Commission in Karachi. The Sub-Commission then left for the Azad Kashmir area on August 12.

After having further meetings with the representatives of India and Pakistan, the Commission released to the press its resolution of 13th, August and the correspondence connected therewith. A further meeting took place in Rawalpindi on 14th September between Ch. Ghulam Abbas Khan and the writer on the one hand, and Messrs Hunddle and Graefee on the other. These two gentlemen of the Commission visited Mangla Head works in Mirpur In Azad Kashmir territory, where they were itertalned to a lunch by the And Kashmir Government.-After us, the Commission left for Srinagar and stayed there until tey returned to Geneva.

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After these prolonged parleys and discussions, the Commission, on the 13th August~ 1948, passed the resolution, which follows, embodying the Cease-Fire and truce agreement-

The preamble expressed the opinion that prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions, the continuance of which was likely to endanger international peace and security, were essential for effecting a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jamiflu and Kashmir. In reply to a query of the Pakistan GoverfllfleT~t, the Commission explaining on the 27th Augtst, that the expression “a final settlement of the situation did not fall short of, nor go beyond, the terms of the SeCUrity council’s ResolUtion ol 21st April, 1948, and was in harmony with it. The commission went on to add that it was not committed to a rejection of a peaceful solution, which might be agreed to by the two govemmefl~ provided that such a solution reflected the wilt of the people.

PART I

This part of the Resolution prcwided that the Governments of India and Pakistan would issue cease-fire order to all forces operating under the High Commands of India and Pakistan including, for this purposes the forces of Azad lCashTr’ir and the Tribesmen. It also provided for the appointment of neutral military observers on both sides of the cease-fire line to supervise the observance of the cease-fire order, and called upon the Goverflmeflb of India and Pakistan to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.

This part of the Resolution laid down the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreemeflt~ the details of which were to be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the CommiSsiO”

FART U

150

(I)
The Pakistan Government was called upon to agree to withdraw its troops from the State. It was sUbsequently explained that the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops would be synchronisM with the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army from Jammu and Kashmir.

(ii)
The Pakistan Government was asked to use its best endeavours to secure the withdrawal from the State of all its nationals as had gone into the State for the purpose of fighting. The Commission made ft clear to the Pakistan Government that the Azad Kahamir Forces would neither be withdrawn nor disbanded, but would continue to remain intact in the areas under the operational control of the Pakistan High Command.

(iii)
The territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops would be administered by the ‘local authorities, under the surveillance of the Commission. It was explained that by ‘local authorities was meant the de facto Government in this area, namely, The Azad Kashmir Government. As regards the Commissions surveillance, this did not mean actual supervision or control but was introduced only to ensure that the ‘local authorities did not do anything against the spirit of the truce agreement.

(iv)
When the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals had withdrawn, and the Pakistan Forces had begun thelT withdrawal, the Government of India were to begin the withdrawal of the bulk of their forces from the State, in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. The Commission, while recognising the need for the security of the State, assumed that the danger of external attack would disappear with the establishment of a truce and that the Indian troops to be retained in Jammu and Icashmir would be the minimum required for the maintenance of internal law and

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order in areas other than those in charge of the Azad Kashmir Government.

PART m

This part of the Resolution called upon the governments of India and Pakistan to reaffirm their wish, that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir would be determined in accordance with the will of the people, and that the two Governments would confer with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions, whereby such free expression would be assured. The Commission informed the Pakistan Government on the 19th September, 1948, that in implementing Part Ill of the Resolution, the Commission would be guided by the terms of the Security Council’s Resolution of April 21, 1948, setting forth conditions for a plebiscite1 subject to such modifications as the Commission might determine, with the agreement of the Governments of Pakistan and India.

The Government of India accepted the Commission’s Resolution, subject, however, to the following interpretations placed upon it-

(a)
The Commission was to recognise the sovereignty of the Maharaja over the entire area of Jammu and Kashmir.

(b)
Responsibility for the administration of the

sparsely populated area of the State in the

North (namely, Ladakh), should revert to the

Government of Jammu and Kashmir, after

Pakistan troops and tribesmen had withdrawn.

(c)
The Government of Pakistan should have no part in the organisation or conduct of the plebiscite, or in any other matter of internal administration in the State.

(d)
The Commission should recognise the necessity of effective insurance of the security of the State against external aggression and internal disorder, and the responsibility of the Government of India in this regard.

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The Government of Pakistan was not fully satisfied with all the provisions of the çormnission’s resolution, yet they accepted it, subject only to one reservation, namely, that the Government of India should accept the conditions laid down in Pan B’ (Articles 6 to 15 , both inclusive) of the Security Council’s resolution of 21st April, 1948, as explained by the sponsors of the resolution in the Security Council, for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jainmu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan. The Pakistan Government base their case on the universally recognised principle, that the will of the people should be allowed to prevail. The accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is the main point in dispute between the governments of Pakistan and India, and, if it is to be decided by peaceful means, the only method is to hold a free and impartial plebiscite, under neutral auspices, to determine the Dominion to which the State should finally accede.

When this Commission landed in the mao-Pakistan subcontinent, the war in Kashmir was going on. But the parties had come to an unwritten understanding that no major operations would be undertaken. An unofficial cease-fire seemed to exist. At least we, who were not very high up, were told on our side, that we should not do anything which would militate against the spirit of this unofficial understanding and aggravate the situation.

In the meantime we were all the time getting information that, in spite of this so-called understanding the Indian Army was continuing its build-up, particularly in the Nowshera Sector. A manifold increase in the strength of the Indian troops had been undertaken. While the Security Council’s Commission was discussing the Icashmir case with regard to a cease-fire agreement, India, it seems, was building up her forces for an all-out offensive in Kashmir with the avowed object of forcing a military decision by subjugating completely the whole of Jammu and Kashmir State, and thus presenting the world with a frill accompli. But, as the plan unfolded itself, it became dear that its real objective was more far-reaching, and that it was aimed directly at the security of Pakistan. The subjugation of

153

the And Kashmir forces in Rajouri Mender Sector, led to the exodus of a very large number of Muslims from Rajouri and Poonch, because the policy of the Indian Army was to liquidate the Muslims from the villages, and to resettle Hindus and Sikbs in their place.

This big offensive towards the end of 1948, came as a surprise to all concerned. India started a very big push from Nowshera, their Corps Headquartersi branching out into different directions. One push was started towards ICotli and another towards Rajouri. Our build-up and strength, particularly on the Mandhar front were very weak. In the first place, we had no direct line of communication with the Maudhar valley. Secondly, the Azad troops were not very large in number, and were spread out from the top of Shopian, in the ICashmir Valley, dowi’ to Azim Garh Fort in Rajouri. Thirdly, these And Army soldiers were very poorly equipped. They, at least the majority of them, belonged to Mandhar valley. Last, but not least, the troops on this front lacked an efficient command. We could not spare first class And Army troops from I’oonch because these troops were necessary to surround the small city of Foonch, where the Indian army had built up strong enough reserves to break through and overrun the western parts of Poonch, if they so desired.

During the months of November and Decen*Ier, 1948, when the Indian Army built up Corps Headquarters at Nowshera, they also built an elaborate line of communication between Nowshera and jammu. The Air Force based at Jammu could very easily give them such air support as the Indian Army would require in an advance. In December, 1948, as the Indian Army began their advance from Nowshera towards Rajouri, a similar advance towards Icotli was beaten back by the And Kashmir Brigade. This Brigade, though lacking in gun support, automatic arms and air cover, resisted the Indian Army attack with unparalleled heroism. The push towards Rajouri and Mandhar was in a very much larger formation. I am told that at least two brigades started this push with tanks, guns and air support. The spear-head. finding a weak spot, breached through our defences. As they breached through, they made a very quick advance towards Mandi Nala and Mandhar proper.

154

This move practically cut away all the Azad troops all along this front from their base. The Indian Army started a ruthless butchery of people and burning of houses. When this information reached Azad Army soldiers on the front, they deserted their units, and ran back to save their families from this wanton destruction. A huge migration of population started from the whole of the Mandhar Valley and Rajouri area towards Pakistan. No less than two lakhs of people migrated en masse to Pakistan. How these helpless people started on foot, carrying their pitifully small amount of luggage on their heads towards Pakistan, in groups of thousands, constitutes a woeful tale of misery, which will probably be told by historian when, In due time, he will write the history of this campaign. How little, barefooted children walked down the hilly terrain of these pans, while the Indian Army troops were after their blood, is one of the most pathetic stories!. The groups of refugees, helpless as they were, were bombed by the I.A.F. on a number of occasions. These people were without food and shelter for days together but they never lost heart and reached Pakistan after a terrible journey.

Simultaneously with their attack on Mandhar front in the month of December, the Indian Army made another push on the Ladakli front. They pushed us back from Dras to Kargil, and ultimately to Skardu. How the And Army resisted this push on the Ladakh front, is another wonderful story of bravery, heroism and patience. The And Army troops, who fought on the Ladaid, front without any line of communication behInd them deserve the greatest praise and credit. It is impossible here to deal, in detail, with difficulties under which the Azad Army troops fought on this front.

The Indian Army, while making these two advances, achieved certain objectives. One objective was link with Poonch, thus releasing the Poonch city garrison. Secondly, to effect a link up with Leh, the headquarters of Ladakh tehsil. This straightened out the line from lanimu to Ladakh for the Indian Army. These two advances within a short period of couple of weeks, caused to us the loss of huge areas of territory. We also lost in army and public moraie. This was the largest

155

major set-back that we suffered since the beginning of the campaign.

As this retreat was taking place in the Mandhar valley gTeat panic spread through the Poonch district. I hurried from Trarkhel to Hajira and from }Tajira to Rawalakot to keep up the morale of the people. I am quite sure that If I had not undertaken this tour, at a time when the morale of the people was at the verge of complete collapse, there would have

perhaps started another exodus of at least five lakhs of people from the rest of Poonch. This would have created additional difficulties fbr us. In the meantime I received an urgent message to reach Karachi. As soon as we reached Icarachi the matter of cease-fire was brought into discussion.

Cli. Zafarullah Ichan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, had complained to the Security Council that the Indian offensive was a violation by India of the pledge they had given that they would not do anything that might aggravate the situation, it became clear later that by such means India wanted to gain control over all the strategic areas, just before the cease-fire agreement was reached and to solve two major difficulties, namely, one of supplying Leh and the other of maintaining Poonch. Supplies to these two garrisons were straining the air resources of India to breaking point.

Whatever the merits or demerits of the proposition1 if we had to agree to a cease-fire, we should have done~ it a little earlier. At the time of this agreement1 so far as the provinces of Jaminu and Kashmir were concerned, we had lost most of the territory in a very brief period. If we had not agreed to the cease-fire, we probably would have lost the rest of l’oonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad. We could have probably continued the Liberation Movement from Gilgit and Ladakh side. The fact that we have got a foothold on the western part of Kashmir is certainly of great use to us. If we had lost even an inch of territory on this side of Kashmir our bargaining position would have been reduced to nil. I can say with certainty that conditions were so dangerously unfavourable that it was quite possible that we might have lost the whole of the territory.

156

On the other hand, by agreeing to a cease-fire, we have, anyhow, not been the gainers. The Indians have been able to consolidate their position, and have built up very strong defences all along the cease-fire line. They will never take upon themselves to launch an offensive, therefore we are left with two alternatives; (a) either the case is settled by peaceful means of negotiation, or (I,) we are forced to attack. If the matter is settled through the U.N.O. by peaceful means, well and good. If these means fail, and if we start the attack, we shall be blamed as aggressors, and India will have world opinion on her side. Even after starting an attack, It is not sure whether war can be kept strictly within the four corners of Kashmir State. If that cannot be done and a general war starts between India and Pakistan, one really cannot be sure of the consequences. In that case the consequences will be too terrible to contemplate and both countries might go under. By accepting a cease-fire at the time at which we did, I think, we have lost much of our bargaining power. My only contention Is that we should either have managed a ceasefire earlier or the Pakistan Government should have gone whole-heartedly into the show to coui~er the last Indian offensive. It was to counter the major Endian offensive of 1948 that Pakistan had to send a small number of troops into Kashmir in May to defend the borders of :he Pakistan territory. Everybody is much wiser after the eventT

After getting the consent of both India and Pakistan, the U.N.Ci.P.passed two resolutions, one on August 13, 1948, and other on January 5,1949. The resolutions, taken together, provided for a cease-fire, followed by the demarcation of a cease-fire line. The cease-fire became effective on January, 1, 1949, and the agreement on the demarcation of the cease-fire line was arranged after a number of meetings of high military authorities of both sides on July 27,1949. The resolutions provided for the demilitarization of the State in two stages:

the truce stage and the plebiscite stage. When the cease-fire became effective, armed forces engaged in the Kashmir fighting comprised the following lines-S

157

On the Indian side there were the regular troops of the Indian Army, the Indian Volunteers, the State MilitarY Forces and the Jammu and ICashmir State Militia. On the Pakistan side there were Mad ICashmir regular forces, the tribesmen, the l’aldstan Volunteers, and the regular troopS of the Pakistan Army. The resolutions of the IJ.N.CIP. envisaged the disposal of the forces in the following manner— Pakistan was to use her best endeayouts to secure the

withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistani volunteers. The Pakistan Government, in their earnest desire for a peaceful solution, have already carried out the undertaldns, although they were under no obligation to do so till a truce agreement had been reached.

In the next stage, it was envisaged that the regular forces of India and Pakistan would withdraw in the following maflfler

Pakistan would take the first step in the withdrawal of the regular forces, but, after Pakistan’s troops had begun to withdraw, India undertook to begin the withdrawal of its forces in stages to be agreed upon by the Commission The Commission assured the Pakistan Government that the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army and the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army would be synchronizea by the two High Commands.

The resolution of January 5~l949, empowered the Plebiscite

Administrator to determine the final disposal of the Indian

Forces remaining in the State, the State Forces~ and State

Militia, on the one hand, and on the other, the final disposal of

the And Kashmir Forces.

When the Commission actually started grappling with the matter of demilitarization: india tried to obstruct the Plan, so that ultimately it would defeat the proposal of the Plebiscite. They put forward fresh and fantastic lemands; for example, they raised the question o~ the disbandfllcflt of the Mad flshmir Forces, and the question of administl ..tion and

158

defence of the Northern Areas of Cilgit and Ladakh. Itniay be emphasized here, that the Mad Kashmir Forces are not an outside element. They consist of the nationals of Jammu and Kashndr State, who launched the Liberation Movement at the end of August, 1947. They represent the will of the people of Kashmir to be free. And, In any case, on the question of the And Kashmlr Forces, the United Nations Commission had taken a clear-cut and unambiguous stand.

The Northern areas, which are mainly mountainous, have a 100% Muslim population. The freedom upsurge in these areas formed part of the Mad Kashmir movement, and in their mountains they had rapidly thrown off the yoke of the Maharaia of Icashnt

Then a long controversy arose as to the interpretation of the agreed resolutions of August 13,1948 and January 5,1949. India put her own interpretation on these resolutions. The U.N.C.I.p,, however, did not agree with the Indian interpretation, and it proposed that all points of difference concerning the truce agreemel)t be referred to arbitiation by Admiral Chester W.Nimitz, whom both India and Pakistan had accepted as the Plebiscite Administrator. This

statesmanlike proposal was supported by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Pakistan accepted the arbitration proposal unconditionally but India turned It down. The United Nations Commission had then no alternative but to refer the case back to the Security Council in December, 1949.

In December, 1949, the writer left for New York to attend session of the Security Council The Security Council was then presided over by General McNaughton of Canada. The Generaj was One of the great personalities I have had a chance to meet. He was authorized by the Security Council to mediate between the parties. Gefleral McNaughton, with all the thoroughness and exaciftude of a military mind, prepared his own plan with regard to the Northern Areas, and also with regard to the subject of demilitarizaHon. Pakistan generously accepted General McNaughtons proposal, but India insisted on

159

amendments, which were tantamount to a rejectior~ of the

proposal.

Then a lengthy debate in the Security Council followed. Eventually on March 14, 1950, the Security Council passed a resolution confirming the U.N.C.LP. resolutions of August 13,1948, and January 5,1949. The Security Council, in this resolution, emphasized that steps should be taken forthwith for the demilitarization of the State and for the expeditious determination of its future, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants.

Then the Security Council called upon the Governments of India and PaÜstan, to prepare and execute, within a period of 5 months from the date of the resolution, ‘a programme of demilitarization on the basis~ of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton5 proposal or of such modifications of those proposals as may be mutually agreed upon. The Security Council also decided to appoint a U.N. representative to replace the U.N.C.I.P., so that the United Nations Representative could assist India and Pakistan in the preparation and execution of a programme of demilitarization. The United Nations representative was also empowered to make any suggestion to India and Pakistan, or to the Security Council, which, in his opinion, was likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute which had arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir’. Sir Owen Dixon, a well-known Jurist of Australia, was nominated as United Nations Representative on April 12,1950. He arrived in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent on May 20,1950.

1 60

Chapter XIV

SECURITY COUNCIL 1949-50

AS aiready mentioned in the last chapter, the U.N.C.I.P. failed in their historic mission. They returned to Geneva, where they took a long time to prepare their report for the Security Council. In this report they admitted the difficulties involved, and suggested the dissolution of the Commission and the appointment of one man as mediator. The Commission could not have succeeded so easily, because, I personally believe, the Commission had their own difficulties. Secondly, the problem of Kashmir is a very difficult one. On the one hand, it involves the prestige of the Government of India, and, on the other hand, the very existence of Pakistan is at stake. The paramount difficulty was that India every time adopted an unreasonable attitude. Particularly, the Government of India put their own strange interpretation on the language of the resolutions which the Commission its~If was not prepared to accept. There could not be any acceptable via media, therefore the Commission had tbend up with a report of failure.

The Kashmir case again came up before the Security Council towards the end of 1949. In this connection, for the second time, I visited the Headquarters of the United Nations in Lake Success, to attend the meeting of the Security Council as a representative of the And Kashmir Government. During my first visit in 1948, I was very much handicapped by the fact that, abroad, very little was then known about the Mad Kashmir movement. This time the question of Kashmir was a very familiar subject to the world press and the people. Since 1948, we had been successful in establishing contacts with organizations all over the world, which did a great deal of propaganda in favour of our movement. For example, all over England we had by now our organisation known as the And

161

Kashmir League. It bad branches in London, sirminghatt~ Leeds, New Castle, Manchester, and even in Scotland. Similar organisations were working in Egypt and other Muslim countries, for instance, Turkey. These branches, from all over the world, contributed towards the Mad Kashinhr Movement in money, material and goodwill.

During the second visit to the Security CouncU, I took advantage of the occasion and spent some time in America, England, Cyprus, Turkey and Egypt. During my visit I made excellent contacts abroad and was able to do concerted publicity in favour of Mad ICashmir and Pakistan. The Icashmir problem had jeopardised Indo~Pakista~~ peace and, consequently, it had affected world peace. it was for this reason that people were deeply interested in this problem. Since both India and Pakistan had done fairly wide publicitY with regard to the question of Kashmir, vis-a-vis Indo-Paldstafl relationS, public interest abroad had also been excited. There was hardly any first class newspaper anywhere in the world, probably with the exception of Russia, which had not, in one way o~ another, commented on the problem of Icashmir. For the same reasons, wherever I went, I found every newSma1~ very keenly interested in whatever I had to say. My press conferences weTe always given fairly good publicity and space In foreign newspapeN

On my way to the Security Council, after Cairo the next scheduled stop was London. At the London Airport I was warmly received by the people of And Icashmir and Pakistam who were residing in different parts of England. As I have already mentioned, these people had formed themselves into a well-knit organisatiOn I have no doubt that these people, who belonged to And Kashmir and elsewhere wee working wholeheartedly for the liberation inovetnelit of Azad Kashmir in England. It was because of the efforts of this And Kashmir League, that we were able to organise a very big meeting in HOThOTn Hall in London. This meeting was indeed a veTy gTeat success. It was presided over by Mr. Hector Hughes, a member of the British Parliament. It was also attended by people of different nationalities, including some Africans- While speaking in English. I was able to impresS upon the public the

162

magnitude of the problem that Kashmir involved, and how that problem was affecting the peace and security of the world Secondly, I was able to tell them, I believe in an effective manner, just how Pakistan stood, with regard to the issue of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State. Thirdly, I was able to tell them, with full conviction, that economically Pakistan and Kashmir were part and parcel of each other, and their economies were completely interdependent and complementary.

While summing up this lecture, and the discussion that took place afterwards, Mr. Hughes was able to say that if the facts brought out in the lecture, were true, and were put in a similar manner before the Security Council, there was no reason to doubt that Pakistan was bound to win her case against India.

I must say that, luckily, the atmosphere then in England was very favourable. The reason was that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, on his way back from the United States, had addressed a Press Conference in London. In that Press Conference he had let himself go, after being completely over-powered by anger and passion. He had given expression to something which was not only undignified but was also in bad taste. The words he used against Pakistan, and the people of Pajdstan, were definitely unjustified, and no sane penon was prepared to accept an opinion that was expressed by Pandit J~waharlal Nehru. He had certainly uttered things which didnot befit him or his high office.

During my stay in London, and during my tour all over England, I made good contacts with the British Press. I met the Foreign Editor of The London Times, Professor Rushbrool? Williams, an extremely fine ‘nan. He knew so much about the ICashmir problem, that it was indeed a great pleasure to discuss thingi with him. He ould see the reasonableness of Pakistan with regard to Kashmir. I also met Editors and Sub-Editors of other London news~pers, whichoff and on, write on thesubject of South-MM. I am very glad to say that these British Journalists apprecfa ted the point of view of And Kashmir and Pakistan. in fact some of them, whose names I need not mention, expressed quite candidly that they were thoroughly convinced that since the beginning of the Kashmir Movement, Pandit

1 63

Jawahar Lal Nehru had been shifting ground on the Kashmir issue. They were equally convinced of the fact that, looking at the problem from the economic, geographical and population points of view, there was no doubt that the State of Jammu and Kashmir should automatically accede to Pakistan. In addition to all this, what convinced every sane person in England, and eveiywhere else, was the fact that the stand it had taken with regard to Junagadh and Hyderabad was so radically different from the stand it had taken with regard to Kashmir. To be candid the Government of Indias stand bluntly amounted to a policy of “heads I win, tails you lose. The problem that baffled them was how Indias face could be saved in the Kashmir dispute. In Kashmir, judged from any point of view, only India’s prestige is involved, but so far as Pakistan is concerned, I consider it is a question of life and death. The British Pressmen, though appreciative of our point of view, pointed out unanimously that they could not do much in the matter. They thought that the position of the United Kingdom, vis-a-vis India and Pakistan, was one of neutrality. ‘England wanted good relations with both India and Pakistan.

I have no intention of going into the matter as to what stand United Kingdom should have taken in this matter, as a senior member of the British common-wealth of Nations. What my opinion was on this matter, I had occasion to express in a later meeting in London, where I addressed world newsmen on my way back from the Security Council. I said, “What use would it be to be member of a club where, if two members qua net, the Chairman is unable to compose their differences or do anything in the matter!” That was such a pointed question that, though it interested everybody, nobody was able to answer it. The position for England, however, as one is able to appreciate, was difficult. During my stay in England I visited Birmingham, Nottingham, Newcastie and Leeds. In all these places I addressed nwetings which were attendS by the British public. The pro~1~at Press gave the Azad Kashmir Movement much better publicity than the London Press. The London press perhaps got thek cue from the Foreign Office. Also perhaps the Indian Embassy had not contacted the provincial press. When I addressed a very big meeting in

164

Birmingham, some of the people who belonged to Azad Kashmir areas burst into tears when I explained to them how miserably the Mussalmans in Kashmir had suffered. The people of And Kashmir living in England made their contributions to the Movement of Azad Kashmir in their small and humble way. Their efforts have been magnificent. In this regard I might particularly mention the name of late Syed Fazal Shah who was the President of the Azad Kashmir League In England.

During my stay in London I was invited by the British Broadcasting Corporation to broadcast from their studios on the Kashmir issue, though I was politely asked by one of their editors that the subject may be made the least controversial. When I had actually made this broadcast I learnt that the Indian High Commission in London registered a regular protest with the British Broadcasting Corporation. Wherever I went, whether in America, England, Turkey or Egypt, the Indian Embassies were sensitive and touchy about me. Whatever I undertook to do, they did their best to counteract.

When I reached New York, the Kashmir case was not yet before the Security Council. We had, in between the meetings of the Security Council,. time to visit different places.

inn America it is impossible to arrange a fixture for a lecture at slwrt notice. In fact, for big meetings, one has to arrange thro~gh special publicity agencies. I had fixtures in Boston, Philadelphia University, Washington and New York. In Boston I addressed the students at two different places. The discussions at these places were interesting. Some of the students khew quite a lot about the Kashmir problem. In Philadelphia University, I addressed a class of persons who had been writing on Kashmir affairs in different journals in America. I had long discussions with them over the Kashmir issue.

Then I visited Washington for about a week. I appeared on television and in a radio programme. Mr. Mubarak Ali Shah of Arizona State, a well-known Muslim Leaguer, arranged a very big dinner in Washington, which was attended by at least

165

fifteen Congressmen which, I was told, is a difficult thing to manage in Washington. I was able to speak on Kashmir at this dinner, and every one of the Congressmen spoke on Kashmir as well. What really was a virtual discovery for them was the fad that Kashmir was on the borders of Communist Russia and Communist China. Only then was their interest aroused. This is true in a smaller or longer way, with regard to every American After the Second World War destiny has placed the leadership of the democratic world in the hands of American people. America, it is quite true, has economically aided some of the small countries of Europe. The Americans today are not a nation trying to exclude themselves from world affairs. On the contrary, America has got the effective leadership of all the countries which are grouped together against the Russian bloc.

In Washington we had a number of fixtures at different places. There are societies and clubs which are interested in the affairs of the South-Asia. Membership of these dubs is usually very small but they take keen interest in Asian affairs. For example, when we took up the Kashmir question, a number of people already knew a lot about this dispute between India and Pakistan. They were in the nature of specialists, who themselves make detailed and special studies on South Asian subjects. In all these meetings were present the officials of the Indian as well as Pakistan Embassies, who had heated discussions among themselves.

It goes without saying that the Indians in America do very wide publicity in favour of their country. Because of strained Indo-Pakistan relations they have been doing dangerous propaganda against Pakistan. An average American does not know much about Pakistan. Nor is there any effective machinery on the Pakistan side to either counteract that propaganda or do positive publicity for Pakistan. It is not an easy job either, because, in the first place1 it costs a lot of money, which small countries can hardly afford; and, secondly, it needs specialized knowledge and experienced men to undertake scientific publicity abroad We at this moment lack both. Vis-a-vis India we are handicapped in another manner. India is a well-known country all over the world. In America India is known because of Mr. Gandhi and his pacifist

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philosophy. I remember in 1948, when Mahatma Gandhi was murdered in New Delhi, huge publicity was given to• this incident. Therefore, it is not an easy task to publicise Pakistan. In spite of this, two factors have come in handy to achieve this result to a degree which would have not been possible ordinarily. In the first place, Pakistan has played a good role in the United Nations organizations, and secondly, because of Kashmir. I personally believe that much more is possible in the field of publicity in all countries of Europe, as far as Pakistan is concerned.

The Security Council met and requested General McNaughton, the President of the Security Council, as mentioned in the last chapter, to get into touch with the parties and to see if he could bring about a settlement. General McNaughton carried out his task and made two reports: an interim report and a final report. These reports incorporated the fundamental principles which have been agreed upon between the parties, namely, that the accession issue of the state should be determined through a free and impartial Plebiscite. General McNaughton had explained that he proceeded on the basis that the agreement already arrived at, must be preserved and that differences that have since arisen with regard to the agreement shouid be resolved. Leaving aside the technicalities, he took the problem of demilitarization as a whole, and made certain changes with regard to the scheme that was visualized by the commission,

After General McNaughton’s mediation efforts failed, and the matter had come before the Security Council, the Pakistan representative, Ch. Zafarullah Khan, addressed the Security Council in the following words— ‘As I said in the opening part of my submission to the

Council, on all the criteria that the Government of India has to date suggested with regard to accession, Kashmir ought to accede to Pakistan, if the choice had to be made by Kashmir itself. The interest of the majority of the inhabitants of Kashmir indisputably points in that direction.”

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During the same speech, the nearly exasperated Foreign Minister of Pakistan expressed himself as follows “But it has been agreed that the whole matter shall be

settled on the basis of a free and impartial plebiscite. Well, then let the free and impartial plebiscite take place.

‘The question to-day is not of any fresh conditions, or any new conditions. The whole question is to implement the resolutions to which the two parties have agreed”.

On behalf of the Government of Pakistan, it was emphasised that, in order to eliminate all possible sources of pressum. the following measures were neCeSSaW

i)
Withdrawal of all outside troops;

(ii)
Neutralization of the Civil Administration;

(iii)
Provision of the fullest and widest powers for the Plebiscite Administrators.

(iv)
Ensuring complete freedom for legitimate political activity.

Before this chapter is dosed, one might mention, along with the failings of the Commission, the achievements which the Commission was able to bring about. One was the Implementation of the cease-fire and the other was that the commission was able to secure, of course with the agreement of the parties, the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator, who fulfilled in every respect the qualities that were laid down as being essential in this case in the person of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.

The Commission recommended the appointment of a United Nations Representative and then the Commission was dissolved.

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Chapter XVIII

SOME BLUNDERS COMMITTED IN

KASHMIR

KASHMIR is a land of extreme beauty. Its valleys, in summer, give a rare view to those who go there to observe and enjoy its scenic beauty. Its rivers, small streams and shimmering lakes, have no parallel on the face of the earth. Its gardens, Shalimar, Nishat and Nasim, at the base of a sky-high mountain, are certainly a heaven on earth.

Kashmir produces a number of rare fruits, apple among them. Peaches and pears are just as lovely. Its people are handsome with clear cut features as if chiselled by an artist. W6men of Kashmir, especially, the Kashmiri Pandit ladies, are among the most handsome females on earth. People certainly are intelligent and hard-working. They are prepared to bear the hardships of an extremely rigorous winter.

Kashmir, because of its beauty, had to pay heavily through ages. Conquerors came and went away, leaving this unfortunate land in misery. Just as one oppressor left, another pounced upon it with fury and hunger. Under Hindu rule, down to Sikhs and Dogras, the land over the ages suffered all the way. Taxes, ‘begar’ and personal persecution made the valley people submit to any insult which came upon them from a whimsical ruler.

1947 saw the Indo-Pakistan continent emerging into two independent countries. The states had to accede to one dominion or the other or could possibly remain independent. Other states, numbering about 5~, quickly decided. But sates like Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad, became a cause for differences and war between India and Pakistan.

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In Kashmir, however, a war of liberation was started in early 1947, particularly in the province of Poonch. The foreigners who have offered comments on the origin of this war, like Johnson, Stephens and Bird Wood, I would quote in these pages. But before I quote foreigners, let us first see what Sheikh Abdullah had to say on this episode:

On October 21, 1947 Sheikh Abdullah said:That the present troubles in Poonch, a feudatory of

Kashmir, were because of the policy adopted by the state. The people of Poonch who suffered under the local ruler, and again under the Kashmir Durbar, who was the overlord of the Poonch ruler, had started a people’s movement for the redress of their grievances. It was not communal

The Kashmir State sent their troops and there was panic in Poonch. But most of the adult population in Poonch were ex-Servicemen of the Indian Army, who had close connection with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children, crossed the frontier and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The Kashmir State Forces were thus forced to withdraw from certain areas.

The foreign commentators include Ian Stiphens who has given a fairly unbiased opinion in the following lines, in his book 1’AKISTAN”. On page 194 of this book he has narrated the story as follows: “The small State referred to, among the three dangerously

undecided ones, was Junagadh, on the Kathiawar coast about half-way between Bombay and Karachi. Most of its inhabitants were Hindu; its ruler the Nawab-not an impressive person, by all accounts - was Muslim. Within the terms of Lord Mountbatten’s advice, the Nawab’s best course was to seek accession to India, because of his subject’s communal leaning; and a mild amazement was the general public reaction for

Junagadh in itself was of negligible

200

importance, indeed most people had scarcely heard of it -when the fact came to popular notice in mid-September, amidst a welter of vastly bigger, bloodcurdling events, that he had in fact, a few days after Partition, asked to accede to Pakistan.”

“What the Government of Pakistan’s motives were for agreeing to this, and presumably for having encouraged it, is not known. Campbell-Johnson, unkind as usual, hints at a

complex trap’, carefully set by the Pakistani Cabinet for India’s detriment. But it seems likelier that the decision was rapidly made, on ill-considered though doubtless hostile impulse. amidst tremendous pressure of other business. In any case, it proved very unwise. It could indeed be up-held legally (and Mr. Jinnah perhaps attached too much weight to legal things); for as explained, the Princes strictly speaking were free to accede to either Dominion -or to none. And had the times been more normal, it might have been just sustainable geographically too, because of Junagadhs maritime position. But that seems about the most that can be said. It did Pakistan no sort of practical good; it ruined the foolish Nawab and his family; its subsequent uses in argument about- Kashmir were not to Pakistan’s advantage, for they could cut both ways;- and relations at the time between India and Pakistan being what they were - acrimonious in the extreme - it caused India disproportionate anger. When it became clear that the Pakistani Government was serious in accepting the accession, the Indians moved troops towards the Junagadh area; soon, threatening displays of armed strength were being made and a provisional government of free Junagadh’ was permitted to function on Indian soil, headed by a distant relative of Mr. Gandhi. Then minor disorders within the State were fostered, or at any rate occurred; on October 26th the Nawab fled to Pakistan; and a few days later the Indian forces marched in, and occupied the State to assist in maintenance of order’. A technique of aggrandisement had been learnt, to be reapplied later elsewhere: not only in 1961 successfully against Goa, and in modified form in 1950-51 and again in 1961-2 against

201

Nepal, but in 1948, as we shall now briefly describe against another of the three princely States which or Independence Day had remained undecided, and a very much bigger and more important one - 1-lyderabad.

“The Hyderabad affair needs examining here out of proper chronological sequence. It broke out several months later than the more intricate Kashmir affair, but it ended decisively and very abruptly; and though its geographical scale was quite different from that of Junagadh, its communal context was identical; namely, that history had so arranged things that a Muslim Ruler, the Nizam incidentally, not a very impressive person either reigns over a population mainly Hindu.

Under the British Raj, Hyderabad had been ~~knowledgs as the premier princely State of India. The Nizam stood iii a class distinct from any other ruler, and was officially designated the British Governments faithful ally’. Since 1857, moreover, he and his forebears had been widely looked upon throughout the subcontine1~t as the maul surviving inheritors of the Moghul tradition. Even excluding Berar - a large tract leased under duress to the British the State covered about s2.000 square miles, an area roughly comparable, say, to that of Britain (including Scotland), or West Germany, or Rumania. Its total population at the 1941 Census stood at about 16 millions. As a potentially independent entity1 however, it had one great physical disadvantage. It was landlocked; August 1947 found it embedded in the Indian Union. Unlike junagadh, it lacked access to the sea. And it contrasted with Kashmir in having no direct land-ward contact with Pakistan.

Then about Kashmir in particulars the author Stephens gives his comments on page 196 as this:“In Kashmir, the third princely State which remained

undecided on Independence Day, the communal roles, as mentioned, were reversed. It is that which has made the quarrel over it so disastrous, the ‘root of all evil’ in

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Indo-Pakistarii affairs. The bulk of its people, about 77 percent, were Muslim; but its ruler or Maharaja - in many ways a regrettable character - was Hindu. Yet India, by resort this time to a totally opposite set of arguments, not democratic but dynastic - and once again to armed force contrived, in the latter part 011947, to overrun the richer and more populous half of it, and has since remained there unbudged, professing moreover a legal right to the remainder. How so paradoxical and indeed shocking a position was reached must now be examined.

Kashmir - or more correctly the princely State of Jammu an~I Kashmir - was just a trifle larger than Hyderabad, when deprived of Berar. And besides size, it had something which Hyderabad had not: great strategic importance, owing to its position, in high Central Asia close to Russia. China, Afghanistan and Tibet. On the other hand its population amounted to only about 4 millions, a quarter of Hyderabad’s. owing to its mountainousness. Near its centre, around Srinagar, lay the renowned and fertile and fairly populous Vale - the real Kashmir as generally understood, and the main region which India laid hold of in 1947; a region of extraordinary scenic beauty, but perhaps unique also In its long record of human woe - exploited for centuries by conqueror after conqueror; by such appalling pre-Muslim monarch as Mihirakula the White Hun, or the tyrannical Shinkaravarman; then, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, by a line of Muslim adventurers, who maintained themselves in independence of the Delhi sultans and included the fanatical iconoclast Sikander ‘Bhut-Shikan’; then by the mighty Moghuls - who however gave it some splendid memorials in their ornamental gardens; and after them, by Afghans proper, mostly barbaric; by the brutal Sikhs of Ran~it Singh’s day; and then by a Dogra Hindu dynasty of rather shady origins from the hills to the south. As a result of all this, the unfortu,,ate inliabitants of the Vale, though talented in many ways, tended to be spiritless, evasive lot, easily overawed; very different from the Dogras of the south of the state, the Sudhans of

203

the south-west, or the Gilgiti peoples of the north. Perhaps the most shameful part of the story was the abject condition to which they were reduced, by the rapacity of the Maharajah and his officials, between the Dogras British-SuppOrted access to power in 1846 and the revenue-settlement which Lansdownes Administration insisted upon in 1889. Vivid glimpses of this are to be found in Walter Lawrence’s and BE. Knight’s writings.~

About how the freedom movement got its beginnings, I might repeat what he has said on page 200 of his book:

“As has been mentioned, the leaders of the Sudhfluti revolt

-
which’ later evolved into the Azad Kashmir’ movement

-
had sent men across the Indus plain into Pathan tribal territory to seek arms. At this time, and on into November, the future political relations (if. any) of the quast autonomous Pathan tribes with Pakistan were entirely uncertain. Discussions had begun, and it was hoped that these formidable, restless people would decide to accede to the new-formed State, if only - by the cynical - because their scope for mis-chief would be greater otherwiSc but the necessary jirgas had not been held. It would be fair to say that the Pakistani authorities felt frightened of the tribes, and conscious that, at least for the nonce, they lacked the physical means for coping with them. The Pakistan Army as yet scarcely existed, it was in process of formation out of the pievious Army of undivided India; bits of the latter were still being shuttled about the map, Hindu and Sikh ones remaining untransferred on Pakistani soil, and Muslim ones on Indian. Arid for decades, the tribes had proved an intTactable, dangerous thorn in the flesh of the much stranger British regime. As recently as 1937-8 those of Waziristan alone, for months, had pinned down no fewer then 50,000 troops of the Imperial forces in sanguinary guerrilla warfare”.

joseph Karbel, who was a member of India-Pakistan LN.

Commission gives his comments as follows. In his book “Danger in Kashmir”, he says on page 63:-

204

“Through all the mists of uncertainty that shroud the negotiations concerning the - future of Kashmir, one fact alone is clear. This is the irresponsible behavior of the Maharaja. It was this that brought his nation uncommitted, his peoples wishes unascertained, past the fatal day of partition, August 15, 1947. It was his stubbornness, his coy maneuvering, including his “attacks of colic”, that brought upon his people unparalleled suffering and pain. In this respect at least, he was a worthy “Son of the Dogras’.

When the fateful day of August 15 4awned, Muslims celebrated a Pakistan Day” with flags enthusiastically displayed throughout the state. The Maharaja ordered them torn down and retaliated by closing all pro-Pakistani newspapers.

Still the pressure mounted, and the stories carried by refugees pouring In from bloodsoaked Punjab by Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims must have done little to allay the Maharajas anxiety. Nor did the presence in Kashmir of these bitter and hysterical refugees do any thing to reduce the tension within Kashmir”.

Again on page 66 he states:

‘Whatever the validity of the mutual accusations, there is l::tle doubt that Icashmir was brewing with revolt against the Maharaja long before the tribesmen. invaded the countmy. The political opposition launched in 1930 was carried into an open resistance in 1946. This was resumed in the spring of 1947, and it reached a critical climax in the summer when the news of the fratricidal struggle in Punjab echoed throughout Kashmir.

205

groups in the wild hills of West Poonch, where theii movements remained unnoticed for some time. They were led by seasoned soldiers who previousLY had been demobilized from the British Indian army They organized the smuggling of arms. Messengers were sent to the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province where manufacturing of small arms and ammunitions had been practiced for years. The Muslim partisans in the hills were armed with these weapons. Many ex~servicemefl from World War II, hearing about the Maharaja’s expeditions against Muslim villages, evacuated their families to West Punjab, where their relatives lived and returned to Jammu to fight the Dogra rule”.

About who led the movement for liberation Joseph Kathel on page 67 of his book gives candidly the fact that:~This movement was led by a young Kashmiri. Sardar

Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, who since June had traveled throu~hOut the country, arousing the spirit of his countrymen. In August he narrowly escaped arrest in Srinagar and fled to Pakistan. At Murree he laid the foundation for a political movement of liberation, out of which later grew the And (free) Icashmir government”.

As soon as Kashmir war of liberation started in the Poonch province of the state, Pakistan Government got. naturally, alarmed. Firstly, because this area of the state was on the border of Pakistan from Sialkot to Abbotabad. Secondly Pakistan army has a large number of army personnel from this province. As soon as these soldiers heard that their kith and kin were in extreme danger, the Pakistan Army soldiers started deserting their units and joined the fight for liberation

The Maharaja of Kashmir fled from Srinagar to Jammu in a terrible panic. The Government of India took undue advantage of this panicky situation and forced the Maharaja to sign a conditioned accession to India, promising a loose sort of plebiscite as soon as normal conditions were restored India took the Kashmir case to the Security Council in a hurry to have Pakistan condemned and have their accession

206

legalised. But in this effort, they failed to succeed. In 1948, when this author was representing the Azad Kashmir cause, Security Council was seized of the mailer and a debate going on in Lake Success. Mahatama Chandi was shot dead in Delhi. The Security Council debate was suddenly postponed. Nothing came out of these stupid debates except a UNCLE Commission to hold parley~s with all concerned parties.

The first blunder that Pakistan Delegation committed was that it managed to meet Sheikh Abdullah in Newyork and asked for the release of our leader Chaüdhari Ghulam Abbas from Jainmu jail. He was supposed to have come to meet Quaide-Azam Mohammad Mi Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan, with a proposal of independent Kashmir. On his first meeting with Mr. Jinnah he out-right rejected any such thoughts even. Chaudhari Chulam Abbas gave start to a quarrel among leaders which liquidated the liberatiop movement and gave birth to a Kashmir Affairs Ministry, with MA. Gurmani as its Minister. This Ministry played havoc with the movement and had it finally liquidated to the satisfaction of all bureaucrats in Pakistan.

Another blunder was the acceptance of accession of Junagadh to Pakistan. Junagadh was a small state ruled by a Muslim Nawab, but majority of its people were Hindus. The State itself was contiguous to India. Pakistan had no business to accept its accession, for accession any state had to be contiguous to a dominion and Raja or Nawab had to ascertain the wishes of his state subjects. If the Nawab of Junagadh had taken the trouble of ascertaining the wishes of his people, the wishes of the Hindu population could not be aAything but a wish for accession to India. This gave a strong argument to India when Pakistan, on the above criterion, claimed the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This was a gamble which cost Pakistan, her legitimate claims on Kashmir. ICashmir was lost as was paradise in Milton’s poem.

Pakistan committed still another mistake in 1948 when

Patel offered to Liaqat Ali Khan, Kashmir, provided

Hyderabad State was conceded to India. Liaqat Ali Khan, the

Prime Minister, took this author into confidence and sought his

207

opinion. This author, without least hesitation, accepted the propoSitiofl as fair and in the interest of peace and welfare of

the State People both in Kashmir and Hyderabad

Liaqat Mi Khan told the author that Ghularfl Mohammad, the Finance Minister, was opposed to the proposition and ~could I go and convince him of this’. consequently a meeting was arranged with Mr. Chulam Mohamma& the Finance Minister. In this meeting, the author tried his best to convince Mr. Ghulam Mohammad, but he refused to budge an inch. This author came to know later on, that one Sydney Cotton. a pilot was bringing in an aeroplane carrying gold bricks from Flyderabad to Karachi. Mr. Ghulam Mohammad had a share in this. This tragic event linished all chances of Kashmir’s amicable settlement. Hyderabad was, later on, annexed by India by marching their troops into it.

That finished Hyderabad too.

In November, 1947, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad All Jinnah, was at Lahore, when Indian troops started pouring into Kashmir, Mr. Jinnah,as a great leader and statesman, ordered his armies to move into Jammu and Srinagar both. It was later

explained that British officers in Pakistan army and Indian army came to meet him in Lahore. Mr. Jinnah changed his orders. This may be so. but I had it from the Quaid-e-Azam that he changed his orders, because his cabinet ‘got cold feet. He himself told me this in a later meeting. He was, during his last months, led up with his cabinet and was not on good terms with the Prime Minister. This I had from Miss Jinnah herself.

If his orders were faithfully and courageously carried out, Kashmir would have fallen in his pocket~ like a ripe fruit. He believed in this bold step but his colleagues were not in agreement with him, particularly Mr. Chulam Mohammad made it very difficult for every one in the cabinet. He once, I am told on good authority, threw his file on the table while Quaid-e-Azam was presiding and ran out of the room. He was a patient of blood-Pressure. Quaid~e~AZam next day sent a man after him and he was got round.

Pakistan’s mistakes were many. I could not do much to prevent them. I was perhaps too small a man to make men at the helm of affairs change their policies which amounted to grave blunders.

In the context of “Blunders” two events must find a special place. These events are in my personal knowledge. One incident could have found a place in the little book “Raiders in Kashmir”, by General Akbar Khan. He was a party to this decision. But it did not find any place in his book.

When we were planning a systematic liberation campaign in Kashmir, we at once realized the strategic value of Kashmir Airport. This was the only method open to India to land their troops in Srinagar, in the valley of Kashmir anywhere. Since Pathankot gave them no land mad connection, therefore, Indian troops could land only by air. This is what actually happened later. This was the crucial step by which India got the upper hand over us in 1947 on-wards

We prepared a special contingent of tough people, in the command of a dependable person. Politically motivated and otherwise thoroughly dependable, this person was almost a favourite choice of General Akbar Khan. I do not think advisable to mention his name. This expedition was to travel by land routes to reach the Airport from behind and sorround it all round by dangerous snipers. They could make it easily impossible for Indian planes to land.

The Dogra Army, as it was spread all over the state, had become vulnerable and non-effective. Banihal pass passage was so difficult. In any case, the Indian troops could not possibly reach Banihal pass to save Kashmir valley for Dogras or for India.

The tragedy happened because our contingent and its young commander got cold feet and ran back after covering some distance from Kohala side. When on 27th October, 1947, the Indian Troops actually landed in Srinagar Airport there was no resistance. The troops of India poured into the valley of

209

Kashmir, fought our Mujahids outside Baramula and Pathan area. First Indian regiment was almost wiped out, including its commanders It was a Kamaoon Regiment with some Sikhs in it.

This happened to be a crucial incident in the history of Kashmirs liberation struggle.

The other event that I wish to mention is another crucial incident. A parallel Government in Jarnmu and Kashmir was formed with a formal announcement on 24th October, 1947. This author was its accepted Head. By this time we have had an army of at 30/40 thousand officers and soldiers. We had liberated whole of Poonch Province, except the city of Poonch. We had also liberated Mirpur and Kotli, liberated almost both of them. Gilgit and Ladakh were also liberated Out of a total area of 84000 square miles, we had liberated at least 1/2 of the state; Kargil, the northern most areas were under our control. We were behind Shopian, a valley town. Whole of Rajouri area was conquered. We had already set up an administrative unit in Rajouri area.

I have already discussed elsewhere that India was raising hell against Pakistan. Pakistan was being dubbed as aggressor. A grave situation was brewing It could result in a war with Pakistan. Pakistan forces being spread all over Indo-Pakistan continent, it would have created a dangerous situation. With thousands of refugees pouring into Pakistan, Pakistan Government was certainly in a very tight position.

On 27th October, 1947, India accepted a conditional accession instrument from the Maharaja, who had run away from Srinagar in a disgraceful manner. This fraudulent accession obtained by India, gave India a legal and constitutional posture to send her troops into Kashmir. Pakistan had no such legal character to ask their troops to do the same, which easily they could have if some legal coverage was available to them.

I rushed to Karachi with the proposal that Government of Pakistan agree to accept an acccssthn on behalf of Kashmir State from the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

210

Accepting this accession, Pakistan with a good enough legal coverage could ask their troops to march to Jammu and Srinagar. This position was almost adopted by the Quaid-eAzam in the first week of November, 1947. My proposal was rejected by Liaquat Mi Khan, the Prime Minister I believe that this was a chance lost. If Pakistan had taken courage and played the fiance, things would have turned in our favour. Non-acceptance of this proposal, to my mind, was a grave error that Pakistan committed.

211

Chapter XIX.

ACCESSION ISSUE OF THE STATES

AT the time of independence both India and Pakistan had as many as five hundred odd states which had to accede either to the Dominion of Pakistan or India. The last Viceroy of pre-partition India, in his last address to the Princes, had positively emphasized that the Princes had to acceded to one of the two dominions. He had further urged upon them that the accession must take place, if possible, before August 15,1947. This meeting of the Princes took place in the month of July, 1947. They were not altogether unanimous nor were they decisive. The out-moded old system of the nile of Maharajas was scattered ~ll over the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and the Princes had not the slightest idea of how to act when the events proceeded so quickly. Probably, most of the Princes thought that the British would never part with power in India. and, therefore, their sun would continue to shine and they would continue suppressing their own people. The Princes always depended on the support of British in India. Quite often the British forces were used against the people in the States, and the gaddies of the Maharajas were made safe for them at the point of the bayonet.

But independence dawned much earlier than these people had expected. They were caught unaware. Therefore they had no considered opinion on the matter, far less any decision to announce. Some of the Maharajas, however, were far-sighted enough and had also enough experience to make up their minds on the accession issue. It was obvious to them that, in a subcontinent like ours, when the British had already left, and the Princes had neither good-will in the Congress circles nor in the Muslim League, their future, unless they unconditionally surrendered according to the advice of the last Viceroy, would

On the issue of accession of the States, the last Viceroy of old India had emphasized the following considerations on the Princes-

1.
‘Geographical compulsiàns which cannot be evaded’; and

be extremely doubtful. There were some Princes, nevertheless,who still believed that the British could help them, or that they could maintain their own separate independent entity. For instance, States like Travancore and Cochin tried their level best to maintain their independent existence, but they were completely broken by the Indian States Ministry headed by the late Mr.Patel. But the question of Hyderabad (Dii.), Kashmir and Junagadh was not so easy. These States became the subject of dispute between the Governments of India and Pakistan.

So far as the Indian National Congress was concerned, it had a definite policy on the States of India. There was a separate Congress Organization known as the States Congress, which was once presided over by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru himself. The Indian Congress positively abhorred the rule of the Maharahjas and the Nawabs and the tyranny which was imposed on the people of the States. The Congress point of view on the advent of Indian independence was that the Princes must go. If any one of the Princes came in the way of this policy he was broken and smashed to bits and pieces. The last expression of this policy of Government of India was made in case of Hyderabad, where by means of police action they broke the resistance of the State and occupied it through their armed forces.

Since the question of the States had to be determined one way or the other definite lines had to be suggested to their rulers. Certain principles were to be determined with regard to the accession issue. The States, with this end in view, had to be guided by the British authority in India on the lapse of paramountcy.

213

I propose to quote here from Mission with Mountbatten by Alan Campbell-Johnson. He says on page 192.

“It has been freely recognized that the act of accession is the prerogative of the Princes. But India’s readiness to recogT~]Se such acts was governed by the time limit of the 15th August, which was, of course, the basis of Mountbattens urgent appeal to the Princes on 25th July. Moreover, arising from that speech two other powerful factors have always been inherent in the choice of accession_first, in Mountbatten’s own words, certain geographical compulsions’ which cannot be evaded and, secondly, the communal majorities of the Rulers subjects.”

As soon as the British Government announced their plan of June 3,1947, for the future of the mao-Pakistan sub-continent, paramountcy over the States was to cease on the appointed day, namely the 15th 1947, and the States were to be left free to decide to which Dominion they should accede. At the same time, the Crown Representative advised the Rulers of the States to take into consideration economic factors, geographical contiguity, the wishes of their people and other factors, in athving at a decision vis-a-vis accession

The Indian independence Act provided that the suzerainty of the British Crown over the Indian Princely States would lapse after the transfer of power to India and Pakistan.

After the lapse of paramountcy, the Crown Representative gave his candid advice to the Princes based on the definite principles mentioned above.

It will appear that at that time the Indian leaders were of the opinion that the accession of a State to Pakistan or to India should depend upon the will of the people rather than that of the ruler. On March 8,1948, the late Mr. Gopalasawamy Ayanger, the Indian Representatives explained to the Security Council the Indian position, as regards accession of States, in these words-

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“No doubt the Ruler, as the head of State, has to take action in respect of accession. When he and his people are in agreement as to the Dominion to which they should accede, he applies for accession to that Dominion. However, when he has taken one view his people have to be ascertained. When so ascertained, the Ruler has to take action in accordance with the verdict of the people. This is our position.”

Similarly, in the White Paper on Hyderabad~ issued by the Government of India on August 10, 1942 the position was stated in the following words-

“The Government of India are firmly of the view that, whatever sovereign rights reverted to the States on the lapse of paramountcy. they vest in the people and conditions must be created in every State for a free and unfettered exercise of these rights.”

As has already been pointed out, the accession issue with regard to other States, was amicably settled. Trouble arose with regard to the State of Hyderabad~ Junagadh and Kashmir. 1ydera’oad had a Muslim Ruler but a majority of non-Muslim oopulation. junagadh. which was contiguous to Pakistan by sea, had also a Muslim Ruler but a majority of non-Muslim population . Kasbmii had a Hindu Ruler but an overwhelming majority of its population is Muslim. Hyderabad decided to remain independent for the time being. Junagadh acceded to Pakistan on September 15, 1947 and the Maharaja of Kashmir made an offer of accession to India, which the latter accepted on October 21,1947, subject to certain conditions.

About Hyderabad, the stand of the Government of India was that the State should first accede to India and then a plebiscite could be held to ascertain the wishes of the people; very much like Hitler’s proposal for a referendum in Austria after the occupation of that country by German troops. In August 1948, the Government of India made a statement of their policy with regard to Hyderabad that:

215

“The Nizam’s Government wish to hold a plebiscite under the conditions in which a small militant group controls the destinies of the people and the Razakars are left free to terrorize the people into submission. A plebiscite without an interim Government representative of and satisfactory to the majority population in Hyderabad will only be a fraud on the people.”

This, exactly, is the stand taken by the government of Pakistan on the accession of Kashrnir. To 1nct~ia what was good enough in Hyderabad was not good enough in Kashmir.

It will appear that the Nizam of Hyderabad desired to enter into special treaty relations with the government of India so that a fair measure of independence could be maintained for his State. This position was not acceptable to the Government of India, and they asked the Nizam to submit and accede to !ndia without any conditions. The Nizaln then offered to hold a plebiscite under the aegis of the United Natiohs so that the wishes of the people may be ascertained on the issue of accession to India. This positions also, was not acceptable to the Government of India. The choice offered tO the Nizam of Hyderabad was a plebiscite after he had already acceded to India. When no amicable arrangement could be arrived at between the Government of India and the government of the Nizaul, the Government of India invaded the territory of the Nizam àf 1-lyderabad by means of a Police action’ and took possession of the State, In the process atrocities were committed on the Muslim population of the State.

With regard to Junagadh, it entered into a stand still agreement with Pakistan on 15th August ,1947 and acceded to Pakistan on 15th September, 1947. The Government of India strongly objected to the agreement between junagadh and Pakistan. The Government of India strenuously maintained that accession to Pakistan was in violation of the principles on which the partition of the subcontinent had been agreed to and effected. They argued that partition of lndo-Pakistan subcontinent had taken place on the basis that, where there were Muslims in the majority that should form Pakistan, and where

216

there were Hindus in majority it should form India. On this basis, they said, the accession of Junagadh State to Pakistan was not justified and the Government of India thought that accession of Junagadh State to Pakistan was a direct encroachment on Indian sovereignty and territory.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, while making his speech in the Security Council in the year 1950, in connection with the accession of the Jammu and Icashmir State, saidtannot Pakistan with equal justice retort with regard to

Kashniir in the very words employed by the Government of India in respect of Junagadh, that the so-called accession of lcashnür to India is in utter violation of the principles on which the partition of the country was agreed upon and effected, that it is an encroachment on Pakistans sovereignty and territory and that it represents an attempt to disturb the integrity of Pakistan?’

It was also pointed out in the same speech by Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, on the logic produced by India, that the majority of the population in Junagadh was Hindu and the State of Junagadh was contiguous to India, the Ruler, though Muslim, had no right to, decide the accession issue against the will of the Junagadh people, Kashinir ought to accede to Pakistan unconditionally. It was pointed out that the ruler of Kashmir was a Hindu, but there was an overwhelming majority of Muslim population in the State. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was geographically contiguous to Pakistan. Then, on what logic and under what considerations could India accept the accession of Icashmir? Speaking further, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan pointed out-

“They proposed that the question of accession should be settled either by negotiations, that is, admitting India’s claim to the accession of Junagadh, or by a plebiscite organized under the joint control of the State of Junagadh and the Government of India.

0If this was a fair offer, why cannot Pakistan with equal

justice, conteml that the ascertainment of the wishes of the

people of Kashmir should be by means of a plebiscite held under the joint control of the State of Kashmfr and the goveflMT~eflt of PakistanT’

SubsequenttY a farcical plebiscite was held in junagadh while India was already in military occUpab0t~ of the State. Pakistan’s complaint with regard to the State of ~unagadh is still pending before the Security Council. So far as the Security Council itself is concerned, it has practically shelved the cases of junagadh and Hyderabad Kashmit still remains a live issue on its agenda.

As regards the issue of the accession of Kashmir it has been aiscussed in the chapter under the heading - Kashmir’s Ties with Pakistan.’ After the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashm showed his in~clinatiOfl to accede to India, an independence movement was started by the people of jamm~1 and Kashmir State against such an accession. Talking about this movement Sheikh Abdullah commented as follows-“The Kashmir State sent their troops and there was panic

in Poonch. But most of the adult population of Poonch were ex-servicemen of the Indian Army who had close conneCti0~ with the people in Jhelum and RawalPindi me)’ evacuated their women and children, closed the frontier and returned, with arms supplied to them by willing people. The present position was that the Kashmir State forces were lorced to withdraw in certain areas’.

When the tribesmen had to withdraw back to Abbottabad, the condition in the Jammu and Kashmir State became very precarious; and the people of the State were in complete panic and tenor. ~~rnediatCly after this a general massacre of the Mussalmans started in the State, particularly in Jammu. I was told by Quaid~e~nm that, when he felt that the Muslims of Kashmir were in grave dangers he, as Govern0rcent decided to send Pakistan troops into the State. What exactly happened after this has been narrated by Alan Campbell Johnson in his book MfssiOfl with Mountbatten on page 223 as follows

218

the military and political implications of today’s move are grave, and Mountbatten is, of course, under no illusion about that. Although his role can only now, in the last resort, be advisory. I get the firm impression that his presence may already have helped to save his Government, overburdened and distracted with the problems of the Punjab and Janagadh, from the most dangerous pitfalls It was a sudden emergency, calling at once for restraint and quick decision.MOUntabatten’5 extraordinarY vitality and candidness were well-adapted to the demands of the hour.

“I gather from him that it was last Friday night (24th October), at a buffet dinner in honour of the Siamese Foreign Minister, that Nehru first spoke of bad news and reported that tribesmen were being taken in military transport up the Rawalpindi road. State forces, it seems, were absent, and altogether a most critical situation was developing. Mountbatten attended the Defence Committee on Saturday 25th, at which General Lockhart read out a telegram from the Headquarters of the Pakistan Army stating that some five thousand tribesmen had attacked and captured Muzaffarabad and Domel land and that considerable tribal reinforcements could be expected. Reports showed that they were already little more than thirty-five miles from Srinagar.”

219

He further goes on to say, The Defence Committee considered the most immediate

necessity was to rush in arms and ammunition already recplested by the Kashmir Governments which could enable the local populace in Srinagar to put up some defence against the raiders. The problem of troop reinforcem~t5 was considered’ and Mountbatten urged that it would be dangerous to send in any troops unless Kashmir had first offered to accede. Moreover, accession should only be temporat3nr prior to a plebiscite. No final decision was taken on these vital questions on the 25th. but it was agreed that V.P MenOn should fly to Srinagar at once to find out the true position ther&

V.P.Menon, the Secretary ci States for the Government of India, flew to Srinagar and found the conditions extremely ~~5turbiflg? He rushed the Mthuaraia through the instrument of accession and flew back to Delhi, leaving the Maharaja at jammu.

Alan Campbell40~50” throws further light with regard to the Kashmir issue via-a-Vis the old Viceroy of India. He says: “While urging the Maharaja to make up his mind about

accession before the transfer of power’ he had all along, from his visit in June onwards, exerted his whole influence to prevent him from acceding to one Dominion or the other without first taking steps to ascertain the will of his people by referendum, plebisote election or even, if these methods were iznpracticables by representative public meetings. When during the past forty-eight hours it became clear that the Government were determined, against the military advice both of their own Chiefs of Staff arid ot himself, to send in troops in response to a request from lcashmir (or aid, he returned to the charge about accession.’

campbellJ0~50fl again~ in the same book, relates the story that when Mr. Stephens~ the Editor of The Statesman,

220

Delhi, wrote a leading article “which in its anxiety over the decline in Indo-Pakistan” relations, had denounced the injection of Indian troops into Icashmir, the Viceroy sent for the Editor and admonished him, in this manner-

“You cannot build a nation on tricks. Jinnab at Abbottabad had been expecting to ride in triumph into Kashmir. He had been frustrated. First there was Junagadh, then yesterday’s fantastic hold-up of the Hyderabad delegation. India’s move on Kashmir was an event of different order. Her readiness to accept a plebiscite had been declared from the outset. A large-scale massacre, including a couple of hundred British residents in Srinagar, by tribesmen would have been inevitable if no military move had been made. The Maharaja’s accession gave complete legality to the action so far taken”.

How Pakistan was prevented from sending her troops into Kashmir is narrated by the same author in his book Mission with Mountbatten, which is, of course, interesting. He narrates in the middle of to-days Defence Committee, Auchinleck

rang up Mountbatten from Lahore to say that he had succeeded in persuading Jinnah to cancel orders given the previous night for Pakistan troops to be moved into Icashmir. The order had reached General Gracey, the acting Pakistan Commander-in-Chief in the temporary absence of General Messervy through the Military Secretary of the Governor of the West I’unjab, with whom Jinnah was staying. Gracey replied that he was not prepared to issue any such instruction without the approval of the Supreme Commander. At Graceys urgent request, Auchinleèk flew to Lahore this morning and explained to Jinnah that in so far as Kashmir had acceded to India, the Government of India had a perfect right to send in troops in response to the Maharaja’s request.

“Before Auchinlekc left him he had not only called off the order, but also invited Mountbatten and Nehru to come to Lahore. Vernon, however, arriving late for dinner after some harassing hours on the telephone, announced, ‘it is

221

the end. The whole plan had broken down as Nehru could not get to Lahore because of illness”.

I am quite positive in my mind today that if, on the urgent call that I had submitted to Quaid-i-Azam. the then Governor General of Pakistan, on behalf of the people ol Kashmir, the Pakistan troops had moved into Kashmir,

i.e.
into Jammu and Srinagar, the accession of jammu and Kashmir would have been accomplished for Pakistan. I am just as sure that there would have been no war between India and Pakistan and I have good reason for saying so. though I cannot go into these details. The alteration of this fateful decision changed the course of history and the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State is now a matter for the future On Kashmir, Mahatma Gandhi (relates Campbelhjohnsoul)r struck an almost Churchiulan note. His line was: ~The result was in the hands of God; men could but do or die. I-ic would not shed a tear if the little Union force was wiped out like the Spartarts bravely defending ThermOPYlae nor would he mind Sheikh Abdullah and his Moslem, Hindu and Sikh comrades dying at their posts in the defence of Kashmir. That would be a glorious example to the Test of India’.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, in his telegram of 8th November, 1947, to the Prime Minister of Pakistan said.

~fl is essential in order to restore good relations between the two Dominions that there should be the acceptance of the principle that, where the ruler of a State does not belong to a community to which the majority of the subjects belong and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as that of the State, the question whether the State has finally acceded to one or other Dominion be ascertained by a reference to the will of the people.’

Then again the government of India took their stand on the same principle. The statement of the Indian Representatives

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Mr. Gopalasawami Ayyangar, may be re-quoted with emphasis. On 8th March, 1948, he said, However, when he (Prince) takes one view and his people

take another view, the wishes of the people have to be ascertained. When so ascertained, the Ruler has to take action In accordance with the verdict of the people. That is our position.”

It crystallises into this position-

(a)
Certain states had to accede straightaway to India, and certain others had, without any controversy, to accede to Pakistan;

(b)
There were other States which wished to remain independent and wished to have relations with both India and Pakistan;

(c)
There were still other States whose Rulers were at variance with the people. Namely, the people wished to accede to one Dominion and the Ruler wished to accede to the other.

In the last alternative above, it was expected by all concerned, i.e. the British Government, the Indian Government, and the Pakistan Government, that in such State the principle that the will of the people should be ascertained should prevail.

While in the case of Hyderabad and Junagadh the Indian Government accepted this principle, in the case of Kashmir they only accepted this principle on paper, and, against all persuasions, they have so far refused to implement the provisions of the plebiscite agreement

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Chapter XX

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

WHEN the Governor-General of India accepted the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State in October 1947, its accession was made explicitly subject to a future plebiscite. In the Indian Independence Act there was no such provision that any State could effect a conditional accession to one of the two dominions. Accession had to be total and irrevocable. In the case of Kashmir State it was not certain as to which dominion, according to the Governor-General of India, the people wanted to accede. Therefore, an arbitrary procedure was resorted to and adopted by India in this particular case.

Again when the matter went to the Security Council about the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State, the Government of India accepted the principle of plebiscite in the State in the clearest terms. The Pakistan Government always insisted that it should be the will of the people, and not the act of Maharaja, that should decide the issue of accession of the State. The principle of plebiscite has ben accepted by all the parties to the dispute. The United Nations has also, in all its resolutions referring to the issue of accession, always laid it down in the clearest terms that it was the democratic process of plebiscite that should finally decide the issue of accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to either India and Pakistan. That has been the position up to date.

Though all concerned have accepted a lull and impartial plebiscite as the only method of deciding the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and the efforts of the United Nations have so far been directed to that end, the attitude of the Government of India has been the main hitch towards the final achievement of this objective. Though the

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United Nations appointed an Administrator to conduct the plebiscite in the State, his induction into office has not so far been possible. The main reason for this delay has been the question of demilitarization of the State and other ancillary matters. Up to this day it is the demilitarization problem that holds up all progress in the matter. It can be said without any fear of contradiction that, with regard to the demilitarization of the State. Pakistan and Azad Kashmir authorities have always been very reasonable and they have been prepared to accommodate the Government of India to every reasonable extent.

If a plebiscite is not held in the Jammu and Kashmir State, I have never been doubtful nor am I doubtful today as to its results. The State is inhabited by 80 per cent of Muslim population. This Muslim population owed allegiance to a number of political parties. One of them was All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. The case of nationalist leaders is that a very large number of Jammu and Kashmir State people believe in the ideology of the National Conference, which in turn owes its allegiance to the Indian National Congress. Nationalist leaders do not believe in the two-nation theory, on the basis of which Pakistan was founded, and India was partitioned. On the basis of this theory, the nationalist leaders believed that the majority of the people of the State wish to accede to India, and, in fact, according to them, they have already acceded to India. The Pakistan and Azad Kashmir case is, that an overwhelming majority of the people of Jammu and Kashmir State is in favour of Pakistan and that includes some of non-Muslims as well. But, taking even a very conservative view of the matter, it would be safe to presume that a very large majority, may be 95 per cent of the Muslims, will vote for Pakistan. It is quite true that there may be some people who are with National Conference, but that does not necessarily mean that they automatically would vote for India. The matter stands this way, that there are National Conference leaders who would like to vote for nationalist leader as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir Sate, but, on the accession issue, they would not like to vote for India. This matter, however, can always be confirmed by neutral observers.

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Nationalist leaders claim that their party followers, because of being members of the National Conference, would ipso fGcto vote for India is not an acceptable proposition. This position has greatly changed now, because Sheikh Abdullah and his party-men have dissociated themselves from the National Conference. They have now formed a new party.

If a plebiscite had been held in 1948-49 or even in 1950, the plebiscite results would have been an 80 per cent vote of the people of the Sate in favour of Pakistan But since then things have changed. Their henchmen, and the Government of India, have consolidated themselves in the State. They have established things according to their own ideas. This might make some difference, but, I am still positive, it will never make a decisive difference. I believe the result of an overall plebiscite, if a free and fair plebiscite is held under a free and impartial United Nations agency, would be a big majority in favour of Pakistan This position is as true to-day as it was ever before. The fact of the matter is that India has manifestly and materially lost her prestige in the State, after the demise of Pandit NehnL

There are people who talk of a zonal plebiscite For this purpose the State could be divided into the following zones-

(a)
Trans-Chenab area i.e., Kathua, Jammu and Udhampur Districts and a part of Riasi.

(b)
Rest of Jammu Area, that means Mirpur. parts of Riasi District and parts of Poonch.

Mirpur District; parts of Poonch District, parts of

Muzaffarabad District and Gilgit and parts of

Ladakh; and

(d)
The Valley of Kashmir.

If, for some reason, we abandon our accepted principle of an overall plebiscite, and think of an alternative plan in the form of zonal plebiscite, this would pm-suppose a partition of the

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State. It would mean that the State must be divided into different zones, and the results of these zones, separately. should decide what parts should go to India and what parts should go to Pakistan. If, for instance, the trans-Chenab area, which Is a Hindu majority area and is also contiguous to India, returns a result in favour of India, then, it is argued, it should go to India. I will show how the results of zonal plebiscite would go, but, before I do so, I wish to go into the question of partition of the Sate, which a zonal plebiscite pre~5UppOSes.

The Government of India is opposed to partition of the State. The Government of Pakistan are also opposed, to the partition of the State. All political parties of the State, with the exception of very few are also opposed to partition. There has not been any suggestion by the United Nations that the State should be partitioned. There has, however, been a suggestion put forward on a diplomatic level, to the effect that the State be partitioned in such a manner that India should get all such contiguous areas as are dominated by the Hindu population. A partition can only be agreed to if the parties agree. In fact, that is tnie about any solution of the problem The Government of India ultimately might have to agree to such a solution, but it will be very difficult for the Government of Pakistan to agree because if the area across the Chenab goes to India, Pakistan’s defence and economic problems will remain unsolved. Since Pakistan is committed to the principle of an overall plebiscite_ it will be very difficult for her to get away from this stand. This may, to some degree, be true about India also. As regards the political parties of the State, they have not so far seen their way to even consider an alternative plan. But if the matter is put to them, as a last resort, in the name of international peace, it will have to be looked at from a broader angle. After Canal Waters Agreement between India and Pakistan this aspect of the problem has become much easier.

• This question can now be considered as a feasible and acceptable solution.

The results of such a zonal plebiscite. one can safely predict1 will be as follows-

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(a)
In the trans-Chenab zone of Udhantpur, Jammu and Kashmir and Kathua an overwhelming majority of votes will go br India.

(1~)
In the rest of Jammu and all other zones an overwhelming vote will go for Pakistan.

The result of this zonal plebiscite would be that in the three districts of Kathua, Jammu and Udhampur, which are contiguous to India, the votes will go for Pakistan.

The third possible solution of the problem, which has recently been discussed in certain quarters, is the independence of the Sate. One cannot easily conceive of Jammu and Kashmir remaining a full sovereign independent State. There are some psychological and sentimental reasons for such a proposition. If one were to examine the whole problem dispassionately1 one is confronted with the following central facts-

(a)
Is the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as an

independent country, a financial and fiscal possibility?

(N
Can the finances of the State be such as to allow the maintenance of some sort of an army to guard her frontiers?

(c)
Are there not very serious possibilities of the State becoming an arena of international intrigue because so many international territories meet on the borders of the State?

(d)
Can the Jammu and Icashmir State be, economically and from the trade and food points of view, absolutely independent?

(e)
Can an independent State of Jammu and Kashmir be of any use to Pakistan or India?

228

f)
Can Pakistan or India countenance and benefit from such an independent State to the extent to which it should?

These are some of the fundamental questions which must be answered. So far as the area and the population are concerned, one can very well visualize an independent Jammu and Kashmir as a Switzerland of Asia. The State could welcome visitors from all over the world and provide an international holiday resort, where people could come and forget their worries and spend some money. That is one way of looking at it. Another manner of looking at it is more difficult. Unless some solid economic and financial aid comes from somewhere an independent Jammu and Kashmir State is not feasible. If, for example, the trade relations break down with India and Pakistan for any reason, what will happen to the trade of the State? If her trade fails, can the State financially exist ~nd maintain her independence. without surrendering her sovereignty to one of the large countries? This, in my opinion, is not possible. The State will have to compromise her sovereignty at every point, when it has to bargain for trade or financial aid. Then the big question is, can the State be independent and maintain an army which could guarantee the defence of the State? The answer is a positive NO. The State finances are such that it cannot be possible for the State to maintain any army at all. It will be foolish to imagine that the State can maintain an army, which will, if occasion arises, fight with my power across her frontiers. If this proposition is correct, then the State has to live only on the good-will and certain guarantees~ which neighbours must give her. An autonomous status can be conceded to Jammu and Kashmir State by Pakistan essentially and also by India. Such a status is conceivable, when Pakistan first, and then India can give a joint international guarantee that both will respect the integrity and independence of Jammu and Kashmir State. If such a position materialises, then the State of Jammu and Kashmir will have to enter into a special treaty agreement with Pakistan with regard to her defence, foreign affairs, communications, trade etc. This will be absolutely essential.

229

There is still another thing which could be considered. That the State should remain in a semi-independent condition, and this position may be guaranteed by Pakistan first, and then by India, and also by an international body like the United Nations. A central government for the State of Jammu and Kashmir may then be established by a coalition of all the political elements of the State and such a Government should be left to continue for a period of ten years to develop the State. In this period, a state-wide educational programme should be taken up by this Government and the people should be thoroughly educated. Both Pakistan and India should extend financial aid to the State. The people of the State in this period should be given the maximum amount of political freedom. After this period it should be left to the Government of the people in the State to hold a plebiscite under auspices of the International Court of Justice or any other international body, to decide whether it should accede to India or to Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan should bind themselves beforehand to accept such a verdict. It may therefore be considered as such by the Governments of Pakistan and India. I must, in the end, emphasise that Pakistan will be a big loser if the State is lost to her, and it is her independence and integrity that will be jeopardized. Any solution, other than an overall plebiscite, must first satisfy the country and the people of Pakistan and must be acceptable to the people of Jammu and Icashmir State and must also be essentially a democratic solution.

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Chapter XXI

FUTURE PROSPECTS

NOBODY can claim to be a prophet~ nor is it advisable to. hazard a forecast which may mislead the public. Since the Kashmir problem involves issues which have far-reaching implications in thc Indo~Paki5~1~ sub~contifle~~t, and, in fact, also in general1 so many factors have a bearing on the solution of this problem. The world situation, which at the moment is full of grim possibilities shall as much affect the Kashmir issue as any other problem The possibility of a third World-War is already in sight in Vietnam, Indo-China and round Formosa. It should surprise no one if, one day, we find ourselves i~~olufltarily involved in a world conflict. So many events and changes in world politics affect problems and lives today that to forecast a definite solution of any problem will not only be inadvisable but also fallacious.

The stage which we have just reached in Kashmir, with the failure of the Security Council, is really alarming. India, I feel, has not, even one fraction changed from her original attitude. As a matter of fact the opposition patties in India, like the Jan Sang and the Mahasabha, have adopted a stiffer attitude on Kashmir in particular and on Pakistan in general. These parties are openly flouting every move of reconciliation between India and Pakistan. The Mahasabha and the Jan Sang leaders have declared that the partition of India was not acceptable to them and their political parties wished to integrate the State of Pakistan with the rest of India. Added to this, there is an agitation going on in Jammu province1 particularly in the districts of Kathua, Jammu and Udhampur The Parishad agitation~ in brief, has the following programme before them—

231

(a)
Application, in two, of the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir State;

(b)
Establishment of a responsible Government in the State with the Maharaja as the Constitutional Head;

(c)
Payment of compensation to the landlords, in the light of the procedure adopted in this connection by the Indian Constitution:

(4)
Banning of cow-slaughter in the State.

The Hindu population in Jammu area seeks complete merger with India. Indian Government are taking steps, through constitutional means, to effect that merger. National Conference is now being integrated with the Indian National Congress.

The Nationalist Government of Srinagar has not been able to satisfy any section of the people of the Valley of Kashmir. The Hindu populace of Jammu feel that Nationalist Government is just as much an alien Government as the one under the British aegis. In any case, the present Nationalist Governments failure has completely disillusioned all sections of the population. To-day the Nationalist Government is there, not on its own, but it is there because of the support that it is getting from the government of India. The same is true of the Government on the Azad Kashmir side. Politically the state has suffered as a whole, but economic aspects of the progress cannot and must not be easily ignored.

The movement in parts of Jammu has opened up possibilities of certain parts of Jammu going over to India, because these parts contain a very big majority of Hindus. From these parts Muslims have practically been turned out. This, it seems, was a pre-planned arrangement, through which Muslims from these parts were either to be massacred or driven into Pakistan, so that these parts become a Hindu dominated areas. Since these areas are adjacent to India they will thus

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automatically fall in line with India. The Hindu leadership has entrenched itself very strongly against the administration of Srinagar Government, though it is an absolute puppet in the hands of the Government of India. The repeated deciaTations of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and others in authority in Srinagar, that Kashmir has entered into a cent per cent accession with India, have failed to satisfy the Hindu elements in Jammu area. These elements have been supported by the reactionary Hindu organizations in lixija, a mention of which has already been made. An agitation at one time so unnerved Pandit Nehru that he had to say that he felt the people of Jammu and Kashmir State may not be with India. If that formed the basis of his policy, which it should have as early as 1947-48 and if certain facts were realistically accepted by Pandit Nehru, the solution of the Kashmir problem may have been much nearer than it now seems to certain people. If the pace of events continues in the present direction for some time, and the Government of India change their attitude towards the whole problem and accept with a sincere heart the basis on which Pakistan and India were partitioned, then it would seem that the whole matter can be settled by sitting round the table, without much ado, or without resorting to arms.

Reverting to the Hindu agitation, which has a very dose bearing on the solution of this problem, one might remark that a plebiscite offer, to decide the future of Jammu and Kashmir State may not be acceptable to the Hindus in Jammu province. The President of the Praja Parishad, Pandit Prem Nath Dogra, in his statement published in The Times of India, Delhi (October 6, 1952), said— P!An overall plebiscite in the State was suicidal and that

it should be limited only to the Kashmir Valley’.

It will be seen that some other reactionary parties of Hindus in India lent substantial moral support to the idea that Jammu, in any case, should integrate with India without the plebiscite.

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The late Doctor 5.1’. Moolcerjee, President of Jan San;~ ii. his statement published in The Statesman, Delhi, August 15, 1952, said--

“The people of Jammu are not prepared to be tagged to Kashmir Valley unless the principle of full integration with India is accepted. To curb this natural desire by force or coercion will be fatal and a separation will then become inevitable. It will be a mistake to brush aside the depth of such feeling by asserting that they are the outcome of the activities of a handful of reactionary and communal agitators.’

This will make it clear that this Hindu movement is directly against an overall, plebiscite in the State and that certain parts of Jammu should integrate with India in any case. It will also appear from the statements ol these reactionary Hindu leaders, that they would rather have the state divided in the following manner--

(a)
Azad Kashmir goes to Pakistan;

(b)
Praja Hindu movement area goes to India straightaway without a plebiscite; and

To these suggestions the Mussalmans, whether they are Nationalists or otherwise, are thoroughly opposed. On behalf of this section of people, it has been proved, and quite rightly, that Jammu province is a Muslim majority province. Therefore, the demand of certain Hindus that Jammu province should integrate with India without ascertaining the will of the people is a fallacy and questions the integrity and solidarity of the State. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehni had, of course, agreed that the indivisibility of the State will be maintained. But who knows, after Pandit Nehru, a weak Government at Delhi may give way to the demand of Hindu reactionary groups.

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Speaking on this matter Maulvi Saeed Masudi, the

General Secretary of the All-Jammu and Kashmir

National Conference, said in a speech in the Indian

Parliament on August

7,1952.

“The cry and slogan that Jammu and Ladakh were predominantly non-Muslim areas was fraught with grave danger. It was fantastic to suggest that the districts of Kashmir, being predominantly Muslim, should be kept apart from the districts of Jammu and Ladakh which were predominantly non-Muslim.”

Of course, the impression created by Hindu reactionaries that Jammu Province is a Hindu dominated province, is an enormous fallacy. That on this so-called basis, the province of Jammu should automatically integrate with India is a still bigger fallacy. That for this purpose the Jammu Hindus have elicited support from the Hindu reactionary parties in India is without any doubt. Pandit Nehru himself in the Indian Parliament on December 13, 1952 stated— “The leaders of the Praja Parishad have been in constant

touch with the leaders of some organizations in India, more specially in Punjab and in Delhi. A deputation of Praja Parishad workers had toured and is still touring Punjab and PEPSU endeavouring to enrol volunteers and setting up branches for this purpose at Amritsar, Jullundur, Ludhiana and the Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu. We have received information that the Praja Parishad collected some money in Punjab (I) and in Delhi. Also that rations and some arms and ammunition have been stocked by it.”

Large-scale American arms aid to India has changed the position substantially. India’s attitude towards Pakistan has become stiff. Any concession to Pakistan on any front by India seems unlikely. In Kashmir, India has in right earnest started its integration without caring for what Pakistan does in the matter.

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These factors, if considered in a cool manner, might affect the decisions of the Government of India on all matters of Indo-Pakistan relations. if India and Pakistan develop cordial relations and all disputes are amicably settled neither of the two countries need necessarily join any of the power blocs.

it will be seen that the possibility of the Security Council producing any solution of Jammu and Kashmir is getting remoter every day. It has already been aiscussed elsewhere that the method of approach to these problems by the Security Council is not that of a Court which can straightaway give a decision and decree en hearing both the parties. The main difficulty is that the Security Counci1 has the role of a negotiator and it has only to bring the parties together and put in best efforts to make them agree to a solution And, for achieving that solution the Security Council only produces certain formula to the respective Governments for their acceptance. This process of bringing out formulae and sending then to the Governments for their acceptance has already been carried on ad nauseum. Therefore, the effort of solving the Kashmir tangle through the Security Council does not seem to 1-told any prospects of success i believe, and it seems that the Security Council also believe, that much cannot now be achieved by further effort.

The possibility of a war between the States of India and Pakistan does not seem to be acceptable to any one at the moment.

In any case it will be a big disaster for the whole of Asia if there is an open conflict between India and Pakistan. Such a war will destroy the economic and political structure of both the countries. They may, in such eventuality, lose their freedom. No wise man, in either of the C0unthes, will advise his Government to come into an open conflict.

The question of Kashmir will have to be resolved. My view is that instead of bringing India and Pakistan into conflict with each other it is more desirable that the people of Kashmir should themselves struggle for their freedom, as has been done by the people of Algeria and by so many other

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people, particularly in Africa and Asia. The struggle of the people for their freedom will be more commendable for the world in general and for the people themselves. No freedom is worth anything and, indeed, it is no freedom at all, unless it is obtained at the cost of the very life blood of the people themselves. What I think the shape that this struggle may take is briefly narrated in the following lines.

It has now been established that during the last 15 years or so, Government of India has tried its best to rehabilitate the people of Kashmir economically and politically. This was done by consistent efforts by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. And, in fact, by delaying the plebiscite in Kashmir, his primary and principal object was to so rehabilitate the people there) economically and politically, that the demand for a plebiscite is finished. But, to his entire disappointment towards the last days of his life, Pandit Nehru was himself convinced that he had failed in his mission in Kashmir. India, in occupied Kashmir, has been facing political unrest and economic chaos. As a consequence of political unrest India had to put in prison hundreds of people including Sheikh Abdullah, the great leader of the people of Kashmir, for as long as a period of a decade. Since the release of Sheikh Abdullah from prison he is continuing his great fight against a foreign rule. Sheikh Abdullah has the backing, in his struggle of freedom, of all the people in Kashmir.

My plan for a future struggle in Kashmir would be as follows:-

(a)
Pakistan Government should completely absolve itself of all the responsibility of maintaining the cease-fire line in Kashmir. The reason is that, in 1949, the United Nations gave solemn guarantees to the people and the Government of Pakistan for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir, when a cease-fire agreement was reached between all concerned. It is now absolutely clear that the United Nations have failed to implement their promises. This, no doubt, has been due primarily to the attitude of the Government of India. But

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nevertheless, Pakistan government should now legitimately, tell the parties to that agreement that all have failed to implement their solemn promise of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir Therefore, Pakistan by herself is not morally or otherwise in a position to guarantee tin maintenance of the cease-fire agreement. If other agreements, which were supposed to follow the cease-fire agreement, have not been brought into being, it is useless to compel the people of Kashmir to be bound by the implication of cease-fire agreement, which, to them, is worth nothing. The people of Kashmir are still suffering a foreign domination and they are deprived of their freedom and liberty.

b)
After Pakistan Government have absolved themselves of their responsibility in the State, the people of Kashmir should be left to themselves to organize a movement of liberation on an all-State level. They should organize themselves systematically, making Azad Kashmir as a solid base for such a struggle. This struggle should be left to be pursued by the people of Kashmir and their leaders.

C)
Before such a struggle is launched, the Azad Kashmir Government should inform all the democratic countries in the world of the existing state of affairs in Kashmir. This Government, which should be an all-parties Government, should also undertake to get the assistance, moral, political and financial, from all democratic countries of the world. After this organisation is complete in all respects the people should launch a struggle for freedom.

What is happening in India today, one cannot fail to notice. India is a large semi-continent. It is inhabited by peoples of all colours and creeds, believing in different ideologies and living in different regions and having different

238

cultures. it is not possible, particularly, for a weak Government to keep these elements together in one united political nation. In India a disintegration process has already set in and it will continue. India may further be divided into different states. This process of disintegration proves that India cannot stand as one country. This one India theory has again exploded. If this is realised by the leaders of India and they adjust themselves accordingly, this will be good for India herelf and for all those countries who am its neighbours, ii, some day, a re-e)(amjnatjon of all the political and social problems of India takes place, this will be a healthy development They will have to conceive in this context, that Kashmir has a separate place in this sub-continent and cannot be made, by force, part of India.

Those who want to make Kashmir a part of India by dint of sheer force only wish to perpetuate an unnatural relationship, which would only end in tragedy for India and Pakistan and Kashmir,

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Chapter XXII

KASHMIR AS A COUNTRY

KASHMIR, a Land of magnificent beauty, with a great historical background, unfortunately did not get her freedom in 1947. Other parts of Indo-Pakistan sub-continent got their freedom. This freedom was obtained by offering sacrifices in human life and in all other ways. August, 1947, dawned on the sub-continent with a message of peace and happiness.

Kashmir had misfortunes instead of independence. Though a policy for accession was clearly laid down by the British panmountcy to guide the states. The states having a Hindu ruler and Hindu majority and contiguous to India had no option but to accede to India. This is a simple straight case which hardly needs any debate. Some of the States took very little time to decide to accede to India. This settled the fate of most of the States.

Three States, Hyderabad, Kashmir and Junagadh remained undecided. The Maharaja of Kashmir and Nizam of Hyderabad waivers for a tong time. Junagadh, however, took a wrong decision and decided to accede to Pakistan. in Junagadh the ruler was a Muslim Nawab and its population was mainly Hindu. The State was primarily contiguous to India. It should have gone to India. Later on India took the State by marching its troops into it. The Nawab ran away to Pakistan, leaving his Muslim su*ct in abject misery.

Hyderabad, at one time, could be bargained for Kashmir but that could not be achieved because of one mans intransigence. India, finally, grabbed Hyderabad also by marching its troops into it in September, 1948, when Quaid-e-Azam

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died. India took fullest advantage of this opportunity when a calamity fell on Pakistan.

Kashmir became a cause for dispute between India and Pakistan. Two wars were fought on Kashmir, one in 1947-1948, the other in 1965, without any outcome. The case was taken to the Security Council by India where Pakistan successfully fought back. A Commission then was appointed to bring about a plebiscite in Kashmir. A cease-fire and a truce agreement was achieved but stage for actual plebiscite was never reached. It was mainly due to India’s intransigence and Pakistan’s weaknesses. Forty years or so have gone by without any sight of deliverance of Kashmiri people from their slavery.

Both India and Pakistan have failed one way or other, to win over completely and unequivocally the people of Kashmir on both sides of the control line. Internal trouble in India - held Kashmir has been going on relentlessly for these forty years. While 6/7 divisions of the Indian Army and Mr force occupy the state by sheer force. No tangible local autonomy has been granted to people. Leaders have been put in prison. Sheikh Abdullah, the great leader of the valley of Kashmir, suffers in carceration as long as ten years in Indian prisons. India has little hope of wining over the people of the valley, because this Muslim population is so sentimentally inclined to Muslim Pakistan that India cannot change her attitude, no matter what it does for economic development of that part of the state. This situation is unlikely to change. The day is not far when India will have to concede a Sikh Land to the Sikhs and Kashmir will become out of reach for India. Pakistan has Gilgit and Ladakh province in the Northern areas of the state. These areas always had oppressive and autocratic rule. The people of this area got a historical importance when 500 miles long road was built to link China with Pakistan. This road and area have now assumed a strategic importance. The Gilgit and Ladakh people demand vehemently a self rule for themselves. This cannot be denied to them for a long time.

The Azad Kashmir now is ruled by Kashmir Affairs Ministry, a Council and one ejected Assembly. A Government is installed there through the assent and blessings of this

241

Ministry. Not much Stability has been achieved here through the years. Local leadership has not been able to rise to the heights which required to build fullest autonomy for Azad Kashmir, though with the efforts of these leaders an assembly, a Supreme Court and a High Court have been established. The Azad Kashmir has a national flag which is colourful and inspiring. All the elements that go to make a country, a self-supporting and dignified country, exist in Kashmir. Population of Azad Kashmir has increased to 3/4 million people, including the refugees settled there.

The population of the whole state has increased to a crore of people (Ten million). The area of Jammu and Kashmir is equal to Mysore, Travancore, Jaisairner and Bekanir put together. The area of the state is 84,000 square miles. This area is as big as five European countries put together. These countries of Europe are the members of UNO, so is Jibutee, in North Africa, with a population of 1/3 of a million.

Kashmir is as big as Pakistan itself minus the area of Baluchistan. Kashmir dispenses all river water to Pakistan for her magnificent irrigation system. Indus comes all the way from Baltistan via Gilgit. Jhelum, Chinab and Ravi all come from Kashmir state with heaven-sent advantages pouring shimmering volumes of water to make Pakistan a fertile and prosperous country. No less is the advantage of supply of Umber to Pakistan at comparatively cheap rates otherwise India would charge unthinkable prices for it.

The case of Kashmir to be treated as a country has become so potent that all serious thinkers believe that, may be, Kashmir problem can be so easily solved if this proposition is seriously debated and considered by all concerned.

By virtue of its area and population, Kashmir is a country as big as Switzerland. It is as beautiful as Switzerland. If Switzerland could be kept out of two World Wars, so can be Kashmir out of all conflicts. Kashmir can then be a Switzerland of the East. In that case both India and Pakistan can have access to this land without any visa restrictions, as it quite manageably happened from 1846 to 1946.

242

Both India and Pakistan can financially help to build the state in industry, forestry and irrigation system for its agriculture. Natural resources are in such abundance that outside help will not be necessary to manipulate its economy. Kashmir can become a viable country if its resources are fully developed and the present obstacles in its way are removed. It for experiment, all roads leading to Kashmir are opened by Pakistan and India, the feasibility of my proposal can be tested.

If a Sikhistan is conceded to the Sikhs, Kashmir’s case as a country will become clear. Both Pakistan and India, would be rid of a lot of intricate problems. Their mutual relationship would be on a more natural basis.

Kashmir again can be an effective buffer state between China, India and Pakistan, Afghanistan and Russia. Kashmir, of my thinking, would not keep an army, because it just would not be able to afford an army to defend its frontiers. U any country commits aggression, it will leave Kashmir soon after with a bitter experience.

All the above mentioned countries should come out to guarantee the neutral position of Kashmir, as it has been done in case of Switzerland. I am talking of something which may attract attention of alt serious statesmen in the sub-continent in time to come.

Kashmir can be a tourist spot for all countries. If Kashmir becomes easily accessible to all kind of tourists this can serve as a meeting place for all people from the World over. It will incidentally increase the revenues of the state beyond ones imagination. This will collect tremendous amount of foreign exchange also

Let us hope that, in time to come people will think in these terms. Let us pray for the day when all complications of Kashmir Will be settled for ever.

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Chapter XXIII

MUSLIM COUNTRIES AND KASHMIR

ON my way back from the Security Council, 1950, I had enough time to visit Turkey, Cyprus and Egypt, of all the Muslim countries, including Pakistan. Turkey, to my mind, is the most advanced from every point of view. One can see that the country has undergone a social, economic and political revolution. One is apt to form inaccurate impressions of the country if one visits only Istanbul and Ankara. The impressions may also be fallacious if one has been there only for a brief period. Even so, one can quite easily see that the people of Turkey have, in a number of fields, made extraordinary progress during the last twenty years or so. Turkey has profitable trade agreements with other countries. Strategically she is so placed, that her position is far from enviable. Because of her, at present, not having good relations with Soviet Russia, she has a hanging threat of Russian aggression. She controls tl~Dardanelles. Most of her finances are, therefore, spent on,J~er Defence. Every son of the soil is a soldier.

Turkey has made experiments with dictatorship, and has quite successfully passed through that phase, though Turkeys counterparts in Europe have not been able to do so. She is now experimenting with party-system of Government. I have no doubt that, with further advance- education, she will become one of the foremost countries in Asia in all respects, and probably may lead all Asian countries in establishing a democratic system of Government.

Turkey has a very good press. When I visited that country in February, 1950, most of the press belonged to the opposition. ULUS was the only Influential Government paper.

244

Turkey is vitally interested in Pakistan affairs. During my stay in that country, the Turkish press and people gave me a real welcome. I will not forget the hospitality and politeness of the people.

During my stay in Turkey, I lectured at a number of places and addressed a number of conferences. A lawyer from Ankara also used to attend these lectures with his little son who was hardly eight years old. When I left Ankara this child gave me a letter as a token of his love for the children of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir While leaving me at the station, this young child burst into tears. This goes to show how close the Turkish people are to us.

Turkey has managed her foreign policy wonderfully well, since the Turkish Republic come into being. She is placed in a difficult position because she holds a key position between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, In the context of the world power blocs of today, to keep neutrality for Turkey is not an easy game. In the last War she was able to do so. Whether she can dolt again in the next World War is a very big question.

We have very often been told, probably by interested people, that Turkey has gone un-Islamic. It is quite true that Turkey has undergone a social and political upheaval, but the people of Turkey are just as much Muslims as people anywhere In Pakistan. Nothing is farther from the truth than the assertion that Turkey is in any way going un-Islamic. I am told that In the educational system compulsory religious education has been introduced by the Government in Primary Schools. The Government has also a separate religious department for all religious matters. -

In the early days of the Turkish Revolution, there indeed

-was a reaction of indifference towards religion, because of political reasons. Mustafa Kamal Ataturk (which in Turkish means father of the Turks) did not like Turkey to be attached to countries, which, though Muslim in name, were in fact, pawns in the hands of the foreign powers. For Turkey, Kamal Ataturk wanted an independent national existence and a foreign policy

245

not tied to that of any other country. In such an attitude he was

quite justified from every point of view. -

Though just as Islamic as any other Islamic country, Turkey has got rid of a lot of old customs which tend to hamper the smooth progress of a people. In education, in social advancement and in political progress, Turks are in the front rank. Turkey had a foreign policy of complete independence till recently. She has no particular liking for becoming a member of a Muslim Block, nor, as matter of fact, any bloc in any other country. The reasons for such an attitude are historical and quite easily understandable But recently she has been compelled to cast away this policy.

My stay in Turkey was brief but in the three weeks that I stayed then I got enough press coverage. I was able to hold a number of conferences and meetings with the newsmen of Turkey. During these formal and informal talks, I was able to convince them, and through them the press and the people of Turkey, of the nature of Kashmir’s Liberation Movement. I was also able to tell them how the Kashmir people had been practically overpowered by India by sheer force of Arms. Of course, this matter was easier for me to do, because the Turks themselves are a people who heroically fought for their own liberty. They have to become stronger still to maintain their

own integrity and Independence

The Turkish papers also commented on the issue of Kashmir, even before my visit to that country, in a very liberal manner. They always support every cause of Pakistan, though the Indian Embassy in Turkey has always tried its best to put a different picture before the Turkish people. It must be said to the credit of the Turks that they are sufficiently educated and wide-awake to examine all matters closely before they form their judgement or views. This is exactly what we lack in this country. We go by gossip and baseless rumours. The people in Turkey are judicious enough to sift what is gossip and - what Is true.

Before I left Turkey I made it a point to visit most of the historical places In Ankara and Istanbul. In Istanbul,

246

particularly, I visited the old palaces of Turkey. These palaces, and the old relics they contain, remind one of the golden age when Muslims ruled over a large part of the world. One feels really proud of them.

After leaving Turkey, I visited Cyprus. Cyprus is a small Island in the Mediterranean, a very Important place from the strategic point of view. The majority of the population of this island Is Greek. The rest are Turks. The loyalties of the Turks are for Turkey and those of the Greeks, quite naturally, for Greece. The Turks wish to be linked with Turkey, while the Creeks seek union with Greece. This is the most vital question for the people of this island, which was, fill recently, governed by the British. The Turks of this Island have wide and deep syinpMhles for every Muslim cause.

When I visited Cyprus only for a day, I found the public very enlightened on the Kashmir question. The local Turkish papers gave a good coverage to my visit. A number of people came to receive me at the airport. I was their guest for a night and attended a concert there which was purely Turkish, and quite interesting for me, though I could not understand the words they spoke. In the morning when I was leaving for the airport, alter naming a baby in my honour, people crowded in the streets. One old man, as my car stopped, came to me and asked If I was the one whose picture had been published in the papers. He showed me the picture in the local papers which he hugged. To my saying, y& tears flowed through the stubs of his over-grown beard. These small things leave an indelible Impression on ones mind. This little island of Cyprus has been, after attaining- her Independence, a victim of a civil war, Which is still going on.

My next stop was in Egypt. I stayed in Cairo for a number of days. Cairo is the centre of all Middle East and Arab countries. It is also a holiday resort for European people. Perhaps it is one of the most cosmopolitan cities of the world. East and West meet here. In the hotels like ‘Semlramis,one finds European traveler as well as foreign diplomats. Along with this crowd one finds the Egyptian I’asha, immaculately dressed with a red fez on his head. Many of the Egyptians in Cairo speak French

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fluently. They also speak English, but not as well as they do French.

Egypt leads the Arab countries, though not quite effectively, through the Arab League. The Arab League in the beginning was an effective organ to plead the cause of Arab countries and all the Mussalmans. Today it has grown weaker. One only wishes that the Arab League were a completely free agency, and not, in any manner, influenced by any foreign power. With the coming into power of the Wafd Government in Egypt in 1948, it was expected that the Arab League would become a strong and independent organisation. The results have been quite the contrary: The new revolution which has taken place in Egypt is expected to change the whole situation. But one has to watch carefully what happens in Egypt, for it is certainly a danger spot in global strategy. She has always been wooed by Western powers because of her position. A suggestion in the form of Middle East Defence has already been put to Egypt for their consideration.

Egyptians and the Egyptian Government had sympathies with the Muslim cause of Kashmir. The Press undoubtedly accepted the case of Pakistan as the real truth about Kashmir. As long as the Wafd Government was in power, it always had a leaning towards Panda Nehru, because of a personal friendship between Panda Nehru and Mustafa Nihas Pasha, the Wafd Leader. The Press, and, in some respects the Government, nevertheless, supported the Pakistan case in Kashmir, though they were not very enthusiastic about it. The policy of the present Government vis-a vis Pakistan and the Kashmir problem, has not yet crystallized into something definite. From the present uncertain affairs, Egyptians will come to understand the Kashmir problem very well because the Sudan problem is similar to the Kashmir problem. -

It is necessary that there should be stability in Egypt in order to create stability in the Middle East. If Egypt is strong then the Muslim countries, jointly or separately, get strength. Since Egypt is a country of the Arabs, therefore the people of Pakistan have very deep sympathies and connections with the people of Egypt. In any case, Egypt is a country with thousands

248

of years of history behind it. People all over the world love to talk about Egypt. We hope that Egypt, after all its economic and political turmoils, will emerge as a strong and independent nation. In the context of present international politics, it is hardly possible for anyone of the Arab countries to lead a completely independent existence

As I have already mentioned to Egypt, Kashmir is another Sudan. Kashmir’s case regarding accession to Pakistan is exactly what Sudan is to Egypt. It was, therefore, very easy for me to put before the Egyptian Pressmen the Kashmir case. There are a number of Cairo Pressmen who have already been to India, Pakistan and And Kashmir. All of them have, naturally, sympathies for Pakistan. As far as the Kashmir case was concerned, it needed no logic to argue with the Egyptians. All of them had sympathies for us. They also appreciate the moral side of the case, though one has to admit that India is also trying her best to concentrate over her popularity in Egypt.

The majority of people in Egypt hive genuine sympathies for Pakistan. There are others who, like the deceased Shah Faruq, think that Pakistan is a rival country This is quite natural. But I am sure, by our consistent sympathetic attitude towards Egypt, and all other Muslim countries, such impressions will disappear in the long run. In due course of time all Muslim countries will be able to form into one united bloc, not necessarily a parallel political bloc, but an organisation based on regional ties and religious sympathies. Only then will Muslims, pulling in one direction as a united whole, be able to affect political and economic issues of the world. That seems to be the only way by which all the Muslims and Muslim countries of the world would not only maintain their independence but also would be able to fight for the other small nations of Asia.

India wishes to exert influence over Egypt in order to win her favour. I do not think India will succeed in this. India does not like the Arab League, because India disowns any bloc based on religious or any other racial basis. Egypt would like to be a leader of all Arab countries, which is a natural aspiration. Because

of Kashmir, Indo-Pakistan relations have been strained. A consistent propaganda has been carried on by India

249

in Egypt against Pakistan. In spite of her admiration for Hindu leaders for their struggle for freedom against the British, Egypt has always been on the side of Pakistan. One thing, however, has been exploited by the enemies of Pakistan. This has been the propaganda that Pakistan has been a deliberate creation of the British. Since Egyptians, because of the Sudan and the Suez Canal policy of the British, have not much liking for the British the above line of propaganda has done substantial damage to Pakistan’s cause. The way the Pakistan delegation took up the cause of Palestine has, to some extent, retrieved our position in all the Arab countries. Pakistan indeed played a very conspicuous role in the fight for Palestine in the United Nations Organisation. Pakistan later on earned for herself a lot of good-will, by espousing also the cause of the many small Muslim countries of North Africa in the United Nations.

I wish to say something, in passing, about Islam in Middle Eastern countries. I admit that I have no experience of wide travelling in these regions, and for this reason my impressions, may be wrong or based on scanty information and inadequate experience. My feeling is that Islam is not a very strong point with the Muslim countries today. Internal and external policies of the Middle Eastern countries are under the influence of big powers for the last two centuries or more. So long as foreign influences exist in the form of economic imperialism, Islam’s revival does not seem to be a very bright possibility. All the Asian countries have adopted, in one way or the other, the Western political systems. Because of Western domination of the Eastern countries for the last two to three hundred years, it becomes clear, that unless these countries revive economically, they are bound to succumb to foreign influences. Strategically countries like Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and also Pakistan, are so placed, that th a global war it would be a miracle for them to keep neutral. But that does not, necessarily mean a policy of surrendering a country’s sovereignty to a foreign power. One surely should have honourable alliances and trade and other relations, without which no modern country can exist.

Formation of an Arab League by itself is not a strong proof of Islamic revival. Islam as, a living economic, political and

250

social guide does not exist anywhere today. The Western type of democracy, in all its essentials, does not exist anywhere either. We are today living under a mongrel sort of system which is Western in character, and is imposed on people whom it does not suit. Unless we again apply Islamic values to solve our problems, we shall be faced with a psychological chaos and all round confusion. If we all agree on this, then no time should be wasted in applying them.

In order to overcome the economic bankruptcy of all the Middle Eastern countries, which has resulted in the economic dependence of an unprecedented nature, economic planning needs to be done afresh. Special conditions of these countries may be studied and a body of economic specialists be appointed to evolve a plan which should be implemented by mutual cooperation of the countries of these regions. Necessary cooperation of the U.N.O. may be obtained for economic emancipation, without surrendering political sovereignty to any particular bloc.

The Kashmir cause has been recognised by almost all the Muslim countries, except perhaps Afghanistan. All countries, for Instance, Iran, Iraq, Syria and others, have expressed their deep sympathies for Pakistan’s cause in Kashmir. Iran in particular, through her Press, has, in clearest terms, supported Pakistan in her struggle in Kashmir.

The writer of this little book has had the occasion of visiting a large number of countries, in 1964, as a member of the Kashmir Goodwill Mission. The writer visited West Africa and East Africa. He also visited Turkey, Egypt and Sudan. After these countries, the writer has had another occasion to visit large areas in South-East Asia. This included countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and Philippines.

African countries have gained their freedom at the expense of great sacrifices. They are emerging as independent nations, claiming full share in the comity of nations of the world. The emergence of independent states in Africa is a source of great inspiration to those countries which are struggling for freedom throughout the world, particularly in the areas which

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were formerly in colonial yoke. The writer was impressed the way in which this Goodwill Mission was received by the Governments and the people of these countries in Africa. This is also true of the countries in South-East Asia. It is hoped that these countries will support, morally and otherwise, a struggle that may be launched in Kashmir by its people. The writer is also convinced that the countries like China and Russia, who have always supported the struggle for freedom of the subjugated people in the world, will morally support such a struggle in Kashmir. These Communist countries must also be approached in this connection and informed of the existing state of affairs in this region. I am also not disappointed with Western democratic countries. Even they will be convinced of a struggle for freedom in Kashmir. Though they may not be able to give any substantial assistance, I am thoroughly convinced they will not oppose our struggle for freedom.

What is of basic importance is the fact that all concerned in India and Pakistan, recognise the entity of the people of Kashmir. They are a people who have always struggled for and suffered tremendously. in their struggle for freedom. All their efforts, to be free, must be supported as such. Nobody should have the idea that Kashmir can be had and owned as a piece of property. Those who have such ideas must abandon them. It will be unfair for anybody to think that Kashmir can be used as a piece of property. This is what the people of this land will not tolerate at any cost.

Then write a subtitle that expands on the information in the title

January 30, 2006--Fargo

Begin with a date and the city where the press release is issued, e.g. January 5, 2006--Fargo, N.D.

The first paragraph should sum up your announcement and mention every company or person involved.

Make the following paragraphs short and provide more detail. Include a quote or two from key people; each quote should start a new paragraph.

Your last paragraph is your "about" statement. It tells readers what your company is and what it does. If the press release includes a partnership with another company, include an "about" paragraph on it as well.

Conclude your press release with contact information.

KASHMIR - Today

Know your Background & Identify yourself.